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The aim of this investigation is to di scuss the merits of 
the three radically divergent views as to the nature and function 
of the categories held by Kant, ',card and Ilexander. 
The scope of the stufig is expressly limited to considerations 
and problems of a general nature with reference to the epistemo- 
logical categories. Consequently, if, as some maintain, there 
are categories unique to the several sciences, our discussion may 
be described as confined to the categories of Consciousness. It 
is, therefore, not directly concerned with such subsidiary problems 
as the number of the categories, or the status of unique categories 
in such snecial sciences as morality and aesthetics. 
These delimitations of the prbblem require no apology. 
They are justified on the methodological -Principle that the basic 
issues of a problem should be thoroufhìy investigated and clearly 
defined before embarking on subsidiary questions. 
This subject was suggested some years ago by the very 
cavalier treatment of a priori categories in most contemporary 
thought. The recent appearance (1) of several works giving explicit 
attention to the nature of the categories is a gratifying assurance 
that the problem is not a dead issue. 
The somewhat lengthy discussion of I ant is due (i) to the 
sharing of Professor Alexander's conviction "that with or after Plato 
(1) Clarence I.hewis Land and the World Order.Scribners.l929 
Studies in the Problem of Relations. Univ.of California 
publication in Philosonhy.1930 
..T. Whitehead, Process and Reality. Cambridge. 1929 
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there is nothing comparable in importance upon this subject with 
what mty be learned from him," (1) ,; (ii) Exposition of Kant must 
be supported by detailed and extensive evidence in view of the con- 
flicts of doctrine in the master himself, and the divergencies 
of interpretation among his expositors. 
In tracing the growth and development of the Kantian 
theory of categories in the seventies, the dating of the Reflexionen 
by Adickes in the Berlin edition is assumed as authoritative. 
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CHAPTER I. 
THE INAUGURAL DISSERTATION AND LETTER TO HERZ. 
Introduction 
With the possible exception of some Reflexionen, the term "category" 
is used for the first time by Kant in his Letter to Herz 1772. 
"While in this way I was searching out the sources of 
intellectual knowledge, tithout which we cannot determine 
the nature and limits of Metaphysic, I succeeded in making 
a distinct division of the parts of this science: and I 
sought further to gather Transcendental Philosophy, or, in 
other words all the notions of pure understanding into a 
certain number of Categories. Nor did I follow the manner 
of Aristotle, who simply set them down one after another 
as they occurred to him in his ten Predicaments, but I 
arrived at a systematic classification determined by a 
few fundamental principles. Without, however, going into 
any further detail, I may say that the essential part of 
my task is now done, and that I am in a position to lay 
before the public a Criticism of Pure Reason, which ex- 
plains the nature of truth both theoretical and practical, 
insofar as it is derived purely from the intelligence: 
and I expect to complete and publish the first part of 
this system, containing an account of the sources of Meta- 
physic, its methods and its limits, within about three 
months." 
The Letter gives no precise connotation to the term '"category ", 
but the context indicates that Kant considers he has made a signifi- 
cant discovery, and the terminology "category" and "transcendental 
philosophy" are introduced to give it expression. To appreciate the 
significance of this discovery it is necessary to sketch the develop- 
ment of Kant's thinking up to the year 1772. 
. Kant's Mental History Prior to the Inaugural Dissertation. 
Kant's philosophical development prior to 1772 exhibits three 
stages. 
"In the first period of his career he was still 
under the general influence of the \Volffian rationalism, 
attempting only to modify it in such a way as to make 
room for the mechanical conception initiated by Newton. "(1) 
This is the aim of The Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, 
the Monadologica Physics and the Dilucidatio Nova, of 1755. 
The second stage comprises several short treatises written 
between 1762 and 1766: - The False Subtilty of the Four Syllogis- 
tic Figures; The Sole Ground for F Demonstration of the Existence 
of God; On the Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and 
Morals; An Attempt to Introduce the Conception of Negative Quantity 
into Philosophy; The Dreams of a Ghost -Seer illustrated by the 
Dreams of Metanhysic. This stage exhibits an incre :sing dissatis- 
faction with Wolffien rationalism and an empirical trend not untinged 
with scepticism. In broad outline its doctrine may be summkrized 
as follows: - 
(1) Objective and real knowledge is synthetical 
(2) Synthetical knowledge depends on experience 
(3) Since the movement of pure thought is analytical and 
proceeds according to the Law of Contradiction, it is impossible 
to pass directly from thought (concepts) to existence. Consistency 
alone does not guarantee the objective reality of concepts. The re- 
lation of ground and consequent in óure notions must be distinguished 
from existential 'position'. 
(4) The method of mathematics must be distinguished from that 
of metaphysics. Mathemrtictl procedure is not mere analysis of defini- 
(1) E. Caird. The Critical Philosophy of Kant. Vol. I. n.104 
tions. 
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"All advance in mathematical knowledge is effected 
by the help of and through an appeal to some real factor 
in experience v.hich Kant was as yet unable thoroughly to 
determine. Negatively it could be said that it is not 
identical with the isolated empirical perceptions; for 
by their help no explanation could be given of the generali- 
ty and universality of a mathematical statement. On the 
other hand, the presence of this factor made a difference 
of kind between propositions in mathematics and proposi- 
tions resulting from an analysis of pure notions... "(1) 
(5) The knowledge of causal relations is synthetical and 
a posteriori. 
"The fundamental conceptions of things as causes and of 
their forces End actions are c;uite arbitrary when not taken 
from experience, and apart from experience we can neither 
prove nor disprove them." (2) 
The implications of these premises might seem not only to 
involve a breech with rationalism, but to commit Kant to a posi- 
tion little different from that of Hume. Consequently, it is 
easy to mistake the strongly marked rationalistic position of the 
Inaugural Dissertation as a violent volte face, unless it be realised 
(a) that even throughout his empirical trend 
"Kant never abandoned his private convictions as to 
the truth and value of metaphysics: nor was he ever at- 
tracted by mere empiricism." (3) 
(b) That the Reflexionen assigned to the years 176c -9 by Adickes 
indicate a natural transition to the position of the Inaugural 
Dissertation. Evidence for this statement will be incorporated 
(1) Adamson. The Development of Modern Philosophy. p.153 
(2) Hartenstein. Werke. Vol.II.p.378: Cf.Kant's Schriften 
Berlin.ed. Band XVII Reflexionen 3728 
(3) Ward, Study of Kant. ID. 29 note and references. Cf.also 
Letter to Lambert (1765) cited by Caird op.cit.144 -5 
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in the following analysis of the Inaugural Dissertation. 
II. The Inaugural Dissertation. 
The Inaugural Dissertation is the third phase of Kant's mental 
history prior to 1772. Kant in retrospecting on his mental develop- 
ment says: 
"Before the Disputation (i.e. the Dissertation) I had 
already got an idea of the influence of the subjective 
conditions of knowledge upon our knowledge of objects. 
This was soon followed by the discovery of the distinction 
of the sensible from the intellectual conditions. As yet, 
however, this distinction was viewed by me merely on its 
negative side." (1) 
In the Inaugural Dissertation this distinction between the 
intellectual and the sensitive conditions of knowledge is explicit- 
ly formulated, and the history of Kant's theory of categories is 
its subsequent development. This doctrine involves no startling 
breach of continuity with his previous works. It is but the epis- 
temological counterpart of the philosophical dualism held by Kant 
in the early sixties. 
"Sven at this time he had the two worlds, the world in 
space and time, and the non -spatial, timeless world, each 
with its own laws. But for the latter, in which he never- 
theless believed, he could find no principle of construc- 
tion The little essay on the nature of Space of the 
year 1768 shows how Kant's...thought was resolving about 
this problem." (2) 
The characteristics of Sensibility and Rationality as defined 
by the Inaugural Dissertation require detailed analysis. 
. SENSIBILITY 
"Sensibility is the receptivity of the subject through 
which it is possible that its power of representation should 
be affected in a certain manner by the presence of some 
(1). 5015 
(2). Paulsen. Immanuel Kant 94. Cf.A.damson op.cit. pp.153,155 
who holds that the antithesis of sense and intellect was 
forced upon Kant by problems arising from a consideration 
of the nature of space and time. 
5 
object." (Par. 3). 
Its object is the sensible (phenomena). 
Things sensitively apprehended are representations of 
things as they appear. 
In sensitive knowledge, we can distinguish between the 
Matter i.e. sensation, an affection of the senses, and Form 
"an internal principle of the mind through which 
various impressions may take on a certain form according to 
stable and innate laws." (Par.4). 
Form here refers to the intuitions of space and time further 
expounded in Section 2, par. 12; and Section 3. Noteworthy in this 
connection is the fact that the Dissertation teaches that the form 
of sensible apprehension is itself ccpable of ordering the manifold, 
whereas the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason shows that the 
cooperation of the categories is necessary for ordering the manifold. 
It would seem that Kant made little advance upon his earlier 
views of space and time until he published his pamphlet On the First 
Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space. (1763). In this work 
Kant drew attention to certain facts which favoured the Newtonian as 
against the Leibnizian view of space. The Newtonian view, however, 
was beset by serious metaphysical difficulties, and the Reflexionen 
of 1769 indicate considerable preoccupation with the problems of space 
and time, which finally resalt in the views of the Dissertation, Each 
of the five characteristics ascribed to space and time in the Disserta- 
tion is anticipated by the Reflexionen of 1769. Thus s - 
(1) The ideas of space and time do not originate in the senses. 
3930 explicitly asserts this, but terms space and time "notiones 
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rationales ", "conceptus intellectus puri ", and groups them with 
Existence, Possibility, Necessity, Ground, Unity, etc. Cf. 4077 
and the Reflexionen auoted below. 
(2) The ideas of space and time are singular not general. 
"The concept of Time is a singular concert. "...4071. Cf.3955 -6. 
(3) Space and Time are pure intuitions. 
In 3955 the expression "conceptus singulares" is used synonymously 
with "intuitus puri" and explicitly contrasted with pure concepts of 
Reason. 
According to 3957 "We have a twofold form of knowledge viz. 
the intuitive and rational. The first occurs only in the immediate 
knowledge of particular things; the second in general presentations: 
the first I call intuiting, the second concepts of reason.... 
The form of appearances depends solely on space and time, which 
arise through no senses or sensation, but depend on the nature of the 
mind, according to which the different sensations can be presented 
in these relations. Consequently, ... the concept of space and time 
is a pure concept of intuition. (Italics mine). 
In_ 4072, Space is termed an "intuitive presentation ". 
According to 4073, "Spatium et tempus sunt conceptus intellectus 
puri. Notiones metanhysicae Bunt conceptus rationis nurse." 
(4) Time is a continuous quantum. 
This is laid down as far back as 1766. "Lex continuitatis mathematics 
est: Spatium et tempus sunt continua." 3801. 
(5) Space and time are not objective and real. 
So 3953... "but whether a thing is in space or not is subjective, since 
the content of Space is not objective." 
And again, 4077 "Both space and time are subjective conditions according 
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to which alone objects can be given to the senses. To consider 
them as objective would be absurd." 
In 3950 and 4191 this statement is qualified by the addition 
that space "is quite real with respect to outer appearances, since 
it is their condition." 
INTELLIGENCE (rationality) 
"Intelligence is the faculty of the subject through 
which it is able to represent things which cannot by their 
own characters act upon the senses." Par.3. 
In Par. 5 Kant distinguishes a twofold use of the intellect. 
"By the first use, the very concepts of objects or of 
relations are given through the very nature of the intellect, 
not abstracted from any use of the senses, and do not contain 
any form of sensitive cognition as such". Par. 7. 
This is the real use. 
"By the second use, concepts, whensoever given, are only 
subordinated to one another, the lower to the higher (the 
common marks), and compared with another according to the 
principle of contradiction: and this is called the logical use. 
The logical use of the intellect is common to all sciences but 
not the real use." Par. 5. 
"No matter to what extent the logical use of intellect has 
been exercised upon sensitive cognitions, they are still to be 
considered sensitive... They do not become intellectual in the 
real sense by being brought to a greater universality and so 
pass out of the class of sensitive knowledge. However high 
they ascend by way of abstraction, they always remain sensitive." 
Par.5. 
The science appropriate to the reel use of intellect is ì;'etaohysics. 
"Since then, no empirical principles are to be found in meta- 
physics, the concepts there met with are not to be looked for in 
the senses, but in the very nature of pure intellect, not as con- 
cepts CONNATE to it, but as abstracted (by attention to its 
actions on the occasion of experience) from laws inborn in the 
mind, and so to this extent as acquired. Concepts of this sort 
are possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc. 
with their opposites or correlates. These never enter into any 
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sensual representation as parts of it, and could not, there- 
fore, in any wise he abstracted therefrom. " Par. 8. 
This reel use of the intellect requires further consideration. 
Firstly , Kant makes a distinction between "laws inborn in the 
mind" and the concepts abstracted therefrom. The distinction raises 
considerable difficulties, but it seems impossible to interpret the 
text otherwise. The passage just quoted from Paragraph S quite de- 
finitely makes the distinction. Again in Paragraph 23 the same dis- 
tinction appears when Kant says 
"For since the right use of reason here (i.e. in Metaphy- 
sics) establishes the principles themselves, and since only 
by virtue of its own powers do the objects and axioms which 
are to be thought about them first become known, the exposi- 
tions of the laws of pure reason is the very beginning of 
the science...." 
In Paragraph 15 - though Kant is here discussing the "singular 
concepts" of space and time - the distinction is again made when he 
speaks of 
"the concepts acquired, as abstracted...from the action 
of the mind in coordinating its sense according to unchanging 
laws Nothing is here connate save the law of the mind, 
according to which it combines in a fixed manner the sense . 
produced in it by the presence of the object." (Italics mine). 
Tempting though it may be to identify the concepts with the 
"laws of the mind" in these passages, the language used quite de- 
finitely precludes it. If, however, these concepts are abstracted 
by attention to the actions of the mind. on the occasion of experience, 
the "laws inborn in the mind" would seem to suffice for rendering ex- 
perience possible. This, indeed, is eventually recognised by Kant in 
his doctrine of categories. 
Secondly, a very difficult question of interpretation occurs 
with respect to the function of these concepts, to which Kant very 
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briefly alludes in Paragraph 9. 
"The concepts of understanding have in especial two 
functions (a) In their critical use they perform the negative 
service of keeping sensitive concepts from being applied to 
noumena. Though they advance knowledge not at all, they yet 
keep it free from contagion of errors. (b) In their dogmatic 
use, the general principles of pure understanding, such as are 
dealt with in ontology or rational psychology issue in some 
exemplar which is conceivable only by pure intellect end is the 
common measure of all other things as far as real." 
The functions assigned to the pure intelligible concepts in 
this passage, are in the Critique ascribed to the Ideas. Consequent- 
ly, when we find the pure intelligible concepts and real use of Rea- 
son thus reduced to a regulative status, the knowledge of things 
as they are becomes an empty phrase. Furthermore, since 
"the use of the understanding in reference to (phenomena) is 
not real but only logical," Paragraph 12 
it would seem that the "pure concepts" of possibility, existence, sub- 
stance, cause etc. with their opposites or correlates (Paragraph 8) 
are precluded from exercising any function in connection with phenomena. 
Nonetheless these concepts are quite explicitly referred to phenomena 
in the Dissertation e.g. "We coordinate alike substance and accidents... 
only through the concept of time." (Paragraph 14). 
"Above all when the intellect is applied to experience 
through the relation of cause and effect ".... (Paragraph 15). 
Again, the connection of these concepts with phenomena seems 
sanctioned by the passage in the Letter to Herz (1772) in which Kant 
is criticising this very doctrine of the usus realis intellectus. Al- 
though I fail to see how these two views on the function of the con- 
cepts of the understanding can be reconciled it is difficult to imagine 
how Kant could have been the victim of such an obvious contradiction. 
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We are consequently compelled to look for some tacit qualification - 
unmentioned in the Dissertation - Which seemed to him to free his 
apparently conflicting statements from inconsistency. 
There are two possibilities in this connexion 
(1) Professor Adamson suggests that we must contemplate a twofold 
consideration of any such notion as cause and effect. 
"On the one hand it appears in the work of pure understand- 
ing as expressing a relation of dependence of pure transcendent 
non -empirical objects: on the other hand it must appear some- 
how (Kant in the Dissertation makes no reference to it) in 
regard to the operations by which, through sense perception 
and the logical use of the intellect, our knowledge is built 
up." (1). 
A hint of this view may perhaps be contained in 
"Certainly, according to the laws of pure intellect every 
series of effects has its assignable ground of existence, 
while according to the laws of sensibility every series of 
coordinates has an assignable beginning." (2). 
(2) A second possibility is that Kant conceived the usus realis 
intellectus to be strictly confined to Metaphysics, and regarded the 
application of pure concepts to phenomena as falling within the pro- 
vince of the logical use of intellect. Thus e.g. a particular in- 
stance of two phenomena A - B is subordinated under the pure concept 
of causality as a particular is subordinated to its appropriate uni- 
versal in formal logic, and the pure concept thus applied becomes an 
empirical concept. 
I do not maintain that I can conclusively prove this hypothesis, 
but I would submit the following evidence in its favour. 
(1) op. ci t. P. 161 
(2) Dissertation , par.28 
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That the relation of the concept of understanding to its object v,ould 
be naturally regarded by Kant as that of universal to particular (and 
hence as coming under the logical use of intellect) is evident from the 
unfortunate persistence of this view even in the developed category 
theory of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
It offers an explanation of the "somehow" of Kant's dual use of the 
concepts of cause etc. which is forced upon us by the Dissertation 
and Letter to Herz. 
It receives support from many Reflexionen of 1769. In interpreting 
these Reflexionen it is important to be precise with regard to the 
connotation of Metaphysics since the pure concepts in question are 
metaphysical concepts. 
"Metaphysics is a philosophy concerning the concepts of the 
intellectus Puri. (3930). 
"It is a science of the ground concepts and basic laws of 
human reason." (3946). 
Metaphysics is explicitly distinguished from; - (a) Logic which 
is analytical and merely concerned with the arrangement of concepts im- 
mediately or mediately according to the Law of Contradiction, and does 
not concern itself with the origin and source of its concepts. (3944; 
3946; 3949). (b) Ontology:- 
"Metaphysics is not ontology, which is falsely regarded as 
a science of things in general quoad praedicata universalia et 
disjunctiva." 
"Metaphysics; other philosophy : : mathesis pura : mathesis 
apnlicata "43930; 3988; 4168). 
Metaphysics is thus a critique of the origin and limits of know- 
ledge, its first principles and basic concepts. But though it is con- 
cerned with the form of knowledge, the Reflexionen quite definitely 
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assume that its concepts mingle with phenomena. 
"The ideas and roles of reason are also used in 
relations of empirical concepts, and this is their n2tural 
and rightful use, etc. " 3932. 
"Metaphysics however contains the rules without which 
we could not know objects (3949 1.27). Cf. 3938. 
"Metaphysics shows the origin of the universal concerts, 
to which all knowledge must be referred, if appearances 
are to be transformed by concepts." (3946). 
It remains to justify the further statement that a pure con- 
cept when applied to phenomena is regarded as empirical. 
"In like manner sensations and appearances made general 
are not pure but empirical concepts of reason; if however 
one abstracts all influence of the senses there remains pure 
concepts of reason, e.g. possibility, substance,etc.... 
(3957. Italics mine). Cf. 3958; 3961. 
"All concepts are either sensible or rational. The first 
are either of sensation or of these have as basis 
the forms of space and time. The second can not be discovered 
through an analysis of experience - although all experience is 
coordinate with them - and are pure rational concepts if no 
object of experience is thought by them. If however this 
occurs they are empirical concepts. "....(3974, italics mine). 
It may be said that this interpretation of the metaphysical con- 
cepts conflicts with the following passage of the Dissertation 
"These never enter into any sensual representation as parts 
of it, and could not, therefore, in any wise be abstracted 
therefrom." Paragraph 8. 
Kant, however, is here explicitly concerned to show that the source 
and origin of the pure concepts lies in the nature of reason itself 
and that they cannot be deduced from any sensual representation through 
mere abstraction. There is therefore no conflict with the foregoing 
exposition which is not maintaining that the pure concepts can be 
derived by abstraction from any sensual representation, but is concerned 
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to show how these concepts, though not discoverable through an 
analysis of experience, can function for the purposes of experience. 
3. CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE DISSERTATION AND REFLEXIONEN OF 1770 
(1) One of the most outstanding features of the Dissertation is the 
sharp distinction between the formal concepts of the understanding 
and objects given in sensation. It is not long before Kant realises 
the difficulties of such unmediated opposition, and as a result 
formulates the most difficult but most significant problem of his 
philosophy viz. how can pure concepts which have their source in the 
soul agree with objects of experience? (1) 
(2). The Reflexionen of 1769 -1770 show that Kant recognised the 
pure metaphysical concepts to be synthetical though subjective: - 
"All rational synthetic principles are subjective, and 
only the analytic are objective. nrincinia ider_titatis et 
contradictionis. 
The synthesis of reason (rational) or of experience 
(empirical). 
The first are either of coordination: whole and part, 
number and unity; or of subordination , ground and consequent. 
The second of coordination according- to space and time." 
(3935) 
"The logical form of our knowledge must be distinguished 
from the metaphysical; the first is analysis, the second 
synthesis." (3944). 
"The rational science of synthetic knowledge and judgments 
is metaphysics." (3974). 
Compare also 3950; 3996. 
(3). The distinction of the Dissertation between the "leges menti 
insitae" and the concepts abstracted therefrom is untenable. For 
the developed category theory, the categories are themselves Ver - 
standes gesetze and there are no more ultimate principles from which 
(1) Cf. infra. nar.4 Letter to Herz. 
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they can be derived. Consequently "attention to the actions 
of the mind on the occasion of experience from laws inborn in 
the mind" can no longer suffice to account for their origin. 
(4). The scepticism of Kant's later thinking with regard to know- 
ledge of things in themselves, ipso facto disposes of the difficult 
doctrine of the 'real use of intellect'. The 'logical use' of 
intellect becomes a 'real use° in the sense that the categories 
are sine quibus non of all possible objects of knowledge. 
(5) With his results to date, Kant's penchant for Systematik 
finds scone in primitive efforts to draw up a table of pure concepts : - 
"The basic rational concepts whereby alone the sensible 
qualities of things can be explained are in outer objects 
Space, Time, Movement. In inner: f 1. The immediate presen- 
tation of Present, Past and Future. 2.,Comp_ arison, Difference, 
Unity. 3. Relation (logical) of connection and oppositiOn. 
4. Consciousness, Judgments, Conclusions. B 1. Feeling, 
Pleasure, Displeasure. 2. In relation to the judgment of 
understanding or of the senses. C. Desire, etc. 
Through the nature of understanding not abstrahendo 
but iudicando there arise concerts of synthesis. Existence, 
Possibility, Unity, Substance, Accident, Relation, Respectus 
realis, Logicus, Necessity, Contingency, Whole, Part, Simple, 
Composite, Ground, Consequent, Force, Cause." (3927). 
This conglomeration of "the inner" at first sight appearsto be 
without any guiding principle of classification. Closer inspection, 
however, would seem to reveal a crude attempt at division on the 
basis of faculties. It is scarcely necessary to add that the 
"iudicando" here implies no consciousness of the "clue" to the de- 
duction of the categories- that categories are functions of judgment. 
A less unsystematic classification of concepts which confines 
itself to the "conceptus intellectus puri" claims to be based on the 
laws of understanding in comperison,conjunction and separation.(3930). 
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These principles of classification are further qualified 
by a subdivision on the basis of coordination and subordination: - 
"Metaphysical concepts arise 1. Merely through coordina- 
tion: (absolute and relative, Whole, part, continuum, discre- 
tum)(multiplicity) singularity, totality (first,last, a singu- 
lar) 2. or through subordination in the logical understanding: 
universal or particular 3. through subordination in the 
real understanding; ground, consequence, cause, effect. 4. 
Existence: necessity contingency (possible) 5. Substance 
(subject, predicate) Simple composite" (3941). Cf. also 
3935; 3976; 4155. 
As Adickes points out if one disregards the bracketed words 
the later categories of Quantity can be detected in (1) and (2); 
of Relation in (3) and (5); of Quality and Modality in (4). (1). 
It would appear then that by this time Kant had already con- 
ceived or was on the verge of discovering the basis of classifying 
the categories "through some few basic laws of the understanding" 
mentioned in the Letter to Herz (1772) 
IV. THE LETTER TO HERZ 
Commentators differ in their estimates of Kant's philosophi- 
cal position indicated in the Letter to Herz. 
Caird maintains that at this time the great problem of the 
Critique - how conceptions, which are not due to experience should 
yet be conceptions to which experience must conform was already oc- 
cupying the attention of Kant. 
Haering contends (2) that two essential modifications of the 
Dissertation had already "dawned" upon Kant at the time of the Letter. 
(1) The relation between sensibility and intellect is changed. 
W.Adickes' Systematik p.22 
(2) Der Diusburg'sche Nachlass und Kant's Kriticismus um 1755. 
p.121 
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They are no longer set in absolute opposition but are regarded 
as complementary for knowledge of objects. (2) Our intellectual 
knowledge so far as it can claim objectivity is limited to pheno- 
mena. If these contentions can be established, it will follow 
that the term "category" used in the Letter implies the essentials 
of its "critical" connotation, and that the Letter is an announce- 
ment of a significant advance in Kant's mental history. 
Professor Kemp Smith on the other hand contends 
"that in 1772 there was no real problem for Kant. 
The assumed fact, that our representations are generated 
in us by the action of independent existences, is taken 
as sufficient explanation of their being referred to 
objects." (1) 
But surely the Letter does not warrant us in supposing 
that Kant made any such assumption. Kant says 
"If the representation contains only the mode in 
which the subject is affected by the object" or 
on the other hand "if the object itself were produced 
by the representation ", 
the conformity of representations with objects might be 
understood. Neither case applies to us. 
"Our understanding (leaving moral ends out of account) 
is not the cause of the object through its representations, 
nor is the object the cause of its intellectual represen- 
tations (in sensu reali)". 
Kant, it should be noted, also states that this problem was 
not even raised in the Dissertation. 
"In the Dissertation I was content to explain the nature 
of these intellectual representations in a merely negative 
manner, viz. es not being modifications of the soul produced 
by the object. But I silently passed over the further question.., 
(1) Kemp Smith, N. A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason. pp. 206 -7 
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how such representations, which refer to an object 
and yet are not the result of an affection due to that 
object, can be possible. I had maintained that the sense 
representations represent things as they appear, the 
intellectual representations things as they are. But how 
then are these things given to us, if not by the manner in 
which they affect us? And if such intellectual representa- 
tions are due to our own inner activity, whence comes the 
agreement which they are supposed to have with objects, 
which yet are not their products? How comes it that the 
axioms of pure reason about these objects agree with the 
latter, when this agreement has not been in any way assisted 
by experience ?" 
These quotations together with the fact that Kant has 
reflected sufficiently to perceive the metaphysical implications 
of the problem, show clearly that he had become quite cognisant 
of its difficulties, and that no such superficial explanationsas 
those mentioned in the passage of the Letter could satisfy him. 
So far from indicating that there was here no real problem for 
Kant, the purport of the Letter is to show that there is e problem 
which has never been previously grasped; the solution of which will 
be given in a promised work entitled a Criticism of Pure Reason. 
That Kant must have had some solution of the problem in mind dif- 
ferent from any previously offered by him, is indicated by the op- 
timism attending his announcement of this work. Were he still con- 
fined to the Dissertation stage, it seems inconceivable that he 
would launch a work upon the public which claimed "to explain the 
nature of truth both theoretical and practical, and to define the 
method, sources, and limits of metaphysics ", when he himself in this 
letter expresses dissatisfaction with the Dissertation on a problem 
which is termed the "whole secret of metaphysic." 
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Professor Kemp Smith also contends that in the Letter 
it is the validity of a priori concepts to things in themselves 
that is under consideration. If this were so, Kant would still be 
virtually at the Dissertation stage and no special significance can 
be attached to the term category. There are two arguments which 
may be offered in sunport of this interpretation: - Firstly, the 
passage of the Letter which runs 
"But when we ask how the understanding can form to 
itself completely a priori concepts of things in their qualita- 
tive determination, with which these things must of neces- 
sity agree, or formulate in regard to their possibility 
princinles which are independent of experience, but with 
which experience must exactly conform,- we raise a ques- 
tion, that of the origin of the agreement of our faculty 
of understanding with the things themselves, over which 
obscurity still hangs." 
Secondly, the Prolegomena passage 
"I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was 
the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted 
my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field 
of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." (1) 
As Professor Kemp Smith points out 
"The essential difference between the Treatise 
and the Enquiry, from the standpoint of their bearing 
upon Critical issues, lies in the wider scope and more 
radical character of the earlier work. The Enquiry 
discusses the problem of causality only in the form 
in which it emerges in narticular causal judgments, 
i.e. as to our grounds for asserting that this or that 
effect is due to this or that cause. In the Treatise, 
Hume raises the broader question as to our right to 
postulate that events must always be causally deter- 
mined. In other words, he there questions the validity 
of the universal causal principle, that whatever begins 
to exist must have a cause of existence; and he does so 
on the explicit ground that it dëmands as necessary the 
connecting of two concepts, that of an event and that of 
an antecedent cause, between which no: connection of any 
kind can be detected by the mind. The principle, 
that is to say, is not self- evident; it is synthetic."(2) 
(1) Prolegomena. Intro.p.7 
(2) Commentary. D. xxvi 
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In this discussion the crucial question is, to which of 
Hume's wor''As, the Enquiry or the Treatise, does the "awakening" 
refer? There is strong evidence that Kant had not himself 
read the Treatise, but had become acquainted with it through the 
excerpts in Beatties' Essay on the Nature and Immortality- of Truth. 
That Kant had read this work in the original is improbable, owing 
to his imperfect knowledge of English (1). The German transla- 
tion of Beatties' Essay did not appear until Easter 1772 i.e. 
after the Letter to Herz was written. If then the "awakening" 
refers to the argument of the Treatise, it must have taken place 
some time after Easter 1/72. This of course would be conclusive 
evidence against our interpretation of the Letter as signalling 
"a quite new direction to Kant's investigation." 
With reference to the first of these arguments it appears to 
me that close inspection of the actual wording and general context 
of the passage from the Letter under consideration, is unfavourable 
to Professor Kemp Smith's interpretation. The expression used is 
"Bingen selbst". The usual expression to denote "things in them- 
selves" is "Dingen an sich ". The context requires the reflexive 
pronoun and "Dingen selbst" is simply the "GegenstYnde selbst" of 
e.g. Reflexionen 5553. 
Again if "Dingen selbst" denotes "things in -themselves" then 
the expression "But with which experience must exactly conform" 
must be interpreted as "experience of things in themselves." But 
(1) Commentary n. xxviii. Note 3. 
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here again even philological considerations make this highly impro- 
bable; for it is our faculty of understanding that is under considera- 
tion, and Verstandesbegriffe denote a reference to the sensible. (1). 
In regard to the second argument - the Prolegomena passage - 
its whole significance depends on the precise reference of Kant's 
"Erinnerung ". Professor Kemp Smith favours the view that the medium 
of the "awakening" was Beatties' Essay. He suggests that 
"Kant's employment of the term 'Erinnerung' may perhaps 
be interpreted in view of the indirect source of his knowledge 
of Hume's main position. He would bring to his reading of 
Beatties' quotations the memory of Hume's other sceptical 
doctrines as expounded in the Enquiry." (2) 
It is admitted, however, that 
"we cannot be absolutely certain that it was not a re- reading 
of the Enquiry or a recalling of its argument that suggested 
to Kant the central problem of his Critical Philosophy."(3). 
In favour of the latter it should be noted that both in the Prolego- 
mena and in the passage of the Critique of Practical Reason (4), 
in which Kant again acknowledges his debt to Hume, Kant asserts that 
the "awakening" was due to Hume's sceptical treatment of causality. 
His own contribution was the generalisation of the problem and its 
extension to other concepts of similar status. Now the Letter to 
Herz indicates that this generalisation had already taken place. 
The passage in the Critique of Practical Reason throws no further 
light on the point at issue other than to show the importance of 
deciding whether the "Dingen selbst" of the Letter means "Dingen 
an sich ". For Kant here explicitly states that the key to his solu- 
(1) Cf. Haering op.cit. p. 136. 
(2) Commentary xxx note. 
(3) Commentary p. xxviii. 
(4) Critique of Practical Reason. Par.170 
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tion of Fume's sceptical position was the realisation that "objects 
of experience" wes not things in themselves but phenomena. 
The only remaining source of evidence for deciding whether 
Kant's "awakening" took place before or after the writing of the 
Letter to Herz is the Reflexionen around 1772. And I would submit 
that they furnish conclusive evidence that Kant's "awakening" had 
already occurred before 1772, and that the Letter indicates a signi- 
ficant advance in his philosophical development. The following 
points are relevant in this connexion: - 
(1) The nature and function of metaphysics is restricted in ac- 
cordance with Critical principles. 
"The use of Metaphysics with respect to the theoretical is 
merely negative. It does not reveal the knowledge of things 
and is not dogmatic, for how could we obtain knowledge of 
things without the senses Metaphysics merely prevents a 
false use of reason, which would overstep its limits and 
consider intellectualia as objects; hence it serves only 
with reference to the modo cognoscendi of sensitive dabilium 
and its limits...:'(4445) Cf. 4459. 
(2) The problem of the agreement of a priori concepts and objects 
is clearly defined. 
"The question arises how can we present to ourselves 
things entirely a priori i.e. independent of all experience, 
and how can we grasp basic principles, not borrowed from ex- 
perience and therefore a priori? How comes it about that 
what is merely a product of our soul should correspond with 
objects and that objects are subjected to such laws? That 
there actually is such a priori knowledge is evident from 
pure mathematics and metaphysics; but it is. important to 
investigate the ground of its possibility:...(4473) Cf.4470. 
(3) A priori concepts are recognised as being synthetic 
"We have therefore judgments a posteriori which are 
synthetic, but also judgments a priori which are also syn- 
thetic and which cannot be derived from any experience, since 
they contain a genuine universality and consequently necessity. 
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This also applies to the pure concerts contained in them 
which cannot have been derived from experience..." 4634, 1.26. 
(4) The objective validity of a priori concepts is limited to pheno- 
mena. 
"If certain concepts are contained in us by means of 
which all experience on our part is alone possible, then they 
are prior to experience and apply with full validity to 
every possible experience and may be called a priori. They 
are however not valid of things in general (Dingen überhaupt) 
but only of what can be given through experience.,since they 
contain the conditions by which these experiences are possi- 
ble. But things which can be given through no experience 
are for us nothing: and though we may very well use such 
principles as general from a practical point of view, we 
cannot employ them as principles of speculation concerning 
objects in general." 4634, 11.1 -12 , p.618; Cf. 4642: 4650. 
(5) The Critical terminology "a priori" (4630; 4634; 4636; 4644,etc) 
and "category" (4276; 4476) appears for the first time in connection 
with the pure concepts. 
(6) Some improvement is indicated in the determining of a category 
table. The basis of coordination and subordination which represented 
the culmination of Kant's efforts around 1770 are explicitly connected 
with (4276) but merge into the persistent trichotomy of Thesis, Synthe- 
sis, Hypothesis -Analysis. The result of the relevant Reflexionen 
results in the following table: - 
Thesis Dasein (3941), Existence (4155), Reality (4476) 
Synthesis Substance (4476), Inherence (4493), Ground and 
Consequent Dependence. (4493). 
Analysis Total et partiale finitum unum et plura (4476). 
From the categories of Thesis emerge later the cate- 
gories of Quality and Modality, from Synthesis those of Relation, 
and from Analysis those of Quantity. 
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The Reflexionen dated by Adickes around 1772 indicate quite 
conclusively that Kant's "awakening" had occurred, and thet the 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF CATEGORIES FROM 1772 - 1800 
In the absence of any published work by Kant between 
1772 -1800, the Reflexionen provide the only source for discovering 
with accuracy and in detail the nature of Kant's philosophical 
development during these eight crucial years. If we confine 
our attention to the theory of categories, there are two points 
of special interest in the Reflexionen of 1755, Which through 
elaboration and development eventually result in the Metaphysi- 
cal and Transcendental Deductions of the Critique of Pure Reason: - 
I. The relation of categories and judgments 
II.The nature and function of the categories. 
I. THE RELATION OF CATEGORIES AND JUDGMENTS 
In 1772 or shortly afterwards Kant makes the pronouncement 
that 
"All knowledge consists in judgments...thinking is 
judging." (1) 
Now it has been shown that although Kant had been exercised 
for some time in obtaining a satisfactory basis for drawing up 
a category table, there is no indication that up to this time 
judgment had been considered as having any unique or special signi- 
ficance for the problem. Once, however, this conviction had dawned 
upon him, it was almost inevitable that an attempt would follow to 
trace a connection between the various categories which had come to 
(1) Reflexionen 4638 
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light and the table of judgments gleaned from the early logics. 
The Reflexionen around 1775 show that Kant had conceived the pos- 
sibility of a classification of categories in accordance with 
the table of judgments and that he is endeavouring to work out 
a detailed parallelism of the two tables. That Kant is experi- 
menting with a new idea is attested by the fact that the working 
out of the symbolism a b x exhibits inconsistencies in various 
passages, and also by the exaggerated importance attached to a 
new idea. Although the parallelism between judgments and cate- 
gories survives in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Critique, 
it is considerably tempered as compared with its possibilities 
as conceived in 1775. Whereas in the Critique, the parallelism 
only extends to the kinds of judgments and kinds of pure concepts 
in a general way, at this time there is an attempt to exhibit 
a parallelism between the particular factors of judgments and the 
particular factors which constitute objective synthetic knowledge(1). 
Another reason for dating this conception of a parallelism 
between the forms of judgment and categories around 1775 is that 
the beginnings of a table of categories °'the basis of this classi- 
fication is making its appearance,9.g. a parallel between the 
categorical hypothetical and disjunctive judgments and the three 
categories of relation is explicitly formulated.(2). Again, the 
relation between categories and forms of judgment is found in 4700, 
(1). Faerin g op.cit. p.66 
(2). 4676 
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where the categories of Unity, Multiplicity, Totality, Causality, 
and Inherence are referred to the judgments of relation concerned ?(1) 
Thanks then to the careful and masterly work of Adickes 
and Haering on the dating of these Reflexionen we can quite defi- 
nitely assign this important doctrine in Kant's category theory 
as having occurred around 1775. 
H. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 
The most significant advance in this connexion is the 
role assigned to the categories in the transformation of the 
subjective into the objective. In the Reflexionen hitherto con- 
sidered, the pure concepts - although recognised as synthetic - 
had consistently been denominated as subjective. The perplexing 
vacillation in the use of the terms is doubtless connected with 
the conviction that though categories are functions of the subject 
they are sine quibus non of knowledge of objects. 
The necessary reformulating of the connotation of subjective - 
objective, however, is not achieved immediately, and in these 
Reflexionen the opposition between the objective and subjective 
can signify 
1. That between the sensibly given, conceived as indepen- 
dent of the percipient subject, and the apprehending func- 
tions of the percipient (sensibly given - functions of the 
mind) . 
2. That between the functions of consciousness which refer 
to objects (Understanding) end the formal analytic functions 
of Reason. 
(1) Adickes' Systematik p.29. 
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3. That between the appearances brought under concepts of 
the Understanding = Erfahrungen, and the "mere appearances" 
not yet "exponierten" "geregelten." 
The third signification is of special interest for the eluci- 
dation of the categories. This opposition between subjective Ers - 
cheinungen ( Wahrnehmungen) and objective Erfahrung or objective 
Wahrnehmungen, is shown to depend on the following distinctions - 
(a) In "mere perception" (subjective) the presentations are 
simply an "Aggregate" (Zusammehang); in "experience" the presenta- 
tions are a "Synthesised Unity" ( Verknüpfung). (1) 
(b) It is necessary for "experience" that merely subjective 
time sequence shall be determined according to a rule, and thus 
transformed into objective time sequence. (2). 
(c) Here as in the Critique universality and necessity are 
formulated as the essential characteristics of objective knowledgeÇ3). 
(d) In the transformation of the subjective into the objective, 
the three categories of relation are usually quoted in illustration. 
They are denominated as "Rules of Perception ", "Rules of Apperception ", 
"Titles of Self perception ", "Principles of Exposition ", "Titles of 
Thought" and are contrasted with such subjective principles as "Rules 
of Presumption" and "Petitions of Reason" which have only an "adop- 
tierte Gewissheit." 
(e) These principles of objective determination are a. priori.(4) 
(f) They are limited to phenomena 
(1) 4674, 1.15,p.643; 4681, 1.6-10,p. 668 
(2) 4681, 1.4(15), p.666; 
(3) 4674, 1.18, p.643; 4677, 1.21, p.658; 4681, 1.230.666 
(4) 4678, 1.8(20-26), p.661. 
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"These three concepts (Substance, Cause and Effect, and 
Whole) contain objects as appearances." (1) 
"It is false to hold thatasynthetic proposition, whose subject 
is a pure concept of the understanding is valid of all things 
in general ( Dingen überhaupt). Though this may be so, it 
cannot be established objectively, but only under the subjec- 
tive restriction of the use of reason. For me the conditions 
of sensibility make the synthesis possible (1) of pure 
(2) of empirical intuition (outer and inner sense)" (2) 
Further specification of the category theory at this time 
requires consideration of the function of apperception. Haering 
calls attention to the fact that two significations of apperception 
are present in these Lose Blätter - a general and a restricted 
meaning. (3). Passages illustrating the general meaning of apper- 
ception are: 
"Intuition is either of objects (apprehensio) or ourselves; 
all knowledge contains the latter ".(apperceptio)..(4) 
"Perception is the position in inner sense in general and 
contains sensation according to the relations of Apper- 
ception..(5)... 
"If anything is to be apprehended, it must be taken under 
the function of A.pnerception." (6) 
"fill appearances must be brought under the title of 
Apperception." (7) 
Contrasted with this general meaning of apperception in which 
it signifies consciousness of all our functions, we find a restricted 
meaning in which it is limited to consciousness of thought function. 
Thus:- 
"Apperception is the perception of one -self as a thinking 
subject in general." (8) 
(1). 4674, 1.23, p.646. 
(2). 4683, 1.15, p. 669. 
(3). Haering op.cit. 148-9. 
(4) 4675, 1.6, p. 651. 
(5) 4677, 1.17, p. 659. 
(6) 4676, 1.1, D. 656 
(7) 4679, 1. 29, p. 664 
(8) 4674, 1.14,p.649 
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"Everything which is thought, stands under a rule of 
apperception." (1) 
Haering considers this restricted meaning to be the genuinely 
Critical view 
"We can trace here the concept of apperception evolving 
from its original meaning to its significance as the highest 
of the high in the Critique. "(2). 
A very difficult question in interpreting Kant's doctrine of 
Apperception is to decide whether he conceives it as a logical con- 
dition implied in all experience, but not explicitly articulated; 
or considers it as embodying explicit self consciousness as an indis- 
pensable condition of "knowledge proper ". 
Haering and some commentators appear to interpret appercep- 
tion as implying explicit self consciousness; yet Haering himself 
issues a salutary warning in his prefatory note to Blatt 12 
"Man darf aber nie vergessen dass es (Apperzeption) sich 
im Unterschied von Leibniz hier bei Kant nicht um einen psy- 
chologischen Prozess handelt, sondern um erkenntnis theore- 
tische Abstraktionen." 
Both Adamson and Professor Kemp Smith on the other hand, have 
quite conclusively shown that (3) this interpretation of appercep- 
tion involving explicit consciousness of self obviously contradicts 
Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense, the discussion of the Paralogisms 
and the implications of the Refutation of Idealism in the second 
edition of the Critique. 
(1). 4677, 1.1, p. 658. 
(2). op.cit. 149. That this restricted meaning of appercep- 
tion is not the critical view is implied in the arguments 
of the next chanter. 
(3). Adamson. p.44. "The last of the elements which we have to 
notice is the supreme unity itself or Logical Ego, the indis- 
pensable factor in all cognition and consequently in itself 
according to Kant, incognisable. 
Kemp Smith Commentary xliii "Consciousness (Kant) maintains 
does not revAni i tçal f }1774 nnl :T i fe n}l iorfe _ Tvi 
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A further consequence, or rather inconsequence, of this 
interpretation of apperception which involves immediate knowledge 
of self, is the resulting view of the source of the categories. 
In Ward's language they must be derived "from What the experient 
subject is, and at the intellectual level knows itself to be." (1) 
That this view is not Kant's last word about the categories 
will be shown in the next chanter. It is, however, present in 
these Reflexionen 
" 'Ich bin', 'Ich denke', 'Gedanken sind in mir'; 
dieses sind insgesamt Verhältnisse, welche zwar nicht Regeln 
der Erscheinung geben, aber machen, dass alle Erscheinung 
als unter Regeln vorgestellt werde." (2). 
Faering's note on this passage is 
" Die drei Funktionen der Apperzeption ( = Selbstwahrneh- 
mung) oder die drei Verhältnisse des inneren Sinns werden 
hier auf die drei Bewusstseinverhgltnisse 'Ich bin', 'Ich 
Denke', 'Gedanken sind in mir' hinausgeführt, die das Proto- 
typ für die drei Verhältnisse der Substanz Kausalitgt und 
Ganzes sein sollen. Ich als Substanz (ich bin 'Dasein') 
Ich als causa der Gedanken, Ich als das Ganze, das die Gedanken 
als Teile in sich schliesst. Es ist gleichsam eine Illus- 
tration zu dem Gedanken vom 'Ich als dem Original aller 
Objekte' ( 733 ) oder dem Gedanken von 115 ('ursprtingliche 
Verhältnisse der Apprehension' (= Selbstwahrnehmung) und 
davon derivierte der (äusseren) 'Wahrnehmung der realen 
Verhältnisse.'" (3) 
A similar view of the categories is found in 
"Die drei Verhältnisse im Gemtit erfordern also drei 
Analogien der Erscheinung, um die subjektiven Funktionen des 
Gemtlts in objektive zu verwandeln und sie dadurch zu Verstandes- 
begriffen zu machen, welche den Erscheinungen Realitht geben. "(4) 
Again "Das Gemüt ist sich selbst also das Urbild von einer solchen 
Synthesis durch das ursprüngliche und nicht abgeleitete 
Denken ". (54 
(1) Ward, J. Study of Kant. p.81 
(2) 4676. 1,3, n.656 
(3) Faering op.cit. p.68 
(4) 4675, 1.23, p. 648 
(5) 4674, 1.3, o. 647 
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These passages show that Kant still (1) considered that 
categories arise through abstraction. from the inner activities of 
the self and are then applied to bbjects by analogy. For such a 
doctrine three crucial problems arise (2):- 
(1) Can the apprehension of the inner precede the outer? 
(2) Is there a unique form of awareness of self which can 
provide the categoría.l. prototypes? 
(3) Can there be a non categor,al level of experience pre- 
ceding the "transsubjective level" at which ex hypothesi the cate- 
gories first emerge? 
The Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the 
Critique precludes (1). (2) is inconsistent with the doctrine of 
Inner Sense which asserts that immediate awareness of our inner 
states is impossible, and which puts them on the sane plane of 
mediacy as outer appearances: hence the appearances of inner sense 
are no more privileged as a source of the categories than those of 
outer sense. Knowledge of either inner or outer appearances pre- 
supposes the categories. 
It remains to show that the third implication of this "Pro- 
jection theory" is at variance with the Critical philosophy. As in 
all theories of this type, the preconceptual level of experience does 
not receive adequate analysis. Kant accords it spme degree of articu- 
lation by introducing certain "subjective" principles of determination 
which he calls "Principles of Presumption." (3) 
(1) Inaug.Diss. par.8: Reflexionen 4412;4495. 
(2) Cf. infra. Part II 
(3) 4681. 
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Their nature and function is very obscure (1), and I can find no 
adequate justification for them. Their description as "preliminary 
determinations of appearances" would seem to anticipate the distinction 
drawn in the Prolegomena between judgments of perception and judgments 
of experience - a distinction which "cuts at the very root of Kant's 
Critical teaching." (2). Consequently, if this suggested identifica- 
tion be correct they must share the ignominy of the latter. (3). 
That this projection theory of the categories died hard with 
Kant is evident from the fact that its terminology still persists in 
the Critique. I shall endeavour to show by further and more detailed 
argument in the next chapter that it cannot be incorporated in the 
Critical philosophy. I shall also argue that in many passages we 
are constrained to interpret the language in a logical rather than 
a psychological sense, e.g. when Kant asserts 
"It must be possible that the I think should accompany 
all my representations," (4) 
the "I think" is not disclosed by introspection nor "enjoyed" by some 
unique form of awareness, but is a logical reconstruction through re- 
flection on the factors necessary for the possibility of experience. 
The Reflexionen around 1775 indicate that Kant had by this time 
grasped the basic principles of the Critique. .evertheless more de- 
tailed investigation on crucial points and considerable concentration 
were necessary before the scattered details could become welded into a 
systematic unity (5). Kant's punctiliousness in this regard.his excessive 
(1) Vide the notes by Haering op.cit. pp. 18 -19; 40 
(2) Kemp Smith. Commentary p. 288 
(3) Cf. infra pp43 -4'( 
(4) Critique B. 132 
(5) Cf. Reflexionen Phases U - and X 
I 
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load of University duties and his indifferent health were pro- 
bably the reasons for the delay in publishing the Critique. (1) 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adickes, E. Kant's Systematik als Systembildender Factor 
Adickes, E. Kent's Gesammelte Schriften Bande xvii and xviii 
Haering, T. Der Duisburg'sche Nachlass und Kent's Kriticismus 
um 1775 
Kemp Smith, N. A Counentary to Kent's Critique of Pure Reason. 
(1) HaerinE, op.cit. pp.153-4 
- 34 - 
CHAPTER III 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION 
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF KANT'S THEORY OF CATEGORIES RESULTING FROM 
THE AMBIGUOUS TERMS 'OBJECT' AND 'EXPERIENCE'. 
The aim of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories 
is to show that they are a priori synthetic functions, which first 
make experience possible and thereby make knowledge of objects 
possible - for the conditions of Possible experience are equally 
the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. 
The real significance of this statement depends on discover- 
ing what is meant by the ambiguous terms "experience" and "objects ". 
Does Kant use "experience" in a restricted sense, meaning 
thereby a systematic and coherent body of knowledge recognised as 
such? Is the function of the categories to render such experience 
possible by clarifying and systematising the interrelations of 
phenomena? Or does he mean by "experience" any form of apprehen- 
sion which conveys meaning? Would he hold that the categories are 
involved in any apprehension that may be called cognitive - in per- 
ception, as well as et the higher level of systematic end scientific 
knowledge? 
A similar ambiguity attaches to the term "object ". Does Kant 
mean to restrict the meaning of object to a unified complex of 
data, definitely and deliberately distinguished as such by a self con- 
scious subject? Does conscicusness of an object only emerge in dis- 
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tinction from a subject which is conscious of itself as such? Or 
would Kant's use of the term "object" be included in the naive ex- 
perience of a child and in the ordinary unsophisticated experience 
of the man in the street? Does Kant differentiate an early precon- 
ceptual level of immediacy, in which the data hang together indepen- 
dnntly of the categories, from a late conceptual level of mediacy 
in which experience and knowledge prover first emerge through the 
application of the categories to the data of the perceptual level? 
Radically different views as to the nature and function of the 
categories result according as one or other of the above interpreta- 
tions of "object" and "experience" is adopted. 
On the first interpretation, since "experience" and knowledge 
of objects is restricted to the reflective level, the categories arise 
relatively late in mental developmert. Their emergence is due to 
introspection and reflection upon "the mindb own activities on the 
occasion of experience." The a priority of the categories is ex- 
plained by the fact that they are abstracted from the activities of 
the mind and applied by analogy to outer phenomena. The function of 
the categories is to render "experience" possible; but the term 
experience is used in a. specially restricted and sophisticated sense 
to denote an objective system involving universal and necessary laws, 
exnlicitly apprehended as such. 
On the second interpretation of experience and objects, the 
function of the categories is much more fundamental. They function 
ab initio as synthetic activities which transform sensations into per- 
ceptions. Since they are conditions of perception and consciousness 
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of any kind, they are not themselves consciously apprehended, and 
must, therefore, be considered as functioning unconsciously, prior 
to the conceptual level. Our so called knowledge of them, is simply 
a conceptual expression and explicit formulation of relational 
syntheses, which have been already active in rendering perceptual 
experience possible. On this view, then, the categories are disposi- 
tions (which may or may not be spFritual) (1) immediately evoked 
through the affection of stimuli. They are not essentially and pri- 
marily methodological concepts which are abstracted by introspection 
and projected by analogy upon outer experience. 
To interpret Kant's theory of categories entirely from the 
self reflective standpoint, results in a timorous and hopelessly 
inadequate idealism, which could have no claim to being a "Coperni- 
can revolution" in philosophy. To show that such an interpretation 
is a travesty of Kant's whole theory of knowledge is the purport 
of this chapter. 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SIX ARGUMENTS PRIMA FACIE FAVOURABLE TO 
THE FIRST INTERPRETATION OF TEE CATEGORIES. 
(1) Passages in the Transcendental Deduction Distinguishing 
Phenomena or "Objects given" from Categorial Objects. 
There are many passages in the Analytic in which this distinc- 
tion occurs, and which may therefore be thought to imply that Kant 
sanctions the notion that knowledge of objects by the categories super- 
(1) Kemp Smith. Commentary p. 277. 
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yenes upon a non categorial perceptual level in which objects simply 
are, but not recognised. I cannot deal with all such Passages, but by 
analysis of some typical examples, I shall show that no such 
inference is justifiable. 
"The categories of the understanding, on the contrary 
are not conditions under which objects can be given in 
intuition, and it is quite possible, therefore, that objects 
should appear to us without any necessary reference to the 
functions of the understanding, thus showing that the under- 
standing contains by no means any of their conditions 
a priori. "(A 89). 
"It cannot be denied that phenomena may be given without 
the functions of the understanding." (A 90). 
"To know a thing as an object is possible only under two 
conditions. First there must be intuition by which the object 
is given us, though as a phenomena only. Secondly, there must 
be a concept by which an object is thought as corresponding 
to that intuition." (A 93). 
In all these passages it appears as though an object were 
first given and that afterwards the categories function in reference 
to it, and make our knowledge of it explicit. Such a view obviously 
conflicts with such passages as: 
"Consequently, all synthesis, without which even perception 
would be impossible, is subject to the categories." (B 161). 
"All possible perceptions, everything in fact that can come 
to empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature 
must....be subject to the categories." (B 165). 
In view of their contradiction with this maturer thinking, we 
may be justified in simply designating such passages = (A 89 -90) as 
"uncritical" and in disregarding them as authoritative evidence for 
any Critical doctrine. (1). They must be regarded then as vestigia 
of earlier reflections which have crept into the Critique through 
(1). A 89 -90 are regarded as uncritical by both Adickes 
and Kemp Smith. 
- 38 - 
defective and hurried editing. It seems to me, however, that their 
uncritical nature must have been somewhat less naive than is usually 
supposed, to escape excision even in a final proof reading. I would 
suggest that both the term "object} and "phenomenon" is used loosely 
and refers to the content of knowledge. (1). That the material of 
thought must be given and cannot be invented is sound Critical doctrine, 
and only by thus interpreting his terminology could Kant have allowed 
the passages to stand. As thus understood the terminology is uncriti- 
cal but not the doctrine. And even in regard to terminology Kant 
might not unreasonably excuse himself by reminding us that a problem 
cannot be expounded by using the language of a revolutionary and novel 
solution. All the quotations occur in the introductory sections of the 
Deduction, order to induce comprehension of the 
problem in hand Kant thought it necessary "to speak with the vulgar 
and think with the learned." (2). 
When "object" and "phenomenon" are equated with the content of 
knowledge, the passages under consideration lend no support to the 
First Interpretation - that the categories are superinduced simply 
to clarify and systematise our knowledge of "things ". 
(2) Objects as Causes 
Another group of passages speak of 
"the material for cognition being given by the object ".(B 145), 
"attributing a degree of influence upon the senses to 
objects of perception." ( B 208) 
"representations being given by -phenomena (A 115). 
(1).Cf. Kemp Smith Commentary 79 -30 where the same use of ob- 
ject = content is noted in the opening of the Aesthetic. 
(2) That Kant was skilful in this respect is noticed by Adickes 
in Kant's Lehre von der Doppelten Affektion. p. 63. 
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In these passages the object to which causal agency is 
attributed is not a noumenon but a phenomenal object. Does not 
then this recognition of existences distinct from their represen- 
tations render the function of the categories entirely regulative? 
And if this be so, have we not incontrovertible evidence for the 
view that the categories are in no way constitutive of objects, but 
presuppose and simply articulate our knowledge of non categorielly 
determined objects? The problem in this connection may be defined 
as the determining of Kant's "Phenomenalism" (1) or Kant's theory 
of "Empirical Affection" (2) in relation to his category theory. 
I must particularly insist that the following outline of 
Kant's theory of "Double Affection" is not,concerned with the philo- 
sophical merits of the doctrine. Day purpose is not to decide 
whether it should be considered as the "Key" to Kant's theory of 
knowledge (Adickes) or whether, it should rather be regarded as 
"a vain attempt" (3) to reckon with his more developed realistic 
outlook. Whether for better or for worse, Kant surmised that his 
Phenomenalism 
"involving a realist view of the world both of science 
and of ordinary experience can....only be defended through 
a doctrine of double affection" (4). 
Since this doctrine is present, though not developed, in the Criti- 
que (5), an exposition of his category theory must give it consider- 
ation. 
(1) Kemp Smkth. Commentary 270 ff. 
(2) Adickes, op.cit. Ch.l. etc. 
(3) Professor Kemp Smith in correspondence 
(4) Kemp Smith. Commentary. n.610 
(5) Adickes, Lehre von D.A.; Qp.Post.pp.249ff ; 655 ff.etc, 
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The doctrine of double affection asserts (a) that the I an sich 
(the transcendental I, the pure I) is affected by things in them- 
selves (1) - Transcendent affection. (b) That the empirical I is 
affected by Erscheinungen an sich (i.e. phenomenal objects minus 
the secondary qualities) - Empirical affection. 
(a) Transcendent Affection. The relations between things 
in themselves cannot, of course, be known. Negatively, it may be said 
that their nature must be non - temporal and non -spatial. Positively, 
they may be speculatively conjectured as logical - teleological, and 
analogous to the relations pertaining to the several moments of a 
mathematical proof. Through affection by things in themselves, the I 
in itself is induced to transform - by means of its a priori forms of 
intuition and synthetic functions - these non -temporal and non -spatial 
relations into temporal and spatial language. It thus constructs the 
spatial - temporal world of Erscheinungen an sich which confronts the 
empirical I. It must be noted that the I an sich does not create 
the phenomenal world; rather it translates into spatial and temporal 
language the prevailing "Gesetzmgssikeit" of the purely noumenal. The 
objects thus constructed are not endowed with secondary qualities. 
They are groupings of atoms - the objects of physical science. This 
whole process proceeds unconsciously for the empirical I. 
(1) Adickes points out that though passages may be found 
asserting an affection of our senses by things in them- 
selves, strictly speaking things in themselves can only 
affect the I in itself. (Ding an sich n.36) 
Professor Kemp Smith suggests the terminology "outer 
sense" (Commentary no. 275; 276.) 
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(b) Empirical Affection: - The empirical I is affected by 
Erscheinungen an sich acting upon the sense organs and brain. It 
reacts with sensations, which it projects into space and which through 
its synthetic functions it unifies and objectifies into Wahrnehmungs- 
gegerstande. The empirical I does not have to translate a non -spatial 
and non - temporal order into the language of space and time, but to 
reproduce as accurately as possible in the world of perceptual objects 
which it constructs, the temporal- spatial relations which it finds 
pertaining to "Erscheinungen an sich ". 
Kow while fully admitting the difficulties and obscurities 
inherent in this doctrine of double affection; nevertheless, there 
emerges therefrom two very significant features for defining the nature 
and function of the categories. In the first place, Kant is so far 
from restricting categories to a privileged "transsubjective level" 
that he cannot even confine them to the conscious level. Ali the order 
and conformity to law (Gesetzmtissigkeit) in the phenomenal world of 
Erscheinungen an sich is assigned to the synthetic functions of the 
I an sich. And this infusion of unity and connection is performed 
unconsciously. (1). Professor Kemp Smith- even before perusal of 
the Onus Postumum - had also recognised that 
"The synthetic processes must take place and complete 
themselves before any consciousness can exist at all. 
And as they thus precondition consciousness, they cannot 
(1) Adickes Lehre von Dopp. Aff. p.48; Ding an Sich 36. 
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themselves be known to be conscious...." (1) 
In the second place, the function of the categories is not 
to clarify our knowledge of objects or to make vague experience 
systematic but to make objects possible. The accounts of both 
transcendent and empirical affection insist that the apprehension 
of objects - nay the very possibility of objects - is only possible 
throuh the employment of the synthetic functions. 
I concludd then that passages attributing causal agency 
to objects and savouring of Realism do not justify "the first 
Interpretation" of Kant's categories. 
(1) The question arises as to whether Professor Kemp Smith 
considers the "synthetic processes" and categories to 
be identical. They seem to be distinguished in ".... 
The synthetic processes, interpreting the manifold in 
accordance with the fixed forms space, time and the 
categories...." Commentary n. 276. (Italics mine) 
Again, '.'.. It may be objected that this is virtually 
what Kant is doing when he postulates synthetic acti- 
vities as the source of the categories." op.cit. 
Introduction LI. note. (Italics mine). 
On the other hand their essential identity seems implied in 
"The conscious processes of apprehension, reproduction, 
and recognition necessarily conform to schemata, non 
consciously generated, which express the combined a 
priori conditions of intuition and understanding 
required fvv unitary consciousness." op.cit. p. 267. 
Unless the essential identity of the synthetic processes 
and the categories be allowed, a very awkward problem 
confronts us in determining their relation. I would sub- 
mit that the requirements of Kant's phenomenalism increases 
the connotation of the term category, so that it denotes 
both the synthetic processes and the results of their 
activity - the "forms" or "concepts" of Unity, Causa.lit , 
etc. (Cf. Adickes, Dine an Sich n. 157). 
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(3) The Distinction Between Judgments of Perception and 
Judgments of Experience. 
The locus classicus of this distinction is Prolegomena 
18 -20; 22; 29 . It has been strongly condemned by Professor Kemp 
Smith 
"The illegitimacy and the thoroughly misleading 
character of this distinction hardly require to be 
pointed out. Obviously Kant is here confusing assertion 
of contingency with contingency of assertion....Even 
a momentary state of the self is referable to an 
object in judgment, only if that object is causally 
and therefore necessarily concerned in its production. "(l) 
The following discussion is directed to enforce this 
criticism, and to show that the distinction between judgments of 
perception and judgments of experience is at variance with the 
fundamental principles of the Critical philosophy. 
The Prolegomena asserts that "judgments of experience" have 
objective validity. They require for this, besides the represen- 
tation of sensuous intuition, "particular concepts originally 
begotten in the understanding" i.e. categories. "Judgments of 
perception ", on the other hand, are only subjectively valid. They 
require no concept of the understanding, "but only the logical con- 
nexion of perceptions in a thinking subject." Unfortunately Kant 
gives no explanation of the grounds of this "logical connexion ". 
So far as can be gathered from the context the indications are that 
the connexion is not "logical" at all, but due to mere association. 
"All our judgments are at first merely "judgments of per- 
ception": they hold good only for us, and we do not till after- 
wards give them a new reference (to an object) and desire 
(1) op.cit. p. 288. 
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that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way 
for everybody else." (1) 
This argument implies that "experience" is being used in a highly 
specialized sense. It would seem to imply that "experience" is a 
judgment or system of judgments with an explicit and deliberate 
objective reference. It also implies that the categories are the 
constitutive factors peculiar to such experience. 
To illustrate the matter 
"When we say, 'the room is warm, sugar sweet, and work - 
wood bitter,' - we have only subjectively valid judgments. 
I do not at all expect that I or any other person shall 
always find it as I now do; each of these sentences only 
expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, 
to myself, and that only in my present state of perception; 
consequently they are not valid of the object." (2) 
This argument is a non sequitur. When we make such judgments of per - 
cention, we certainly do desire that I and everybody else should 
always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same 
circumstances. Otherwise, (provided the factors remain constant ) 
we would be frivolous or foolish. 
The continuously reiterated assertion that "judgments of per- 
ception" only refer to my mental states and are not referred to an 
object, is at variance with actual facts. It ascribes to naive 
consciousness a sophistication which is entirely absent. It is, 
no doubt, true that ordinary consciousness is also guiltless of an 
explicit distinction of self and object; but nevertheless it would 
be much more in accord with the findings of psychology to say that 
(1) Prolegomena, Par. 18 
(2) Prolegomena, Par. 19 
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objective reference rather than subjectivism is an outstanding 
characteristic of naive perceptual consciousness, 
In his examples of "judgments of perception" Kant makes 
e distinction. 
"Such perceptual judgments as 'the room is warm', 'sugar 
is sweet' could never become judgments of experience, even 
though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because 
they refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be 
merely subjective, and which, of course, can never be attri- 
buted to the object and consequently can never become 
objective." (1) 
Contrasted with these is a species of judgment of perception 
such as "the air is elastic" which can become a judgment of experience, 
provided that "the perception be subsumed under a concept of the 
understanding." e.g. cause and effect. The "easier" example given 
in the note on Paragraph 20 viz. the transformation of the perceptual 
judgment "When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm" to the 
judgment of experience "The sun warms the stone" is unfortunate. 
Since warmth is feeling and is purely subjective, should not this 
be excluded from ever becoming a judgment of experience on the same 
grounds as the judgment "the room is warm "? It may be rejoined that 
the two examples are not on a par; that the judgment "the room is 
warm" is equivalent to "the room is warm to me ", whereas in the judg- 
ment "the sun warms the stone" the reference is entirely objective. 
But surely the truth of the matter is that the two judgments have a 
similar logical status. Though both judgments have a. secondary 
quality as predicate, in each case the secondaryquality has an ob- 
jective reference which transcends itself, and therefore requires 
(1) Prolegomena Paragraph 19. Note. 
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categorial determination. This indeed follows from Kant's own 
teaching on the nature of judgments in B 140 -2. 
Kant's failure to realise the full implications of his doc- 
trine of judgment in this connection, is due to the domination of 
his thinking by the view oint of physical science. He tends to 
regard the non -qualitative object of nhysical science, with its 
mathematically determinable primary qualities, as the only genuine 
object. Following his predecessors he considers secondary quali- 
ties as intrinsically subjective, and thus fails to realise that 
though they are private they are not necessarily subjective. Having, 
however, fallen into this confusion, it was easy for him to consider 
that judgments about such "subjective" states must be treated on 
a different plane from judgments about nhysical objects. 
While then it cannot be denied that Kant explicitly makes 
a distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of 
experience in the Prolegomena (1), it nevertheless stands self con- 
demned through its incongruity with his more considered doctrine 
of judgment. According to Professor Kemp Smith 
"This Kant seems to have himself recognised in the in- 
terval between the Prolegomena and the second edition of 
the Critique. For in the section before us (B 140 -2) 
there is no trace of it. The opposition is no longer 
between subjective and objective judgment, but only be- 
tween association ,If ideas and judgment which as such is 
always objective." (2) 
I would submit,then, that this distinction between judgments 
of perception and judgments of experience is too precarious to afford 
(1) Cf. also supra Ch.2, p. 
(2) op.cit. p. 289. 
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an authentic basis for formulating genuinely Critical doctrine and 
cannot by itself afford evidence for the First Interpretation. 
(4) association 
The observed fact that representations which have fre- 
quently accompanied one another become so closely united, that the 
presence of one tends to recall the other is as old as the Greeks.(1) 
The doctrine of association had, however, a special significance 
for Kant, since according to Hume, all syntheses ultimately resolve 
themselves into mere imaginative associations. To establish his 
own theory of relations, Kant is constrained to show that empirical 
association is not an ultimate fact incapable of further analysis, 
but that on the contrary, it presupposes certain transcendental con- 
ditions. As Professor Kemp Smith neatly puts it 
"Kant's argument is therefore as follows. Ideas do 
not become associated merely by co- existing. They must 
occur together in a unitary consciousness; and among the 
conditions necessary to the possibility of association 
are therefore the conditions of the possibility of experi- 
ence. Association is transcendentally grounded In 
other words representations must exist in consciousness 
before they can become associated: and they can exist in 
consciousness only if they are consciously apprehended. 
But in order to be consciously apprehended they must con- 
form to the transcendental conditions upon which all con- 
sciousness rests; and in being thus apprehended they are 
set in thorough going unity to one another and to the self."(2) 
Consequently, since association presupposes self identity, 
Hume's attempt to make self identity a product of association is 
a hysteron proteron. So far the argument is quite clear. 
We must now consider the very difficult part of the discus- 
sion which outlines the doctrine of "objective affinity ". Even 
empiricists would admit that associations are not entirely hap- 
(1) Plato Phaedo 73 -4 
(2) op.cit. p. 254 
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hazard. Unless they exhibited a certain uniformity and regularity, 
they could not serve as a plausible explanation of experience. 
What thenp_ is the ground of this regularity? It cannot be due to 
the "reproductive imagination" for this simply reproduces an order 
that is already there. 
"This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the 
phenomena themselves are really subject to such a rule.... 
If cinnabar were sometimes red and sometimes black, some- 
times light and sometimes heavy, if a man could be changed 
now into this, now into another animal shape, if on the 
longest day the fields were sometimes covered with fruit, 
sometimes with ice and snow, the faculty of my empirical 
imagination would never be in a position when representing 
red colour, to think of heavy cinnabar." (A 100 -1). 
Similarly A 121 -3 insists that the subjective and empirical ground 
of reproduction must possess an objective foundation. 
"If this unity of association did not possess an ob- 
jective foundation also, which makes it impossible that 
phenomena should be apprehended by imagination in any 
other way but under the condition of a possible syntheti- 
cal unity of that apprehension, it would be a mere acci- 
dent that phenomena lend themselves to a certain connec- 
tion in human knowledge." (A 121). 
In these passages Kant asserts that a certain minimum of regularity 
is necessary in order that association may take place. This ap- 
pears at first to be begging the whole question at issue. In A 101: 
A 123; however, we find that this regularity is ascribed to the "pure 
transcendental synthesis of imagination ", more usually termed 
"the productive synthesis of imagination." According to A 122 
"This objective ground of all associations of phenomena 
I call their affinity, and this can nowhere be found except 
in the principle of the unity of apperception applied to all 
knowledge which is to belong. to me. According to it, all 
nhenomer!a., without exception, must so enter into the mind 
or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of apperception." 
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Kant may seem here to be simply refuting the associa:tionists 
under cover of a Berkeleian subjectivism. It may be allowed that 
Kant has pointed out a significant fact in his contention that associa- 
tionism cannot explain self identity, for the possibility of associa- 
tion presupposes unity of consciousness. It might also be admitted 
that it is but an application of the principles of the Transcendental 
Deduction to assert that any experience depends on relational synthe- 
ses which are its formal conditions. Something more penetrating 
however, seems required to guarantee such de facto regularity out- 
lined in A 100 -1. 
As Adickes points out the full significance of Kant's teaching 
here can only be grasped when read in connection with the "doctrine 
of double affection ". 
"All difficulties vanish when one employs the doctrine 
of double affection, and perceives the I in itself is the 
cause of Affinity in the phenomenal world. Then the 
KrAftecomplexen, upon Which everything depends and on which 
the Erscheinungen an sich subsist, must have been already 
oriented in direction to the unity of transcendental a.pn er- 
ception and its requirements. Since all synthesis and all 
connection in the phenomenal world - and therefore obviously 
also in the case of Erscheinungen an sich - can only arise 
through us and our a priori faculties, consequently the 
Krtlftecomplexen are, of course, connected through the syn- 
thetic functions of our I in itself into objects and these 
again synthesised in accordance with the unified spatial 
system of experience. There naturally impart their unity 
to the effects which proceed from them (movements) and to 
the perceptions resulting from the latter. These perceptions 
must already from the very beginning be associable: they are 
planned by Nature both in relation to one another and the 
developing system of unitary experience. Hence Affinity 
loses its mysteriousness,4ince the world of Krgftecomplexen - 
confronting our empirical I as an independent actuality, 
which meets us in one of our requirements in so accommodating 
a manner - is not Being in itself, but the phenomenal world 
posited by the I in itself and dependent on its functions 
of unity." (1) 
(1) Adickes Lehre von Dopp.Affek. pp. 91 -2 
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Association, then, is transcendentally conditioned, and its 
Possibility presupposes categorial determination by the I an sich. 
Hence the function of the categories cannot be restricted to a level 
of experience supervening upon "mere association. "(1) 
(5) Distinction of Function Assigned to Imagination and 
Understanding. 
Kant frequently speaks of imagination and understanding as 
separate faculties with distinctive functions. To imagination is 
assigned the function of synthesising the raw material of the mani- 
fold so as to produce images (e.g. A 120); to understanding the 
function of "intellectualising" the "figurative synthesis" of 
imagination by bringing it under concepts, and so producing know- 
ledge "properly so called (A 78). Such distinction between the two 
faculties would seem to support the contention that understanding 
and the categories belong to a special level of experience and 
"knowledge proper ", superinduced upon the relatively vague level 
of imaginative synthesis or "apprehension" (A 120). Typical of 
this view are the following passages: 
A 78. "We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general 
is the mere result of what I call the faculty of imagination, 
a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which 
we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of the existence 
of which we are scarcely conscious. But to reduce this 
synthesis to concepts is a function that belongs to under- 
standing, and by which the understanding supplies us for the 
first time with knowledge properly so called 
"The first that must be given us a priori for the sake of 
knowledge of all objects is the manifold in pure intuition. 
The second is, the synthesis of the manifold by means of ima- 
gination. But this does not yet produce true knowledge. The 
(1) Kant unfortunately lapses in this regard, e.g. in the 
proofs of the Second Analogy where he contrasts purely 
subjective succession f objective succession. The 
incongruity of such an expression with his Critical princi- 
ples is noted by Kemp Smith, Commentary n. 367 
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concepts which impart unity to this pure synthesis, and 
consist entirely in the representation of this necessary synthe- 
tical unity, add the third contribution towards the know- 
ledge of an object and rest on the understanding." 
Similar teaching is contained in A 118 -119. Preliminary synthetic 
activities are assigned to Imagination; such "constitute the 
ground of the possibility of all knowledge nay of all experience" 
but knowledge prover does not arise until these synthetic activities 
of the imagination have been referred to the transcendental unity 
of apperception. "Knowledge, Kant seems to contend in A 118, re- 
quires not merely synthesis, but the representation of the unity 
of synthesis: 
"and the unity of that synthesis (viz. of imagination) is 
called transcendental, if with reference to the original 
unity of anperception it is represented as a priori 
necessary." 
The relation between unity of apperception, understanding 
and imagination is briefly set forth in the next paragraph. 
"This unity of apperception with reference to the 
synthesis of imagination is the Understanding, and the 
same unity with reference to the transcendental synthe- 
sis of the imagination, the pure understanding. It 
must be admitted therefore that there exist in the under- 
standing rare forms of knowledge e priori which contain 
the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagina- 
tion in reference to all possible phenomena. (These 
are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the 
understanding)." (A 119). 
Similarly, A 123 -6 
"Apperception.... must be added to pure imagination 
in order to render its function intellectual. For by 
itself, the synthesis of imagination, though carried out 
a priori, is always sensuous, and only connects the mani- 
fold as it appears in intuition, for instance, the shape 
of a triangle. But when the manifold is brought into 
relation with the unity of apperception, concepts which 
belong to the understanding become possible, but only 
as related to sensuous intuition through imagination." 
B Paragraph 21 says of the categories 
"They are merely rules for an understanding whose 
whole power consists in thinking, that is in the act 
of bringing the synthesis of the manifold, which is 
given to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity 
of a.nperception." 
All these passages appear to reoognise a preliminary 
synthesis by imagination and subsequent synthesis on the part 
of the understanding. But to sgtstain the thesis that the cate- 
gories condition each and every experience, however simple or 
however complex, it must be shown that even on the imaginative 
level categorial functions are involved. Further investigation 
into the nature of the synthesis of the imagination shows that 
such is the case. Thus for example B 152: 
"As however its synthesis (i.e. the synthesis of pro- 
ductive imagination) is an act of spontaneity, determining, 
and not, like the senses, determinable only, and therefore 
able to determine a priori the senses, so far as their 
form is concerned, according to the unity of apperception, 
the faculty of imagination is, so far, a faculty of deter- 
mining our sensibility a priori, so that the synthesis of 
the intuitions, according to the categories, must be the 
transcendental synthesis of the faculty of imagination. 
This is an effect, produced by the understanding on our 
sensibility, and the first application of the intuition 
which is only possible to us." (1) 
This passage unequivocally áserts that the synthesis of pro- 
ductive imagination takes place in accordance with the categories. 
The last sentence of the quotation implies that Understanding 
and Imagination are in actual fact indispensably united with one 
another. This is indeed asserted in A 326 
"Pure Beason leaves everything to the Understanding, 
which has primarily to do with the objects of intuition, 
or rather their syr besis in imagination." 
(1) The very obscure language of this passage and of 
B 154 is no doubt due to the fact that Kant is using the 
terminology of the doctrine of "Self Affection" which first receives explicit formulation in the onus 
Postumum (Cf. Adickes On.Post 251) 
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Again the affinity between understanding and imagination 
is implied in the chapter on Schematism. The schema is a product 
of productive imagination. Yet the schematism of our under- 
standing is the necessary condition of its application to phenomena. 
According to B 165 
"That which connects the manifold of sensuous intui- 
tion is the faculty of imagination which receives from the 
understanding the unity of its intellectual synthesis 
and from sensibility the manifoldness of apprehension." 
Similarly in the note to B 162 
"In this manner it is proved that the synthesis of 
apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily conform 
to the synthesis of apprehension, which is intellectual, 
and contained in the category entirely a priori. It is 
one and the same spontaneity, which there, under the name 
of imagination, and here, under the name of understanding, 
brings connection into the manifold of intuition." 
It would seem evident therefore that for experience and 
knowledge of objects it is impossible for understanding to func- 
tion without productive imagination or for productive imagination 
to function without the use of categorial syntheses. And that 
"experience" and "knowledge" here apply to the perceptual level 
is shown by the following quotations: 
B 161 "Consequently, all synthesis, without which even percep- 
tion would be impossible, is subject to the categories; and 
as experience consists of knowledge by means of connected 
perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility 
of experience, and valid therefore a nriori also for all 
objects of experience." 
B 165. "Thus, as all possible _perceptions depend on the 
synthesis of apprehension, and that synthesis itself, that 
empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental, and, 
therefore, on the categories, it follows that all possible 
perceptions, everything in fact that can come to the empirical 
consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature, must, so 
far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the 
categories. " 
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The results of our investigation seem to have led to an 
impasse. We have on the one hand a number of passages which 
explicitly distinguish imagination and understanding. On the 
other hand there are many passages which stress their affinity 
and essential identity. 
The solution of this difficulty seems to be provided by 
Professor Kemp Smith's ingenious discussion of productive imagi- 
nation. (1). He points out that the requirements of the Critical 
Philosophy demands a recognition of activities which are non -con- 
scious. Now such activities being the conditions of consciousness 
cannot themselves be consciously apprehended. This preconscious 
activity is the main characteristic of productive imagination.(2). 
Unfortunately Kant gives no detailed and explicit exposition of 
this revolutionary doctrine. It is, however, quite unmistakably 
implied in such passages as 
A 78. "We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general 
is mere result of what I call the faculty of imagination, 
a, blind but indispensable function of the soul, without 
which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of the 
existence of which we are scarcely conscious. But to re- 
duce this synthesis to concepts is a function that belongs 
to the understanding, and by which the understanding supplies 
us for the first time with knowledge properly so called." 
A 141. "This schematism of our understanding applied to 
phenomena and their mere form is an art hidden in the depth 
of the human soul, the true secrets of which we shall hardly 
ever be able to guess and reveal." 
Further the discussion of Association showed that precon- 
scious categorial synthesis by the productive imagination is an 
(1) op. cit. pp.263 -70 
(2) Cf. Adickes Lehre 48;84; Opus Postumum 295; 314. 
Also Feininger. Kant Seine Anhanger und Seine Gegner.pp.98 -9. 
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indispensable presupposition of the doctrine of "objective 
affinity ". 
A 123. "The affinity of all appearances near or 
remote is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in 
imagination which is grounded a priori on rules." 
Understanding, on the other hand, is regarded as the faculty 
of conscious apprehension. Now, as Professor Kemp Smith observes: 
"Though Kant's insistence upon the conscious character 
of understanding compels him to distinguish between it 
and the imagination, he has also to recognise their 
kinship. If imagination can never act save in conformi- 
ty with the a priori forms of understanding, some rea- 
son must exist for their harmony. This twofold necessi- 
ty of at once distinguishing and connecting them is the 
cause of the hesitating and extremely variable account 
which im both editions of the Critique is given of their 
relation." (1) 
Though Kant may be vague and vacillating as to the precise 
relation between understanding and imagination, the requirements 
of the Critical philosophy definitely commit him to the view 
that the activities of productive imagination involve a precon- 
scious use of categorial functions. (2) 
Thus the distinction between understanding and imagination 
so far from supporting the view that categories belong to a sophis- 
ticated conceptual level, shows on the contrary that they function 
at the very threshold of experience. 
(1) op.cit. p. 264 
(2) Cf. supra p. 31 -2 
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(6) The Doctrine of the Transcendental Unity of Annerception. 
Ward's interpretation of Kant maintains 
(1) that the transcendental unity of apperception belongs 
to the transsubjective level. 
"It is not enough for knowledge that its data should 
be strung together as occurrences (Erlebnisse) and so 
perceived in a single sentient consciousness. Only when 
they are, in thought, brought together in the 'apperception" 
of a subject aware of its own unity, can they be said to be 
effectively synthesized, Only then do they form 'an object' 
for such self- conscious subject." 
"First, Kant finds it needful to point out more explicit- 
ly what so far has been only implied, viz. that the unity 
of apperception entails the objective unity, in which ex- 
perience at the thought -level begins; for it is through 
it 'that all the manifold given in an intuition is unified 
in some concept of the object." 
(2). That the self conscious subject is the source of 
the (real) categories of substance and cause. 
"But if formal lagic is not the source of these cate- 
gories whence then are they ultimately derived? From what 
the experient subject is and at the intellectual level 
knows itself to be. This seems to be the true answer, 
and it is the answer which really underlies the whole of 
Kant's 'transcendental deduction' in its final form." 
"Must we not then conclude that Kant's transcendental 
deduction clearly points to the experient subject as the 
source whence these real categories of substance and cause 
are in fact 'deduced'? In maintaining these categories 
to be indispensable to the possibility of any intelligble 
experience of the world is Kant not really maintaining that 
the world is intelligible only when it is interpreted in 
terms of what the experient subject at the transsubjective 
and self conscious level knows itself to be ?" (1). 
(1) . Ward, J. Study of Kant np.49: s 1 :81: gz 
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The wording of many passages would appear to support 
Ward's interpretation. The following will serve as typical 
A 107. "No knowledge can take place in us, no con- 
junction or unity of one kind of knowledge with another, 
without that unity of consciousness which precedes all 
data of intuition, and without reference to which no 
representation of objects is possible. This pure, 
original, and unchc:ngeable consciousness I shall call 
transcendental apperception." 
f. 108. "Therefore the original and necessary con- 
sciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same 
time a. consciousness of an equally necessary unity 
of the synthesis of all phenomena according to concepts, 
that is, according to rules, which render them not only 
necessarily reproducible, but assign also to their 
intuition an object, that is, a concept of something 
in which they are necessarily united." 
Both these passages belong according to Professor Kemp 
Smith to the "First Stage ", but the same teaching is found in 
f 116. "We are conscious a priori of our own permanent 
identity with regard to all representations that can 
ever belong to our knowledge, as forming a necessary 
condition of the possibility of all representations...." 
123. "This apperception it is which must be added to 
pure imagination in order to render its function intel- 
lectual." (Italics mine). 
B 133. "The unbroken identity of apperception of the 
manifold that is given in intuition contains a synthesis 
of representations, and is possible only through the con- 
sciousness of that synthesis....0i21y because I am able 
to connect the manifold of given representations in 
one consciousness is it possible for me to represent 
to myself the identity of the consciousness in these 
representations." 
B 131. "Connection is representation of the synthetical 
unity of the manifold." 
These passages seem to imply that the unity of appercep- 
tion is explicit self consciousness; and consequently, that 
the categories which are indissolubly bound up with the unity 
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of apperception can only emerge at the level of explicit self 
consciousness. 
We contend, however, that both the general principles of 
the Critical philosophy, and a closer inspection of Kant's explicit 
teaching on the transcendental unity of apperception renders this 
interpretation impossible. In the first place, this "unbroken 
identity of apperception" is not a direct awareness. The "repre- 
senting to myself of the identity of consciousness in these repre- 
sentations" is a necessary logical presupposition of the accom- 
plished fact that synthetical unity has taken place. This is ex- 
plicitly pointed out by Kant in 
B 134. "The thought that the representations given in intui- 
tion belong all of them to me, is therefore the same as that 
I connect them in one self consciousness, or am able tt 
least to do so; and though this is not yet the consciousness 
of the synthesis of representations it nevertheless pre- 
supposes the possibility of this synthesis." 
B 278: ?Tote II of the Refutation of Idealism. "The conscious- 
ness of myself, in the representation of the Ego, is not an 
intuition, but a merely intellectual represer1ation of the 
spontaneity "of a thinking subject." 
B 157. "In the transcendental synthesis, however, of the 
manifold of representations in general, and therefore in 
the original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, 
neither as I appear to myself, nor as I am by myself but only 
that I am. This representation is an act of thought not of 
intuition." 
A 117 note. "It does not matter whether that representation 
is clear (empirical consciousness) or confused, not even 
whether it is real; but the possibility of the logical form 
of all knowledge rests necessarily on the 
of this apperception as a faculty. 
A 546 must be interpreted in the light of these passages. 
Accordingly when Kant says there that "man knows himself through 
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mere apperception" we must substitute for " Erkennen" some such 
term as "erleben". According to Adickes 
"Das indifferentere "erleben" bzw "sich erleben" dürfte 
besser als Gefühl, Wahrnehmung und Erkennen das bezeichen, 
was ihm vorschwebte." (1) . 
In the second place the transcendental unity of apperception 
is not restricted to the conceptual level. Conclusive passages 
in this connection are / 113 -14 and A 121 -3 already discussed 
at length in connection with "Associationë(2)To these may be also 
added, 
B 129 "We see that all connecting whether we are con- 
scious of it or not, and whether we connect the manifold 
of intuition or several concepts together, and again, 
whether that intuition be sensuous or not sensuous is an 
act of the understanding." 
A 127 "This sensibility, as an object of our knowledge 
in any experience, with everything it may contain, is pos- 
sible only in the unity of apmerception, which unity of 
apperception is transcendental ground of the necessary 
order of all phenomena in an experience. The same unity 
of aptierception with reference to the manifoldrepresen - 
tations ( so as to determine it our of one) forms what we 
call the rule, and the faculty of these rules I call the 
understanding. As possible experience therefore, all 
phenomena depend in the same way a priori on the under- 
standing, and receive their formal possibility from it 
as, when looked upon as mere intuitions, they depend on 
sensibility, and become possible through it, so far as 
their form is concerned." 
The transcendental unity of apperception is thus shown to 
be a logical presupposition of all knowledge, not itself a species 
of immediate self knowledge. As the indispensable condition of 
(1) Adickes Ding all Sich p. 125. Cf. also the list of passages 
cited in the Opus Postumum as illustrative of logic al - 
conceptual meaning of "self positing." 
(2) Cf. supra. pp. 47 -50. 
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any mental process which is cognitive in character, it cannot 
be restricted to the transsubjective level. (1) 
Thirdly, and as a consequence of the preceding argument 
Ward's other contention that the categories are derived from the 
transcendental unity of apperception must also be denied. The 
categories cannot be "derived from" the transcendental unity of 
apperception, for the transcendental unity of apperception is not 
a species of knowledge at all. Rather, the transcendental unity 
of apperception and the categories are inseparable presupposi- 
tions of any kind of knowledge, which mutually imply and condi- 
tion one another. Neither the categories nor the transcendental 
unity of apperception can be themselves directly apprehended. 
Kant deduces both as necessary conditions of a fait accompli - 
consciousness. As conditions of consciousness, they cannot them- 
selves be anprehended. Our so called knowledge of them is 
simply a conceptual expression of factors which the possibility 
of experience implies. 
Fourthy,the contention that the categories are derived from 
the transcendental unity of apperception is in blatant contradic- 
tion with Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense; for this doctrine implies 
that all knowledge requires both the categories and an intuitional 
manifold, and that these requirements are as necessary- for the ex- 
perience of our mental states as they are for experience of external 
(1) I would atso point out that the identification of Kant's 
transcendental unity of apperception with Ward's empirical 
ego or Ye in Psychological Principles p. 377. cannot possi- 
bly be allowed. 
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phenomena. 
It remains to consider Ward's contention that Kant's doctrine 
of the "transcendental object" supports his interpretation of the 
transcendental unity of apperception and the categories, 
"On what other grounds can it be assumed that the 
transcendental object or non Ego so far from being 
utterly alien is verily the Ego's own correlate." (1) 
It is true that Kant sneaks of the transcendental object 
as the "correlatum of the unity of apperception" (A 520), but 
in this same passage Kant very explicitly says that we can have 
no knowledge of the transcendental object. 
"This means a something equal to X of which we do not, 
nay, with the present constitution of our understanding, 
cannot know anything...." 
Similarly 
A 253 "The object to which I refer the phenomenon in 
general is the transcendental object, that is, the entirely 
indefinite thought of something in general. This cannot 
be called the noumenon, for I know nothing of what it is 
by itself, and have no conception of it, except as the 
object of sensuous intuition in general, which is there- 
fore the same for all phenomena." 
So also A 191 "the transcendental object of which is unknown" 
and A 104 "such an object can only be conceived." 
A 540 "as we must always admit in thought a transcendental 
object as the foundation of phenomena, though we know 
nothing of that it is by itself." 
Thus although the transcendental object is the "correlatum" 
of the unity of apperception it is unknown, and neither the trans- 
cendental unity of apperception nor the transcendental object 
hermits of schematised categorial determination. Consequently, 
(1) Ward, J. Study_ of Kant n.82 
III. 
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when Kant ascribes the category of cause to the transcendental 
object in A 393, we learn from A 540 that this causality is 
"intelligible "; and 
"so far as it is intelligible, it would not have 
a place in the series of empirical conditions by which 
the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense." 
Similarly, in the case of the transcendental unity of apperception, 
the I is substance in concert, simple in concept, etc. but such 
"pure" categories cannot by themselves render knowledge possible. 
As regards the application of categories both the unity of apper- 
ception and the transcendental object are in the same position 
as other things in themselves. Kant allows that they may be 
thought by means of the pure categories, but they cannot thus become 
objedts of knowledge. It follows therefore that the "real" cate- 
gories of substance and cause cannot possibly be "derived from" 
the transcendental unity of apperception through psychological 
introspection. 
SECOND INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S CATEGORY THEORY. 
The results of the above criticism of the six arguments in 
favour of the First Interpretation of Kant's category theory have not 
been merely polemical and negative. The discussion has also afforded 
positive results which allows us to dispense with detailed argument in 
support of the Second Interpretation. It will be sufficient to outline 
the fundamental features which, on this view, characterise Kant's cate- 
gories. 
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(1) Their Function 
When Kant says that the categories are essential for 
'experience' and 'knowledge of objects', the term 'experience' is 
not restricted in meaning to systematic experience; it denotes any 
form of meaningful apprehension. Again ''object' is not that which 
is deliberately contrasted with subject - i.e. an object explicitly 
recognised as such. 'Knowledge of objects' denotes the apprehension 
of existences in space and time as exemplified by naive experience. 
For Kant, then, the categories are indispensable factors in any 
form of apprehension that may be called cognitive. Their function 
is not to clarify experience and knowledge, but to make objects, 
experience and knowledge possible. 
(2) Their Nature 
Since the categories are the sine quibus non of experience 
and knowledge as thus defined, they precondition apprehension; and 
since they are predonditions of apprehension, they cannot themselves 
be directly apprehended. Reflective thought may disclose their 
conceptual expression; but the categories as synthetic functions 
are the source of concepts, not themselves concepts. This, I have 
argued, (1) is an indispensable requirement of the Critical philoso- 
phy; it is a view, however, which. Kant never clearly formulates 
owing to the persistent influence of formal logic and rationalistic 
prejudices. He continually speaks of the categories as though they 
were concepts under Which particulars were subsumed. Such a mode of 
expression completely distorts their nature and function as demanded 
(1) Cf. supra pp. 65;60 
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by his own philosophical system. As Professor Kemp Smith justly 
observes 
"A category cannot be viewed as a predicate 
of a possible judgment, and as being applied to a subject 
indenendently apprehended; its function is to articulate 
the judgment as a whole." (1) 
Misinterpretation of Kant's category theory is inevitable 
unless it be realised that he employs the term category in a 
double meaning. 
"In the first place it represents the conceptual 
expression for the synthetic functions of our transcendental 
unity of apperception, by means of which we synthesise 
the material of perception, and form objects. In the second 
place, it denotes the results of this activity - the most 
general qualities, Syntheses and relations in things 
created or posited (by these functions) e.g. the Unity, 
Multiplicity, Quantity of objects, their causal connec- 
tions, etc." (2) 
Exclusive attention to the second meaning of the term 
yields not merely a superficial but an actually mistaken view 
of the categories. They are primarily dynamical synthetical 
functions and the source of relations and formal determinations. 
Only in a derivative and secondary sense are they concepts. 
(3) Their Source. 
Adamson points out 
"That Kant is forward in rejecting....the hypothesis 
that mind has somehow a structure which is adapted to the 
reception of the objects furnished in experience." (3) 
Such a "bifurcation" of subject and object would be attended 
with all the difficulties of the Cartesian dualism, and would 
(1) Kemp Smith.Commentary p.335 
(2) Adickes. Ding an Sich pn.57 -8 
(3) Adamson. Development of Modern Philosophy p. 185 
- 65 - 
preclude any natural explanation of synthetical a priori knowledge. 
When, however, this unmediated opposition between subject and 
object is transcended, and mind is recognised as (in a sense) 
the "maker of nature ", this objection no longer applies. 6o fax as 
Kett means by mind the power of representation he seems committed 
to the view that categories form part of the inherent structure 
of mind. From the genuinely Critical standpoint, however, this 
affords no basis for dogmatising as to the metaphysical nature of 
the categories. As Professor Kemp smith points out for Kent 
"Mind (Gemtit) is a neutral term without metaphysical implications. "(1) 
IV. Conclusion 
is T interpretation of Kant's category theory stands or falls 
with the legitimacy of extending the denotation of the term category 
to the synthetic nrocesses. I have supported my contention in 
this regard primarily by appealing to the requirements and doctrines 
of the Critical philosonhy, but also by the authority of a great 
master in Kantian exegesis - Erich Adickes.I have also set forth 
its advantages by showing that it avoids the difficult implications 
of a privileged categorial level and the Pickwickian interpretations 
of the a priori which attend the exclusively conceptual view. I 
might also add that it directs attention to the highly significant 
role of unconscious factors in the constitution and nature of mind - 
a suggestion which contemporary thought is making its own. 
(1) Commentary n. 81 
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Incidental references to Ward's doctrine of the categories 
have been made in discussing his interpretation of Kant. This part 
seeks to substantiate the criticisms already presented by a closer 
analysis of the doctrine as expounded in Psychological Principles.(1) 
We shall first state in summary fashion Ward's view of the 
nature and function of the categories, and then seek to show that his 
theory is unacceptable and open to the following criticisms: 
(1) That the perceptual level of experience asserted by Ward to 
be antecedent to the categcrial level is possible only by the 
employment of categories. (Ch.I. Perception): 
(2) That the development of self consciousness asserted to be the 
presupposition of categories, is possible only by the employment of 
categories. (Ch.II (1) The Development of Self Consciousness): 
(3) That the account of the Self - the pattern and prototype of 
the categories - is defective (Ch. II. (2) The Nature of the Self). 
The categories are forms of synthesis by which the content - 
"the sensory elements we are said to receive" (p. 315) - of ex- 
perience is combined. Three distinct modes of synthesis are recog- 
nised; (1) The formal (mathematical and logical) categories such as 
Unity, Plurality, Number, Difference, Likeness, Identity; (2) The 
reel categories Substance and Attribute, Cause and Effect, End and 
Means; (3) The so- called axiological categories of Value and Worth. 
(1) J1l references are to the Psycholoai cal Princinles 
unless otherwise stated. 
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With the possible exception of the mathematical categories of 
Unity, Plurality and Number, which "depend primarily on intui- 
tion"(1), these various modes of synthesis belong to the reflec- 
tive level. Thus the logical categories of Difference, Likeness, 
and Identity result from "reflective comparison,"(2), and the 
formation of the real categories of substance and attribute «cause 
and effect "depends primarily on self consciousness." (3). 
The ensuing discussion will be confined to the 'real' cate- 
gories of substance and attribute, cause and effect, since these 
may be regarded as crucial to this theory. 
The outstanding characteristic of Ward's view of these 
categories is their "anthropomorphic" nature. They are forms of 
synthesis which the subject projects upon things on the analogy 
of the self and through explicit self consciousness. 
"We find again without us the permanence and indivi- 
duality, the efficiency and the adaptation we have found 
first of all within we attribute to extended things 
a unity which we know only when we act and suffer our- 
selves..." (4) 
This "anthropomorphic" view of the categories implies that 
they are not employed until late in the development of mental life. 
"The formation of these concepts depends primarily upon 
the facts of what in the stricter sense we call self con- 
sciousness - implying intersubjective intercourse - and 
secondly, upon certain spatial and temporal relations among 
our presentations themselves. "(b) 
(1) There appears to be two different principles of forma- 
tion assigned to the category of unity. In 321, its source 
is traced to the "movement of attention "; whereas in 335 
it is said to be a projection upon external things of the 
unity of the self. "We attribute to extended things a 




(4) 335, Cf.338;343 
(5) 334 
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It must not be supposed that in maintaining the late emer- 
gence of these categories, Ward is concerned with an exclusively 
psychological account of how factors implicit in the formation of 
experience come to explicit consciousness. The employment of the 
categories at the "transsubjective level" virtually introduces a 
transfigured world and 
"we pass from mere perceptual experience to that 
wider experience which transcends it." (1) 
That Ward's analysis of experience is not merely psycho- 
logical, but is also regarded by him as epistemologically valid, 
appears evident from the important role which it plays in his strict- 
ly philosophical works. (2). Consequently, the following discussion 
is not concerned with the psychological development of the cate- 
gories, - the history of how the individual comes to explicit 
consciousness of substance and cause - but with the logical appli- 
cations of psychology which have been grafted into his philosophy. 
From this point of view the basis of our criticism consists 
in challenging the view that experience can be divided into non - 
categorial and categoriei levels; on the contrary, we contend that 
categories are indispensable constituents of all meaning, and 
therefore of all experience. In like manner, we question the legi- 
timacy of Ward's sharp demarcation between the perceptual and con- 
ceptual levels of experience; and will argue that even perceptual 
experience requires judgment, and the implicit use of conceptual 
(1) 33 
(2) e.g. Naturalism and Agnosticism Vol. II. xvi; 
Realm of Ends Intro. p. 11; ch. VI. 
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syntheses which transcend bare immediacy. The most elementary 
end ultimate of these syntheses are the categories. 
It may be suggested that Ward's insistence on the principle 
of continuity, (1) and various passages of the Psychological 
Principles explicitly repudiating a sharp demarcation between the 
perceptual and conceptual levels, (2) render this criticism an 
ignoratio elenchi. In reply, we contend that in so far as consis- 
tency between such statements and the doctrines of various levels 
of experience is preserved, it depends on maintaining that thought 
knowledge develops out of sense knowledge. Subsequent analysis 
will seek to confirm Professor Stout's criticism that 
"It is misleading to sneak, as Ward does, of a continuous 
development from sense knowledge to thought knowledge. All 
knowledge and all development of knowledge involves both 
thought and sense in inseparable unity. A blind sense ex- 
perience is not knowledge at all and could not become so by 
any process, however continuous of differentiation and 
integration. (3) 
(1) 90; 93 etc. 
(2) e.g. 292 -3; 336 
(3) Monist xxxvi. D. 46. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PERCEPTION 
I. The Presentational Continuum. 
The problems connected with Perception arise out of 
Ward's views of the "Presentational Continuum." This doctrine 
is thrown into relief by contrasting it with the atomistic 
psychology of Hume and Kent. 
"The notion - which Hume and Kant did so much to 
encourage - that psychical life begins which a confused 
manifold of sensation is one that becomes more incon- 
ceivable the more closely we consider it. In absolutely 
new presentation, having no sort of connexion with former 
presentations,till the subject has synthesised it with 
them, is e concept for which it would be hard to find 
a warrant. At any given moment we have a certain whole 
of presentations, a 'field of consciousness', psy-cho- 
logically one and continuous; at the next we have not 
an entirely new field, but a partial change within the 
Wo e. i) 
Mental advance does not consist in the combination of 
discrete elementary units, but in the gradual differentiation 
of an objective continuum. 
"The so called elementary sensation is really a 
partial modification of a pre existing and persisting 
presentational whole which thereby becomes more complex 
than it was before." (2) 
Differentiation, Retentiveness and Assimilation are the 
three intimately related processes (3) which give complexity and 
qualitative richness to the originally homogeneous presentational 
continuum. Differentiation implies that the seemingly simple 
(1) 77. (Italics in text) 
(2) 78 
(3) 83 
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becomes complex or the complex more complex. It implies also that 
this increased complexity is due to the persistence of former 
changes - Retentiveness. Finally, the process in which later 
differentiations 'blend with' and specialise what is retained of 
earlier less definite presentations, is Assimilation. 
It is difficult to determine whether Differentiation, Re- 
tention and Assimilation are to be regarded as characteristics of 
presentations or as functions of the attending subject. On the 
one hand are passages reminiscent of Locke's conviction that 
"in bare naked Perception the mind is for the most 
part passive." (1) 
"Retentiveness and associability of 'ideas' in the 
narrower sense, or representations, pertain primarily 
to the objective factor in experience." (2) 
"What are here celled objects or presentations are not 
the products of a sort of creative activity pertaining 
to the conscious self, which it is womehow mysteriously 
stimulated to exert. They have properties and laws of 
their ovum, in accordance with which indeed their inter- 
actions may be modified, but that is all. It was perhaps 
a wild dream of Herbart's that there could ever be a 
statics and dynamics of presentations; but his attempt 
may at least serve to exhibit more impressively the large 
amount of independence there is between the subject of 
consciousness and its objects." (3) 
"Can we provided we credit presentations with certain 
mutual attractions, repulsions, associations, complicating 
etc "(4) 
"We have already described the Process from the objec- 
tive side as assimilation or immediate recognition..s'(5) 
On this view it would seem that the subject but mirrors the 
properties and relations of the presentations confronting it. 
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Differentiation, retentiveness and assimilation are characters of 
the presentational continuum, not mental functions of the appre- 
hending subject. The three taken together are said to constitute 
"the plasticity of the presentational continuum." (1). 
On the other hand evidence is not lacking for the view that 
Differentiation, Retention and Assimilation are characters of atten- 
tion. 
"What we effectively retain assimilate and integrate 
is just what we have attended to and no more." (2) 
"Every acquisition, whether cognitive or practical, 
presupposes such acts of attention, and to these its 
retention, assimilation and association....are largely 
due." (3) 
"So the objective differentiation progresses on 
subjectively determined lines." (4) 
Again the explicit caveats against confusing retentiveness 
with memory (5) and the synonymous use of assimilation and recog- 
nition, (6) would certair.ly indicate that retentiveness and assimi- 
lation belong to the apprehending subject rather than to Presen- 
tations. 
This view receives further confirmation from Professor 
Stout's penetrating analysis of Ward's theory of attention. 
"(Ward) extends the term Attention to cover both 
theoretical and practical activity. What is distinctive 
of practical activity is that Attention is in it directed 
to 'motor presentations' which are thereby translated 
into actually experienced movements of the body, pro- 









- 74 - 
instance when I actually dissect a flower. Now 
Ward seems to hold as a fundamental principle; that 
we also produce objective change, though in a very 
different way, when, by attentively contemplating 
a strange flower, we gain a more distinct and de- 
tailed apprehension of its partial features.... 
According to him there is not merely discrimination 
of pre -existing differences; new differences actually 
emerge, through the interaction of subject and 
object....Further the process throughout is an inter- 
action of subject and object in vthich the action of 
the subject in attending is the formative agency. 
In attending, the subject alters its object; it makes, 
instead of merely apprehends differences." (1) 
Though this view is not without difficulties (2), it clearly 
indicates that attention is no mere passive mirroring of an 
objective continuum; on the contrary, by interested selection 
it is a formative agency in the construction of the objective 
continuum. Regarded thus, attention transcends the merely 
given, (3), and differentiation, retentiveness, and assimila- 
tion are its modus operandi. Differentiation, retentiveness 
and assimilation cannot be described as laws of attraction 
and repulsion belonging to presentations; they are analytical - 
synthetical functions essential to attention and judgment. As 
(1) Monist xxxvi . 30 -1 
(2) Especially its implications with respect to the 
problem of Appearance and Reality Cf. Mind xxx 
"Professor Wara's Psychological Principles" by 
G. Dawes Hicks pp.12 -13; Monist xxx. 73.31;34. 
(3) The purely immediate or "merely given" would 
appear to be a fiction. Cf. Phil. Rev. xxxvii.2. 
Immediacy and Meaning. G.P. Adams. 
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such they witness to the implicit (1) operation of thought (2) 
factors or categories at the very threshold of experience. 
H. PERCEPTION 
Differentiation of the sensori -motor continuum could not 
proceed far without integration. 
"On the contrary there is every reason to think.... 
that further differentiation was helped by previous 
integration, that perception prepared the way for more 
distinct sensations, and purposive action for more 
varied movements." (3) 
The various though related meanings ascribed to Perception 
by psychologists indicates its relatively complex nature. Its 
analysis requires a discussion of 
(a) The Recognition of Impressions 
(b) The Localisation of Impressions 
(e) The Intuition of Things. 
(1) Ward condemns the word "implicit" in Lund N.S. xxviii, 
p.263 Sense Knowledge (1). "Perhaps it would be fairer 
to say that all they mean is that whatever is logically 
implicated is unconsciously involved. But surely this 
is bad psychology and assumes a scientifically unwar- 
ranted use of the notion of potentiality." 
On the other hand, exclusive attention to the 
explicitly,conscious may result in erroneous analysis 
through over simplification. That which can estab'_ish 
itself as necessary for the possibility of e given ex- 
perience - even though not consciously realised in the 
experiencing - may surely claim to be "implicit ". The 
term appears to be used in this sense by Ward himself 
in Mind N.S. xxviii pp.446 -9 Art. Sense Knowledge.(II). 
(2) By thought factors is meant factors which transcend 
the immediacy of sense. 
(3) 139 
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(a). Recognition of Impressions 
Recognition is a term of wide range. Its more developed 
forms require free ideas, distinct memories and distinct anti- 
cipations. In tts simpler forms it appears to be closely allied 
or even identical with Assimilation (1); and as such involves 
"no confronting the new with the old, no determination 
of likeness, and no subsequent classification." (2) 
Iccording to Ward, perceptual recognition functions or 
a strictly sensory level and without the cooperation of thought 
factors. This, I submit, is impossible; and subsequent analysis 
will indicate that Ward's account of perceptual recognition implies 
thought as well as sense. 
In reoognition we have not merely S, a presentation or 
sensation, but S gamma. Suppose for example 
"a new or strange situation A; then after more or 
fewer repetitions we say this situation was recognised, 
became quite familiar. If A wes a complex movement, we 
say that at first it was hard to perform, but that after 
repeated trials it was performed with perfect facility. 
Familiarity and facility then may be regarded as charac- 
ters that perceptions or actions gradually acquire... "(3) 
I do not think it would be correct to say that Ward ex- 
plains recognition in terms of familiarity and facility. Fami- 
liarity, facility and recognition appear to be regarded as in- 
volving one and the same problem - viz. to determine the nature 
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tion (1). Unless this be so, the explanation is obviously circular, 
for the familiarity which would explain recognition can only be 
familiar because it is recognised. 
The enquiry as to the nature of gaìnna is considered under 
two headings - the subjective and the objective. 
Under the former we shall have briefly to note that changes 
the process of such development entails upon the subject. Under 
the latter we shall have to ascertain more at length the charac- 
teristics thereby entailed upon the presentational continuum.(2) 
Consideration of the subjective phase of the problem reveals 
(1) that though familiarity and facility are closely related 
to feeling, they are not the result of feeling (3); 
(2) that gamma does not result from a mere association of 
a plurality of identical presentations. A gamma is neither the 
mere sum nor a mere fusion of a series of preceding experiences 
A an a3 a2 a1 (4) 
(3) "That apart from subjective selection and interest 
the percept or movement A could never have acquired the character- 
istic gamma at all." (5) 
(1) I am assuming that recognised should be read for "cognised" 
in the sentence "We may indicate this acquired characteris- 
tic by gamma so that A in becoming cognised or assimi- 
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The statement of the objective chase of the inquiry is 
primarily concerned with the rise of 'free ideas'. Its bearing 
on the nature of recognition is indirect and negative. It argues 
that perceptual recognition is confined to the sense bound level; 
and though it results in something additional to the mere percept, 
this additional feature must not be confused with a memory image 
or a 'free idea'. 
"It is, as it has been happily called, - a tied or 
implicit idea." (1) 
As further evidence of the sense bound stage of this immature 
idea "after percepts" - the socalled memory after image - and 
"preperception " is submitted. 
The evidence to show that preperception is in all its factors 
sense bound is quite unconvincing. Examples of preperception 
are furnished by every day illusions, such as the hailing of a 
scarecrow by a traveller who mistakes it for a farmer, or the at- 
tempts to eat wax models of fruit. But surely these illustra- 
tions show conclusively that the immediacy of the sense presented 
is transcended. The scarecrow is hailed, questioned, etc. because 
it is judged to be a particular of "such. a kind" that can be hailed 
and questioned. Though in such a case there is no explicit psycho- 
logical analysis sundering-the particular and the universal, there 
is an awareness of the general embedded in the awareness of the 
particular (2). The implicit universal enshrouds the presentation 
(1) 183 
(2) Stout Manual 4th ed. revised 310 
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in a context, and endows it with a meaning pointing beyond itself. 
The illustrations of the scarecrow and wax orange are 
particularly obvious on this point, because they happen to be cases 
of error, and - as Plato showed (1) - the very possibility of error 
or mistake involves the transcendence of the immediate; but trans- 
cendence of the immediate is also a necessary constituent of true 
prepercepts, as when the sight of ice yields a forefeel of its 
coldness, or the smell of baked meats a foretaste of their savour. 
It will be observed that Ward's discussion makes little 
positive contribution to the determining of perceptual recognition 
or the nature of gamma. We learn that gamma is not rather than 
what it is. The negative result is significant. It is the 
inevitable outcome of refusal to recognise that thought as well 
as sense is involved in attention and conation. Ward insists 
"That apart from subjective selection and interest, the 
percept or movement A could never have acquired the 
characteristic gamma at all" 
yet he endeavours to account for the nature of gamma exclusively 
in sensory terms. Now as Stout says 
"What is sought must be predetermined for the psycho- 
logical subject himself as a change in the given situation 
in those respects in which the situation is felt as unsatis- 
fying. This implies that something is thought that is not 
given in actual sense experience. The immediacy of sense 
is so far transcended ". (2) 
(1) Theaetetus 195 d; Sophist 264 c. 
(2) Monist xxxvi.p.42 
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This also holds for attention in its theoretical aspect 
"What is here sought is more complete apprehension of 
an object as initially given or presupposed. The tendency 
is to make the object more distinct and to relate it to 
its context - to develop it more fully in consciousness. 
Even in the most primitive stages of the process there 
must be some inarticulate counterpart of the question which 
we should formulate as : what? or what next? or what more ?(1)" 
(b) The Localisation of Impressions. 
"To treat of the localisation of impressions is really 
to give an account of how the psychological individual comes 
to a knowledge of space. "(2) 
Spatial experience is a complex affair. It requires the 
apprehension of externality, juxtaposition, distance and inter- 
nality, The problem is to discover how the perception of this 
complexity has come about. According to lard it depenis on 
three factors: 
(i) The intrinsic extensity of sensation 
(ii) The extensity of the presentational continuum 
(iii) Movement. 
Since my primary concern in discussing spatial perception 
is to show that not only sensory but also cognitive factors are 
involved, I shall not challenge the validity of the extensity theory 
of sensation or question the legitimacy of ascribing the term con- 
tinuum to an 'originally dimension -less° and 'primitively amorphous' 
totum objectivum. (3). I shall therefore proceed to consider the 
role of movement in spatial perception. 
(1) Monist xxxvi. p.43 
(2) 144 
(3) Cf. N.K. Smith Prolegomena pn.100 -5 
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According to Ward both local signs and movement are necessary 
for apprehending position and spatial relations. Local signs 
without movement may render possible qualitative differences, 
but the additional factor of movement is necessary for the appre- 
hending of position. Local signs are not perceptual localisatioas, 
they are merely sensory marks that make localising in filled 
space possible. On the other hand, movement apart from local signs 
would not give place, but possibly a successive series of kinaes- 
thetic sensations. 
"The one yields potential position without place, the 
other potential place without position." (1) . 
Hence both local signs and movement are necessary for spatial 
perception. 
Thus 
"If Fd and Fg are e.g. two impressions produced by 
compass points touching two different snots as ld and lg on the 
hand or arm, and we place a finger on ld and move it to lg, 
experiencing thereby the series P1P2P3P4, this series constitutes 
ld and lg into positions and also invests Fd and Fg with a relation 
not of mere distinctness but of definite distance." (2) 
Now it is not at all evident how on a strictly sense pre- 
sented level the series P1 P4, 'hieh is successive should give 
distance. Even if we suppose the series P1 P4 to come into 
relief from a presentational continuum through each being connected 
with e specific local sign, yet the connection of the intervening 
Position Pl - P4 is not cfntinuous as presented successively. 
(1) 150 
(2) 151 
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On a strictly sense bound level what retains pl and P2P34=n P4 
is reached, so that the successive series P1 - P4 yields distance? 
This difficulty is present even in the simpler case where 
localisation is carried out by active and passive touches on the 
body; but it becomes much more acute when distance perception be- 
tween external bodies is in question, for here active touch is alone 
operative. In the latter case the question is, how does a series 
of touches sensed successively in an exploring member of the body 
e.g. the finger, yield distance between objects, external to the 
body? Ward answers 
"When the series of movements is accompanied by active 
touches without passive, there arises the distinction 
between one's own body and foreign bodies. When the initial 
movement of a series is accompanied by both active and 
passive touches, the final movement by active touches only, 
and the intermediate movements are unaccompanied by either, 
we get the further presentation of empty space lying between 
us and them - but not until, by frequent experience of 
contacts along with these intermediate movements, we 
have come to know all movement not merely as a succession 
but as a change of position. Thus active touches come at 
length to be "projected" passive touches alone being localised 
in the strict sense of the term." (1) 
As an account of certain factors involved in the genesis of 
the spatial relations concerned this quotation may be unimpeachable, 
but does it describe what takes place on a merely sensory level? 
Can the triple comparison, or if this term be objected to, the aware- 
ness of a threefold unlikeness in the series of movements accom- 
panied by both active and passive touches, accompanied by active 
touches only and unaccompanied by either be apprehended on the level 




An analysis of Ward's account of 
discloses difficulties analogous 
than those indicated in the case 
temporal perception 
to and no less formidable 
of space. 
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(c) The Intuition of Things 
The intuition of things necessitates the discussion of 
(i) the objects reality, (ii) its solidity or occupations of 
space, (iii) its unity and complexity (iv) its permanence or 
rather its continuity in time (v) its substantiality and the 
connexion of its attributes and bowers. 
The complexity of perception is hereby clearly indicated, 
and it requires no lengthy analysis to show that thought factors 
transcending the immediacy of the merely sense presented are 
necessary. 
Thus though the real is not strictly an item by itself but 
a characteristic of all the items enumerated, its recognition rests 
primarily on distinguishing presentations from representations. 
"Now this distinction....depends partly upon the relation of the 
presentation of the thing to other presentations in consciousness 
with it, partly upon the relation to it, the attitude which it 
evokes in the subject whose presentation it is." (1) 
Again the apprehension of unity and complexity requires 
the discrimination of a thing as relatively fixed in its temporal 
and spatial relations. 
"It is only where a group, as a whole, has been found 
to change its position relatively to other groups, and to 
be - in general - independent of changes of Position among 
them, that such complexes can become distinct unities, a 
world of many things." (2) 
(1) 162 
(2) 164 
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Lastly the apprehension of things as permanent is not an 
immediately presented sense datum, but a projection on the analo- 
gy of the bodily self. 
"As we have existed - or more exactly, as the body has 
been continuously presented - during the interval between 
two encounters with some other recognised body, so this 
comes to be regarded as having continuously existed during 
its absence from us." (1) 
These passages sneak for themselves in every case they 
imply that the merely sense presented is transcended. 
The other issues involved in Ward's theory of perception 
req, +:ire discussion of the development of self consciousness and 
projicience, and are reserved for the next chapter. 
(1) 165 (Italics mine). 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
NATURE OF THE SELF. 
In outlining Ward's account of the 'Real' categories their 
dependence upon self consciousness was emphasised. The cate- 
gories of substance and cause are said to have their source in 
the explicit consciousness of self and are then attributed by 
analogy to things. 
ne find again without us the permanence and indivi- 
duality, the efficiency and adaptation we have found 
first of all within." (1) 
Self consciousness is not attained until the immanence 
or immediacy of individual experience has been transformed by 
social life. Its emergence thus presupposes stages of experi- 
ence in which categorial functions play no part. The aim of 
the ensuing discussion is to show (1) that the development of 
experience prior to the level of self consciousness is only 
possible by means of categories; and that therefore since self 
consciousness presupposes consciousness of objects, and conscious- 
ness of objects is only possible by the categories, self conscious- 
ness cannot be the source and origin of the categories; (2) that 
the self revealed in self consciousness cannot be the prototype 
and paradigm of the categories. 
(1) 335 
(2) Mind and Matter 288 
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The Development of Self Consciousness 
Professor Stout expounds Ward's earliest level of experience 
as follows: 
"In the first pltce there is purely individual or 
immediate experience in which the individual is confined 
to his own sense. and feelings and has no cognisance of 
independently existing things or other selves." (1) 
This statement might seem at first to misrepresent Ward, since 
it appears to conflict with his cardinal principle of the duality 
of subject and object (2), with statements in his account of per- 
ception (3), and with such assertions as: 
"The psychologist must maintain that no experience 
is merely subjective." (4). 
Nevertheless, unless Professor Stout's estimate of Ward's 
position be correct, the importance assigned to introjection and 
intersubjective intercourse as preliminary to the transsubjective 
level - at which consciousness of objects first arises - seems mis- 
placed. 
Assuming then that Ward considers experience begins by 
being purely individual, how is the experient released from his 
solipsistic confinement? Ward's answer is afforded by his account 
of the transition to the level of intersubjective intercourse.(5). 
The following typical passage will serve for the purnoses of critical 
analysis: 
"Again such special parallax or acquaintance with 
others of its own kind, is the direct outcome of the extended 
range in time which the individual's progress in perception 
(1); Mind and Matter 288 
(2). 30 -33; 37 -8; 45; 47- 8.etc. 
(3). 161 
(4). 32 
(5). I take it that 'ejective' and'intersubjective' refer to 
the same level of experience. 
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and memory secured; and when in this way its (bodily) 
self hes become an object, the objects that resemble 
it become other selves or 'ejects' tt 
and once the ejective level is attained, some interchange of 
experience is possible. So disappears the great gulf fixed 
between subjective or individual and intersubjective or uni- 
versal experience by rival systems in philosophy. (1). When 
subjected to careful scrutiny this passage proves to be tanta- 
lisingly indefinite. The significant phrase "the objects that 
resemble it" etc. is especially ambiguous. 
On the one hand "the objects that resemble" has been taken 
to signify other organic bodies. The passage would then assert 
that when the body has become an object for the individual ex- 
percent, he will attribute to all other bodies like his own, mental 
faculties, powers, feelings, sensations, etc. Hence recognition 
of other embodied selves is what immediately supervenes upon the 
purely individual level of private sensa and feelings. 
The following considerations would seem to support this inter- 
pretation; 
(a) The aliodosis of the phrase in question viz. "become other 
selves or ejects:" 
(b) Ward's contention that knowledge of objects and things as dis- 
tinct from selves does not arise until the later transsubjective 
level; 
(o) it appears to receive the endorsement of Professor Stout. 
Stout describes the transition to the intersubjective level 
(1) 33 -4 Cf. Realm of Ends 28 -9; Naturalism and Agnosticism II,165 
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as follows: 
"The next step is that he finds his actions conditioned 
and limited in ways which can only be interpreted by assuming 
other active selves interested in what he himself is interested 
in. As this interpretation proceeds on the analogy of his 
own existence as an experiencing individual, it is a 'pro- 
jection of the self.' Ward illustrates by the case of several 
men contending for the same loaf of bread. This is the stage 
of intersubjective intercourse. It involves the recognition 
of other selves as members of a society, or at least the rudi- 
mentary beginning of a society. But it does not involve the 
recognition of other things, e.g. the loaf of bread, as inde- 
pendently existing in the way that the individual himself 
and his fellow -men exist." (1) 
I shall not dwell on the insuperable objections to which the 
theory is open, as thus interpreted. Ward becomes committed to the 
outrageous assertion that initially the perception of the experient 
consists exclusively in the recognition -of organic bodies like his 
own. Ward certainly says nothing of the kind in the passage we are 
considering. On the contrary he says 
"acquaintance with others of its own kind is the direct out- 
come of the extended range in time which the individual's pro 
press in perception and memory secured." 
It is surely obvious that if perception were developed 
enough to perceive our own body and other complexes of presentations 
like our own body, Ward is compelled to admit that foreign bodies 
bogy 
are perceived as things. A. foreignAis not presented as a self, it is 
endowed with a self. Furthermore the exclusive recognition of such 
complex appearances as organic bodies appears incredible, when one 
realises how intimately the early life of the individual is associated 
with non bodily appearances such as bottles, rattles, etc. Can we 
suppose that Ward can have overlooked the facts of infant and animal 
(1) Mind and Matter 288. Of course Professor Stout does not 
himself subscribe to the doctrine. 
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behaviour which so obviously f'efute the restriction of initial 
recognition to members of our own species? 
A much more plausible theory results if the phrase "the objects 
that resemble" be taken to signify not merely organic bodies but any 
complex of sense presentations, capable of being handled and mani- 
pulated like the body. Experience is still of course, conceived 
as being essentially anthropomorphic and built up on the pattern 
of the self. And though this theory is by no means free from 
difficulties, as thus interpreted it escapes the absurdity of 
restricting initial recognition of the not -self exclusively to 
organic bodies like our own. I would urge the following considera- 
tións as evidence for this interpretation: 
(a) Such passages are: 
"Up to this point the presentation of self has shaped 
that of not -self - that is to say, external things have been 
interpreted more or less ejectively." (1) 
"Things for primitive minds are much nearer to what we 
call 'ejects' than to the seemingly inanimate objects which 
we now discriminate from these. The term ' eject' then 
may be regarded so far as covering the two cases - that of 
things personified and that of actual persons; and the assump- 
tion of the former seems to be implicit before the recogni- 
tion of the latter is explicit. (2) 
(b) The discussion of Perception in the Psychological Principles, which 
though it maintains that the intuition of things is anthropomorphic 
gives no indication that it is preceded by a recognition exclusively 
confined to embodied selves. (3). 
(1) 368. (Italics mine) 
(2) Contemporary British Philosophers Second Series.p.34 
(Italics mine). 
(3) There are ambiguous passages on 165 which might be construed 
to the contrary; but the discussion as a whole would be 
against restricting recognition to organic bodies like our 
oä71. 
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7evertheless, even on the second and more plausible inter- 
pretation of the ambiguous phrase 'objects that resemble it', 
Ward's account of the transition to the 'ejective' level must be 
pronounced invalid. The entire procedure is vitiated by the illegi- 
timacy - at this level of mental development - of the projection theory 
of the self on which it depends. 
Ward never shows successfully how e transition is made to 
the perception of the not -self by means of his projection theory 
of the self. The following passages dealing with this specific pro- 
blem are obviously inadequate for this purpose, since they indicate 
that our body is only recognised in distinction from other bodies. 
"As soon as definite perception begins, the body is 
distinguished as an extended thing from other bodies. "(1) 
"As we have existed....during the interval between two 
encounters'with some other recognised body, etc.:'(2) 
Again to say, "that the primordial factor in external reality.... 
is due to the projection of a subjectively determined exer- 
tion which meets with resistance... "(163), 
is, as Stout remarks, an obvious netitio nrincinii to account for the 
way in which objects become known. 
"Awareness of an embodied self in interaction with an 
embodied not -self is already presupposed in the awareness of 
resisted effort." (3) 
In the first place, does not 'projicience' presuppose the ex- 
ternal reference which it claims to render possible? If the answer be 
in the affirmative there is an obvious netitio nrincinii; if the answer 
be in the negaive, we are still within the circle of private individual 
(1) 365 
(2) 165 
(3) Mind and Matter 167 
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sensa end feelings. 
In the second place, how can there be a projection of the 
self at this level of experience? Since 'ejects' are characterised 
by a thorough going animatism, the projection which ex hyoothesi 
renders their recognition possible cannot be a projection of the 
self as body. (1). To render the apprehension of 'ejects' possible, 
the self on which they are patterned must be an 'anima'. The 
subject must have appropriated experiences of activity, efficacy 
and permanence before it can attain the "ejective level ". How 
is this awareness of activity and the other attributes characteris- 
tic of 'ejects' possible? It cannot be through the consciousness 
of M, the empirical Ego, for this - in any appropriate sense - 
would involve the social milieu which it seeks to explain. Hor 
can the projection be consequent upon a direct awareness of the 
activities of the pure Ego or I, for the pure Ego, according to 
Ward, is by its very nature as ultimate subject precluded from being 
known. Neither the pure Ego (2), nor activityÇ3), nor attention (4), 
nor pleasure and nain (5) can be known immediately in themselves. 
Yet they cannot be known at this stage "mediately and by their 
effects "(6), for this would require the recognition of a not -self 
which is the thing to be explained. 
(1) To perceive the body as object would indeed be but a 







In the third place as Professor Stout Cloys 
"We have no conception of the action of an individual 
self except as essentially including transactions between 
him and other beings which appear to him as bodies and 
embodied selves. In being aware of himself as active 
he is already aware of an independent not -self with which 
he interacts." (1) 
It is evident then that the projection theory of the self 
must be rejected as an explanation of the transition to the level 
of intersub jective intercourse. Tor can recognition of things as 
independent of self, await a transsubjective level; reared upon 
the developed self consciousness resulting from the social coopera- 
tion and conflict of intersubjective intercourse. The duality of 
subject is as primordial for epistemology as psychology. Only by 
transcending the immediate is any experience possible. But, as has 
been repeatedly urged, transcendence of the immediate involves 
cognitive factors, universal principles of relation or categories. 
These fundamental constituents of experience must function ab initio. 
They cannot be assigned to a late stage of development. Their primery 
function is not to clarify experience, but to render it possible. 
"The function of the fundamental categories....is to 
endow the mind with the capacity to apprehend certain uni- 
versal meanings which are indispensable for the intuition 
of time and space and objects." (2) 
(1) Mind and ratter 293 
(2) Smith, T.K. n Prolegomena 176 
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II. The Nature of the Self. 
I shall now seek to show that the Self revealed in Self 
consciousness cannot be the prototype and paradigm of the cate- 
gori es. 
Ward distinguishes shapply between the pure Self and the 
empirical Self. The pure Self or I is the knowing experiencing 
self, 
"the thinker of all our inmost thoughts, the doer 
of all our very deeds," (1) 
the indispensable subject of all experience. The empirical Self 
is the self which is known in internal perception of self conscious- 
ness. 
"Self consciousness is attained when besides knowing 
feeling and acting, we also know that we know, know that 
we feel and know that we act; when in short we can say 
'I know myself', or as the French more aptly say Je me 
connais. The self known we call the empirical Ego or 
Me, and distinguish it from the self -knowing, the I, 
which Kant was wont to call the pure Ego." (2). 
The empirical Self is a genetic product. Its development is 
traced from its nucleus, the vital sense or coenaesthesis, through 
the levels of the bodily sensitive self, the imagining and desiring 
self to the thinking and willing self - the most developed and 
"inmost" self known. (3). Nevertheless, this "inmost self" is not 
the pure Ego. 
"To identify I and Me is logically impossible for ex vi 
terminorum, it is to identify subject and object." (4). 
(1) 371 
(2) 361 
(3) 364 -570 
(4) 379 
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It is by no means easy to determine precisely Ward's opinion 
as to the relationship between the pure Self and the empirical Self. 
Although, no development of the empirical Self can make it identical 
with the pure Self, nevertheless, the empirical Self is "appropriated 
by the I as a presentation of itself. "(1). Evidently, then, the 
empirical Self is regarded as, in some sense, a presentation of the 
pure Self. Yet since the development of the empirical Self is but 
an asymptotic approach to the pure Self, the presented Self must be 
of a different order from the pure Self. As Professor Stout points 
out 
"For (Ward), the empirical Self of the lower levels is 
a 'double' which does not include, but is provisionally sube 
stituted instead of the pure Ego." Stout pertinently asks 
"How then can it be revealed, directly or indirectly, merely 
by removing these empirical substitutes ?" (2). 
Now this representationism has serious consequences for ',ard's 
deduction of the categories. It is obvious that it is the empirical 
Self which must be regarded as the paradigm of the categories. The 
pure Self is excluded, since it is unknowable save in so far as it is 
represented by the empirical Self; also the late emergence of the cate- 
gories is precisely due to their prototype - the empirical Self - not 
being revealed until the self conscious level has been attained. 
Our Problem then is to determine whether the empirical Self 
revealed in internal perception is an adequate paradigm of the 
categories. 
A serious difficulty immediately arises owing to the external 
relationship just indicated between the pure Self and empirical Self. 
(1) 391 
(2) Monist xxxvi.p.49 
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The pure Self is the knower, the subject of attention and its modes. 
The empirical Self is a presentation, and like all presentations is 
contemplated, known - in short a content. Now the categories es 
forms of synthesis must be employed by the knower - the pure Self. 
The question, therefore, arises - How does the pure Self contemplate 
the categories in a presentational medium, without already employing 
the categories? Furthermore, it might be asked, if it can do so in 
the case of an inward presentational complex, why not in the case 
of the outward presentational complex? Since the empirical Self 
is only a representation what special claims has it for privileged 
intimacy with the pure Self? If, however, the pure Self employs 
categories in contemplating the empirical Self, the empirical Self 
is not the source and origin of the categories. 
In the next place, how can a presentation - a content contemp- 
lated and known - be a prototype of 'synthetic functions'? Ward 
himself says of the categories 
"Unlike other concerts, categories....do not in the first 
instance signify objects of thought but these functions of the 
understanding in constituting objects." (1) 
That synthetic functions connote activity is particularly evident in 
the case of cause and effect. 
"It would seem that when in ordinary thinking, we say A 
causes this or that in B, we project or analogically attribute 
to A what we experience in acting, and to B what we experience 
in being acted on." (2) 
More precise determination as to the adequacy of the empirical 





The symbolism suggested for internal perception is Ip(Mp -ol). 
It designates such experiences as "I am conscious of hearing the 
thunder." I is the pure Self. M is the empirical Self at whatever 
stage it is known, but for our purposes its highest stage. of is 
a differentiation of o, e.g. my thunder as I hear it and "own" it, 
is considered as a differentiation of thunder not so qualified. 
p1 is exemplified by : - I am conscious of seeing the lightning, 
of hearing the thunder, of remembering the morning's news, of 
imagining a tropical forest, of enjoying music, of enduring tooth- 
ache, etc 
"We might say with Locke that pl here answers to 
the perception of the operation of our own mind within 
us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got." (1) 
Now as Professor Laird very justly observes 
"If p1 is correctly described as remembering., hearing, 
imagining (and the rest), then not only may M be indistin- 
guishable from a continuity of pls, but pl bids fair to 
be indistinguishable from Ds As we have seen, these very 
instances of remembering, perceiving and the rest were 
stated in an earlier chapter to be instances of attention; 
and attention it is here stated (and in general abundantly 
evident) is a faculty of I (it is p not pl) ". (2) 
This overlanping between p and p1 raises difficulties on 
every hand. 
In the first place, imagining, desiring, thinking and willing 
are modes of attention attributed to I; to attribute them to Y is 
a. duplication threatening the unity of consciousness. Secondly, 
even if we suppose M endowed with these capacities and powers, _it 
(1) 371-2 
( 2) Monist xxxvi. p.100. 
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would seem impossible - on Ward's principles - that the I could 
apprehend them. Since neither attention nor feeling can 'be known 
immediately, there seems no ground for assuming that the I could 
apprehend the Me qua attending and feeling. Thirdly, what justifi- 
cation is there for calling the empirical Self described as thinking, 
willing, etc. a presentation? To know the empirical Self as a pre- 
sentation involves that it be "more or less attended to "(1); hence 
to know M qua feeling, imagining, thinking, willing, etc. implies 
that I attends to M presented as thus described. But neither ac- 
tivity nor attention and its modes are presentations (2). Hence M 
as thus described cannot be a presentation, and therefore cannot be 
the paradigm of the categories. 
Our account of M and p1 would be incomplete unless attention 
were drawn to passages indicating a very different meaning for these 
terms. 
"We have to ask concerning the subjective factors - sym- 
bolized as 14 .p1 - what exactly it is that, at the self con- 
scious level, we are said to 'perceive,"? All that we can 
be said to Perceive answering to subjective factors, must, 
it would seem, be something pertaining not directly to the 
subject but to the organism and its environment. This we 
have found to be true of M as the presentation of the sensi- 
tive and appetitive self. It is true also of the pl 
/*plating this zone of M with its objective differentiation 
o ." (3). 
Thus, pl denotes the sense organs or that part of the organism 
instrumental in annrehending an object, which are they referred to M. 
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pleasure and pain attending the strains and muscular adjustments 
involved in looking, listening, recollecting', etc. 
"This is especially the case when owing to fatigue, 
functional defect, or intensity of stimulus any further 
activity is for the time nainful. Here the pain felt 
Prompts the reference of n1 to M or the bodily self." (1). 
Ultimately, then, pl is neither the sense organs nor the 
muscular adjustments and strains, but the pain arising from fatigue, 
functional defect or intensity of stimulus, which makes further 
activity for the time Painful. 
Now it seems impossible to reconcile this assertion with 
','yard's contention that feeling, and its modes pleasure and pain, 
are incapable of being directly known. (2). This, indeed, is 
expressly reiterated in the present chapter and the conclusion 
reached is that 
"The socalled 'internal Perception' of feeling, then, 
is not a perception of the feeling itself, which is supposed 
to be its direct object. It is rather, as in the case of 
attention and its operations, a reference of its objective 
accompaniments to the appropriate zone of the empirical 
self." (3). 
Nevertheless as we have just sh wn 
"the reference of its objective accompaniments to the appro- 
priate zone of the empirical Self" 
ultimately depends on the perception of nleaaure and pain which ac- 
companies impeded or unimpeded functional activity. 
It is a significant reflection on lard's theory of categories, 
that his account of their prototype the empirical Self proves so 
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necessary for a satisfactory theory of the Self involve the surren- 
dering of its being the paradigm of the categories. 
We have seen that Ward insists that although the nure Self 
cannot be known (as e presented object) nevertheless, it cannot be 
gainsaid. Pis solution of this difficulty is to render the pure 
Self vicariously known through a presentational duplicate, which 
though increasing development, asymptotically approaches the I as 
a limit. Two criticisms arise in this connection: - 
(1) the empirical Self in its development appeared to take 
on functions which obviously belong to the nure Self. (pl was 
described as remembering, hearing, imagining, etc.) 
(2) We get the extraordinary result that the development of the 
Self consists in sloughing off successive stages of outwardness 
and gradually reducing to but never attaining a focus imaginarius. 
"We began with self represented by concentric objective 
zones, sensory, ideational, personal, spirit1L l , and end 
with a focus imaginarius, as Kant celled it This 
concept of the pure Ego, or I, in other words is the 
limit to which the empirical Ego points." (1) 
Ward indeed protests that 
"the pure subject or Ego which we reach in our analysis 
of experience at its rational level stands for no abstrac- 
tion so long as we are content to distinguish it without 
attempting to separate it from its objective complement, the 
non -Ego." (2). 
I agree with Ward that it is 'outrageous' that the I of 
which one speaks in some supreme issue should be regarded as an 
utter abstraction; but I fail to see how Ward's account of the 
(1) 377 
(2) 379 
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Self consistently applied can escape it. 
I would suggest that the pure Self can only escape becoming 
an abstraction by recognising that it is not a focus imaginarius, 
but a growing structure of appetitions, habits, beliefs, and senti- 
ments. If all that makes the Self a dynamic centre be assigned 
to a presentational substitute, how can we avoid making the pure 
Ego an abstraction? There are therefore not two selves, but one 
self, and we must guard against hypostatising the Self of "internal 
perception" which is but a partial reconstruction of the actual, 
dynamic, spiritual Self. That the Self is not a presentation 
"to be taken in at a single gulp by an act of sensing ",(1) 
seems evident from the difficulties and intricacies attending its 
analysis. Consequently, if an immediate awareness of conscious 
activity be denied, the "empirical Self" must be a reconstruction 
of the experiencing Self. Such reconstruction, of course, to be 
adequate is an extremely complex affair, but Socrates' "know thy- 
self" should have made us realise that. I would hazard the sug- 
gestion that some of the obscurity attending the problem of the 
Self might be avoided by abolishing the expressions "-pure Self" 
and "empirical Self ". The problem of internal perception would then 
be formulated as that of reconstructing the Self in idea. 
Such a view will assign the categories to the Self as functions 
indispensable for any apprehension that may be called cognitive. They 
are as original as attention, and indeed indispensable for its exer- 
cise. They are not acquired at a certain level of experience but in- 
dispensable factors for the possibility of experience. 
(1) Monist xxxvi 108 
Ward, J. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Alexander, the categories are determinations 
of all things which arise within Space -Time. (1). They are 
structural determinations which belong to existents in virtue 
of their intrinsically snatio- temporal nature. S -T is the stuff 
of which matter and all things are complexes; and the categories 
are pervasive features of these spatio- temporal complexes. 
The categories are in no sense due to mind. They are not 
concerts by which we shape a chaotic manifold; rather the "mani- 
fold" is intrinsically categorial, and mind - when in compresence 
with things - does but appropriate by intuition (2) the categorial 
features already in the stuff of things. 
The common expression "application of the categories" must 
be used with caution. 
"The clue to the understanding of our thesis is 
that the categories are not anplicable as it were ab extra 
to spaces and times; but that they are applicable to 
things (including minds), because they flow from the 
nature of the space -times which they occupy or which 
they are, Applicability to space -times has no meaning 
for the categories, which are the features or deter- 
minations of the space -times themselves ". (3) 
Now although the categories are not due to mind, they are 
non -empirical and a priori. The universality and necessity, which 
Kant designated as the criteria of the a priori, belong to the cate- 
gories not through dependence on mind, but because they are present 
in every existent however simple or however complex. 
(1) Cf. General Introduction; 1.321; 331. 
(2) Cf. infra pp. 148 ff. 
(3) I. 190; 195; 217; 305 
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"This does notimply that a priori or categorial characters 
because not empirical are not experienced. On the contrary, 
they are the essential and universal constituents of whatever 
is experienced, and in the wider sense of that term are 
therefore empirical." (1). 
Their non -empirical character means that they cannot be derived 
from existents, for they are the sine quibus non of the possibility 
of existents. This protean characteristic of the categories is 
strikingly formulated in the following passage: - 
"The categories apply obviously to all finites in the 
ordinary sense of that term; but they apply also to 
everything empirical, everything which is not the whole 
of S -T, but a part of it. Thus they apply to what I 
have called empirical infinites, like the infinite 
numbers, or as we shall see later to the infinite deity, 
because they are not the whole of S-T." (2) 
This outline of Alexander's categorial theory shows that its 
basic foundation is S -T. It is essential therefore, in appraising 
the theory of categories, to examine the validity of this founda- 
tional doctrine. 
We shall therefore first outline briefly Alexander's doctrine 
of S -T, and then urge against it the following criticism 
(1) The nature of S -T disclosed by the empirical method cannot 
establish its clair to be the basic stuff of the world; 
(2) S -T as primordial stuff cannot account for becoming and crea- 
tive process which are admitted as real features of the world; 
(3) The notion of S -T as stuff is incompatible with the nature of 
categories which Alexander claims to be a "central" doctrine 
of his philosophy. (3). 
(1) I. 185 
(2) I. 324-5 
(3) :And xxx.120. p.411. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
ALEXANDER'S THEORY OF SPACE-TINE 
Fundamental Characteristics of Space -Time 
(a) Space and Time are Interdependent. 
The interdependence of Space and Time is argued at great 
length and ingenuity. The initial arguments show that the em- 
pirical face to face characteristics of Space and Time depend 
on their essential interconnection. Thus the contúity and suc- 
cessiveness of Time - its outstanding empirical characteristics - 
requires the offices of Space. 
"Now if Time existed in complete independence and of 
its own right there could be no continuity in i t.... i f it 
were nothing more than bare Time it would consist of 
perishing instants. Instead of a continuous Time, there 
would be nothing more than an instant, a now, which was 
perpetually being renewed. But Time would then be for 
itself and for an observer a mere now, and would contain 
neither earlier nor later. And thus in virtue of its 
suceessiveness it would not only not be continuous but 
would cease even to be for itself successive. "(1). 
"If, therefore, the past instant is not to be lost 
as it otherwise would be, or rather since this is not 
the case in fact, there needs must be some continuum 
other than Time which can secure and sustain the together- 
ness of cast and present, of earlier and later....This 
other form of being is Space; that is, Space supplies 
us with the second continuum needed to save Time from 
being a mere 'now'." (2). 
In a similar manner, the continuity, infinity and co- 
existence of Space are shown to be dependent on Time. 
(1) I. 45 
(2) I. 45-6 
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"Space taken by itself in its distinctive character of 
a whole coexistence has no distinction of parts. As Time 
in so far as it was temporal became a mere 'now', so Space 
so far as merely spatial becomes a blank. It would be 
without distinguishable elements. But a continuum without 
elements is not a continuum at all Thus the empirical 
continuity or totalness of Space turns out to be incompati- 
ble with the other empirical feature of Space, that it 
contains distinctness of parts. That distinctness is not 
supplied by the characteristic altogetherness of Space. 
There must therefore be some form of existence, some entity 
nor itself spatial which distinguishes and separates the 
parts of Space. This other form of existence is Time. "(1). 
This correspondence of Space and Time is not a one to one 
correspondence, it is a one -many correspondence. 
"One instant nir'y and does occupy several points 
and one point may and does occur at more than one instant.. 
If the correspondence were unique, neither would Space 
be able to perform its office of saving the instant from 
perishing, nor Time its office of saving Space from 
blankness." (2). 
It is unnecessary for our purposes to enter into the details 
of the one -many correspondence between Space and Time, or into 
the arguments which seek to establish the connection between the 
characteristics of temporal order and the three dimensions of 
space. They are considered invalid by both Dr. Broad (3) and 
Professor Murphy (4). We must of course distinguish between a 
conclusion and the arguments for it. Thus even though Alexan- 
der's arguments for the interdependence of Time and Space be incon- 
clusive, it does not follow that the interdependence of Time and 
Space is thereby disproved, unless it could be shown that the 
arguments employed were the only possible proofs. Again, as Mr. 
(1) I. 47 
(2) I. 49 
(3) Mind xxx. 117.n. 37 ff. 
( 4) Monist Vol. xXFVi i 
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Leighton remarks, 
"One might demur to (Alexander's) doctrine that 'Space- 
Time is the one all -includive living stuff or body -soul of 
reality, and accept his conclusion with regard to the inter- 
dependence of space and time...." (1) 
The interdependence of Time and Space is now a scientific 
and philosophical commonplace; but this characteristic of Space and 
Time is by no means the prerogative of the doctrine that Space -Time 
is the primordial stuff of the universe. Indeed Alexander's argu- 
ments for the interdependence of Space and Time are derived not from 
the consideration of pure Space -Time, but from the nature of S -T 
as a relational continuum of events; and the subsequent discussion 
shows that the doctrine of pure Space -Time as a stuff owes its 
plausibility to the surreptitious employment of considerations belong- 
ing to the relational view of Space -Time. 
(b) S -T the Ultimate Stuff of the Universe. 
A brief outline must now be given of this other main feature 
of Alexander's doctrine of S -T. 
The following will serve as tynical of many passages 
"Space -Time is a stuff which is the simplest form of 
reality, and all existents which are made out of this stuff, 
are, as it were, crystals within this matrix." (2). 
Alexander rejects explicitly the relational view of S -T which de- 
clares 
"Space and Time to consist of relations between things 
or entities, these entities with their qualities coming 
first, and Space and Time being then respectively the order 
of coexistence and succession of entities." (3) 
(1) Philosophical Review xxx.3 
(2) Abstract of Gifford Lecture (hereafter quoted as Abstract) 
p.6; I.38;60;163;328;342; P. vi Preface to New Impression. 
(3) I.37; ch.vi; 49 
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mace -Time is absolute, logically and temporally prior 
to all finite being. (1). All difference and heterogeneity 
fall within the all embracing medium to which any finite being 
however complex is ultimately reducible. 
I. Criticism of Alexander's Doctrine of S- T 
(a) The Nature of S -T Disclosed by the Empirical Method Cannot 
Establish its claim to bh the Basic Stuff of the World. 
The characteristics of Space directly experienced are 
continuity, coexistence and infinity. The characteristics of 
Time directly experienced are continuity, successiveness and ir- 
reversibility. That these empirical characters of Space and Time 
are also characteristics of Space -Time as the primordial entity 
is evident from many passages. 
"The elements of the one reality which is 5 -T, and not 
either Space or Time alone owe their distinctness in either 
kind to the complementary element." (2). 
"It is because Time is intrinsically repeated in Space 
and Space in Time, that it is possible at all to speak of 
Time or Space by themselves, when in fact neither exists 
apart from the other." (3) 
"We are to consider how Space and Time are related to each 
other, and we shall find that neither is a reality without 
the other, and that instead of two realities - Space and 
Time, there is but one reality, which is S -T." (4). 
The purport of these typical passages is to insist that the 
Space and Time of common parlance, reveal on fuller analysis their 
interdependence. The characteristics of Time and of Space so called, 
are dependent on their mutual salvation. Strictly speaking the em- 
(1) II. 48-9 
(2) I. 60 
(3) I. 81 
(4) tbstract p.6 
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pirical features of Space and Time are features of spatio 
temporal reality. Furthermore, if S -T were not revealed by the 
analysis of the empirical features of Space and Time and by per- 
spectives, 'the empirical method' (1) would be entirely abortive. 
We would then be committed to the sceptical conclusion that Space 
and Time as experienced can supply no information about the nature 
of S -T the ultimate, and it must therefore be essentially unknowable. 
It seems evident therefore, that Alexander considers the empirical 
characters of Space and Time to be expressive of Space -Time, the 
ultimate stuff of things. Now our contention is that the S -T thus 
disclosed is not the S -T described as the primordial entity, the 
stuff of the world. The following investigation shows that Alexan- 
der has two incompatible connotations of S -T in his system, and that 
the S-T established by the empirical method and the discussion of 
perspectivesis toto genere different from the pure primordial S -T 
stuff. The latter is not justified by empirical verification, end 
is the product of a mistaken metaphysical prejudice. 
Let us then consider the derivation of Space and Time from S -T 
expounded in the chapter on perspectives and sections. 
The simplest basis of reality is S -T or pure Motion. The 
history of the world is a 
"perpetual redistribution of motion, or in more exact 
phrase a perpetual redistribution of the instants of Time 
among the points of Space within the one infinite S -T. 
The world grows and changes not by addition bgt by internal 
redistribution, like the movements in a disturbed ant heap. "(2) 
(1) I. Intro. p. 10 
(2) Abstract p. 8; cf. I.63 
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Consider the universe at any moment. What will S -T be under 
these circumstances? 
"The natural and immediate answer would be, the time 
section consists of the whole of Space as occupied in 
every point by events occurring at that moment Space 
may be described as the assemblage of events which occur 
at the same moment of time." (1) 
Such an assemblage of events constitutes a section. 
Thus if we take a point instant Est *, we can consider all 
the events contemporary with Est. We then might say that the 
Space section would be the S factors of all these events at the 
moment t, and the time section all the t factors at the point S. 
The notions of space and time thus obtained are legitimate enough 
within certain limits, (2), but they do not actually represent 
S -T at any moment its history. 
is not instantaneous space, for space at any moment is "full of 
memory and expectation ". (3) 
The method of perspectives, however, affords a more legiti- 
mate and less artificial account of S and T at a moment. In a per- 
spective we have the whole of Space not occurring at one instant, 
but filled with events of different dates, just as the animal body 
consists at any moment of cells of different stages of maturity. In 
like manner, if we take a perspective of S -T from a point 
"we shall have the whole of Time occupying not 
but points of Space at all manner of distances 
point of reference." (4). 
Note that "A perspective from an instant of time and 
the same point, 
from the central 
one from a point 
of space are different perspectives, and cannot be combined 
into a single perspective." (5) 
(1) I.67; 1.75 
*The symbolism is Broad's. 
(2) I.67; I.83 
(3) I.67 
(4) .I.75 
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It is also of importance to note the following statement 
with regard to point -instants 
"Thus in describing S -T in reference to a centre of 
reference which is now - its perspective from that point 
of view - we are not supposing that the universe is stopped 
at that moment artificially, in which case there would as 
some think be a now spread out over infinite space." (1) 
Thus the connectedness of perspectives is not a juxtaposition of 
instantaneous snapshots. To borrow Bergson's celebrated simile, 
the connectedness of perspectives is not cinemato "graphical 
"One perspective cries out for the next to 
they fit together by themselves." (2). 
"Each perspective leads on to some other. 





What then is the relation between the Space and Time of per- 
spectives and Total Space -Time? (4). Total Space -Time is the syn- 
thesis of all partial space -times or perspectives of S -T (5). 
The above account of the relation of Space and Time to Space - 
Time contains two difficulties. The first concerns the legitimacy 
of perspectives at a level of "non qualitied events "; the second 
is that the characteristics of S -T as revealed in perspectives is 
not the pure primordial stuff postulated by Alexander as the basis 
(1) I.72 
(2) Mind xxx.120.p.417 
(3) I.79 
(4) Total Space -Time must, of course, be distinguished from total 
Space and total Time which are the products of a perspective, 
and also from he more artificial total Space and total Time 
of sections. Total S -T contains not only all S and all . T 
but all point- instants,Cf.Mind xxx.120; 418 
(5) I.76; I.80; I.82; I.86. 
of reality, The legitimacy of perspectives. 
"within the region of S -T pure and simple, before qualitied 
events, like the fall of a stone or the birth of a flower 
or the existence of complex percipients like plants or 
ourselves," (1) 
has been challenged by Broad. (2). Alexander replies (3) that 
though the term perspective is metaphorical at this non -mental level, 
the metaphor is well grounded because (for him) the point -instant 
is a sort of body mind.(4). Also Broad is said to have forgotten 
the "intuition" (5) which point -instants possess. 
This is not a satisfactory reply. It relies entirely on 
metaphors which are meaningless at the level of pure S -T. Since 
the issue is the legitimacy of perspectives at the pure S -T level, 
how can the appeal to "intuition" and the quasi body -mind character 
of point- instants be allowed? 
It is significant that all the illustrations of point- instants 
and perspectives belong to the 'higher' level of qualitied events - 
the cells of a man's body (6), the concentric rings on a tree trunk(?), 
the bullet killing a man (8), Sirius and the earthly percipient (9), 
the points on the hand as related by the discharge of an electric 
current (10). 
Mr. Hallett also pertinently asks whether the real characteris- 
tics of Time, viz. its continuity, successiveness, irreversibility, 
(1) I.78 
(2) Mind xxx. 117.32 
(3) Mind xxx 120.419 
(4) II. 11. (Italics mine) 
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and uniformity of direction can 
"be the characteristics of a 'time'emancipated from all 
points of reference; or whether they do not belong to time 
only in its relation to that moving origin of reference, 
this or that finite individual, or supposed mean or repre- 
sentative, experient or indicator; and whether when that 
point of reference is in every sense and form excluded, time 
will still flow. "(1) 
In one passage Alexander says 
"We have seen in fact that physical Time is only earlier 
or later and that the instants in it are only past, pre- 
sent or future in relation to the mind which apprehends. " (2) . 
This would grant all Mr. Hallett requires, but it appears 
obviously inconsistent with the central principles of Alexander's 
doctrine of S -T. True Alexander is speaking here of "physical" 
Time, not metaphysical Time, but no such radical differences be- 
tween the two as are here indicated could be allowed if tfie 
realism of the system be sustained. 
Alexander suggests the following practice as an aid for the 
apprehension of pure S -T. 
"In practice I am accustomed in thinking of Space and Time by 
themselves to keen constantly pictures of material things 
and events before my mind and then forget their richness 
and smells and otherqualities." (3) 
This personal testimony is very significant. The supposi- 
tion is that by gradually eliminating "qualities ", we attain grasp 
of Space and Time by themselves. But in assuming this, we have 
"forgotten" more than the colour, smells and other qualities. We 
have forgotten that our S -T residuum is an abstract formulation Of 
relations between concrete things, and must not be hypostatized 
(1) Aeternitas p. 30 
(2) I.95 
(3) I.39 
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into an ontological entity. 
Since the notion of perspectives is only intelligible when 
construed in terns of relations between qualified events, we must 
conclude that the empirical method - the beacon of this philosophy 
does not justify the notion of perspectives at the level of pure 
S- T. (1) 
Vie pass to the second difficulty in Alexander's doctrine 
viz. that the characteristics of S -T as revealed in perspectives 
are not those of the pure S -T stuff postulated as the basis of 
re lity. Point -instants are said to be "pure events ". (2). As the 
previous argument has shown, the discussion and illustrations afford 
no evidence that point- instants are events. The discussion shows no- 
thing more than that point- instants are termini of reference in the 
interrelation of events. (3). There is no proof given for the view 
that point -instants are stuff. On the contrary, their essentially 
relational character precludes their bein' stuff. How could "stuff" 
allow the vagaries ascribed to points in such a passage as 
"In general a perspective of S -T from one point- instant 
differs from the perspective from another point -instant, whe- 
ther the perspectives be taken in respect of the instants or 
points. Points which were simultaneous in the one may be 
successive in the other; the interval of time or space may be 
altered, and even two points may reverse their dates in the 
different perspectives." (4) 
As Murphy insists,(5), if a relation is reduced to stuff it 
fails to connect. If the lelation between point -instants is only 
another point- instant, it fails to connect them, and we are thrown 
(1) I.325 
(2) I.48 
(3) I.151; I.238 
(4) 1.78 
(5) Monist Vol. xxxvii 
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into the infinite regress of the "third man ". Furthermore, we 
are explicitly told that point- instants are not constitutive of 
motion, the stuff of things. 
"Motion is not e succession of point- instants, but 
rather a point -instant is the limiting case of a motion. "(1). 
Point -instants admit categorial determination (2) and therefore must 
be distinct from S -T the primordial stuff which is supra categorial.(3) 
In all these passages the essentially relational character 
of point -instants is evident. To make them stuff or pure events 
appears to result from a hypostatization of conceptual termini in the 
interrelation of events into real ontological units. Thus the 
S -T that would result from the synthesis of all partial space times 
or perspectives (4) is not a stuff but a system of spatio - temporal 
relations between entities.(5). 
(1) 1.321; I.61 
(2) I.325 
(3) I.337 
(4) I.76; I.80;82 
(5) It might be suggested that S -T the primordial entity is not 
identical with "total S -T ", "S -T as a whole," the synthesis of 
all perspectives. The necessity of "taking time seriously ", the 
emphasis on the reality of the world's history and the doctrine 
of emergent evolution suggest that S -T is pregnant with novel- 
ty and becomes fuller as it matures. This interpretation would 
undermine the legitimacy of perspectives as a method of dis- 
closing the nature of the primordial entity. Also it seems ex- 
cluded by such passages as "But a beginning of existence is it- 
self an event in S -T which is the system of point -instants and 
it is therefore clear that S -T as a whole begins either 
everywhere or nowhere." I.62. 
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I. (b) S -T Cannot Account for Becoming and Creative Process 
Which Are Admitted as Real Features of the World. 
S -T is "the matrix of things, the nurse of becoming. "(1). 
"S -T in its simplest terms is a growing universe and is 
through and through historical." (2). 
These typical passages show that growth and creative process 
are fundamental in the Philosophy of Alexander. If, then, S -T 
is to justify its claim to be the primordial basis of the universe, 
growth and creative process must be shown to flow from its intrinsic 
nature. 
Professor Alexander chafes because he has been criticised 
for not explaining why in the development of S -T colours and life 
etc. should emerge. Fe replies 
"That is not my business and further I don't see how it 
can be anybody's business except to note the facts and be 
grateful for them, or at least put up with them." (3) 
Of course there are questions which may legitimately be asked and 
there are also questions which should never be put, and to 
"know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself 
a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence." (4) 
Now to demand that the basis of a metaphysical system shall 
exhibit itself as the ground of admittedly fundamental characteris- 
tics of the world is surely not unreasonable; and therefore we feel 
justified in requiring that growth and creative process be shown to 
flow from the intrinsic nature of S -T. 
(1) I.331 
(2) I.66 
(3) Mind. xxx. 120 p.410 
(4) Krit.of Pure Reason. A.56. 
- 116 - 
Our discussion will confine itself for the most part to 
Vol.I and reserve the consideration of the doctrine of emergence 
until we are dealing with Lund. 
Our contention is that the claim of nure S -T to be the basis 
of becoming and creative process is plausible only through the sur- 
reptitious endowment of nure S -T with characteristics which can only 
belong to S -T as a relational system of events. Thus by an indepen- 
dent line of argument we reach the same conclusion as in the fore- 
going section II(a). 
S -T is pure Motion (1) and we are assured that 
"If we are serious with Time, there is no difficulty 
in the thought of a S -T which contained. no matter or other 
qualities but was, in the language of Genesis, without form 
or void before there was light or sound." (2) 
Quam mirum praemium pietatis naturalist Unless there is gross misun- 
derstanding our discussion will show that such a notion is fraught 
with insuperable difficulties. 
In the first place, if Time be taken seriously, is it legiti- 
mate to speak of "total S -T" and "S -T as whole "? Observe that we are 
not thereby speaking of the total Space or the total Time of perspec- 
tives and sections; we are referring to the total S -T which is "the 
synthesis of all perspectives." (3) 
Ls we have already pointed out total S -T is different from total 
S and total T.(4) 
"Each perspective contains all Space (or) all Time, whereas 
total S -T contains not only all S and all T, but all ?point- instants." 
(5) 
(1) I.62; I.320 
(2) I.65 
(3) I.76; I.77; I.80; I.82 
(4) Supra p. 110 A?ote 4 
(5) Mind. xxx.120 p.418 
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The impropriety in speaking of "Total S -T" in this system is 
well expressed by Alexander himself when he tells us S -T is not a 
whole of parts. 
"If S -T were such a whole, it would be given all!at once. 
But being Time (or indeed Space which is the same thing) it is 
not, as Pair. Bergson rightly says, given altogether. To suppose 
so is to ignore the reality of Time, to fail to take Time 
seriously. At any one moment the universe is the whole of its 
existent parts, but at any one moment the universe is not the 
whole universe of parts. (1). For in the redistribution of dates 
among places new existents are generated within the one S -T. 
It may indeed be called not a whole of parts, but the whole or 
system of all existents." (2) 
An earlier passage though immediately concerned with Space seems 
to have a similar implication. 
"Under a certain condition, to be explained presently, we may 
indeed contemplate Space as an infinite whole when we consider 
only the points it contains. Directly we allow for its Time, 
we realise that while there may be a complete whole of conceived 
timeless points, there cannot be one of real point -instants or 
events. For incompleteness at any moment is of the essence of 
Time." (3). 
(1) This sentence is very puzzling. In the first place does the 
phrase "At any one moment "..mean a perspective from an in- 
stant? This would at first sight seem the most natural inter - 
pretation of the phrase, but it does not satisfy the require- 
ments of the discussion. A perspective from an instant would 
give us total Space. What the text requires in the considera- 
tion of S -T in reference to a point -instant. The (at least 
theoretical) possibility of this seems sanctioned by "S -T 
considered in reference to a point- instant, from the point of 
view of both the point and the instant is nothing but S -T ". 
I.76. This consideration offers some assistance in interpre- 
ting the distinction drawn between "the universe as the whole 
of its existent parts" and "the universe as the whole uni- 
verse of parts." S -T from a point- instant would presumably be 
S -T at a moment. At such a moment the universe or S -T would 
be the whole i.e. an aggregate of its existent parts; but 
since S -T is filled with "memory" and "expectation" a sum of 
parts does not adequately describe S-T, therefore S -T is not a 
whole universe of narts. The objection against this explana- 
tion is that "S -T at a moment" seems a contradiction in terms; 
and also that a characteristic of a perspective is that it al- 
lows for differences of dates among point -instants and there- 
fore S -T from a point -instant would not be adequately des- 
cribed as a whole of parts. 
(2) I.339 
(3) I.66 
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In view of these considerations "total S -T" "S -T as w whole" 
are seen to be illegitimate expressions to describe the primordial 
entity, the basis of the world. If they are taken seriously - as 
Alexander does - they are incompatible with process and becoming. 
A second difficulty in reconciling Alexander's account of 
S -T with process arises when we ask how pure motion becomes - so 
to speak - scrambled. 
Alexander endeavours to achieve the scrambling process by 
properties ascribed to point- instants. 
"S -T consists of what may be called lines of advance 
connected into a whole or system in a manner to be 
described." (1) 
"Lines of advance" are illustrated as follows: 
"Call 0 the instant of reference. One of its points is 
o; there are points intrinsically contemporary with o. 
A. point a is earlier than o, and if we call the time of 
o the present, a is past. The point a is of the same 
data as b and is earlier than c Now the meaning of 
such reference in date to o is that the events a b e 
lie on lines of advance which connect them with o." (2) 
Further 'lines of advance' would appear to constitute motion. 
"In a line of advance c b a we have the displacement of 
the present from c through b to a, so that a becomes 
present while b becomes past and c still further past. 
Points do not of course move in the system of points, but 
they change their time coefficient. Vihat we ordinarily 
call motion of e body is the occupation by that body 
of points which successively become present, so that 
at each stage the points traversed have different time 
values when the line of motion is taken as a. whole." (3). 
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in terms of perspectives, yet the exigencies of the metaphysical 
hypothesis of a pure S-T stuff, drives Alexander to maintain in 
other passages that pure motion is prior and presupposed by events 
whether pure or qual i tie d. 
"Motion is not a. succession of point- instants, but rather 
a point -instant is the limiting case of a motion." (1) 
"Movement is anterior to things which are complexes of 
movements." (2) 
Notwithstanding the commendations of perspectives Es being 
genuine historical phases, and the descriptions of S -T as being 
the synthesis of all perspectives (3), an infinite continuum of 
pure events or point-instants (4) , we now discover that these 
descriptions are inadequate as applied to pure potion the stuff 
of things. Thus point -instants cannot adequately describe pure 
Motion, because they presuppose Pure Motion, Their ontological 
inadequacy is further evidenced by their amenability to categorial 
determinat ion. 
"They exist, have universality, and substance and the like "(5). 
S -T, however, is not subject to the categories. (6). againythe des- 
cription of S -T as an "infinite continuum of pure events" must be 
metaphytically inedequate,for S -T has no Parts "while a continuum 
without elements is not a continuum at all." (7). Lastly,"lines of 
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point- instants, and share the ontological inadequacy of the latter. 
Can nure Motion admit change? It must admit change if it is 
to fulfil its claims to be the basis of a growing historical uni- 
verse, for becoming and creative process involve change. Change is 
change of something else; (1); 
"it implies movement and is movement from one movement to 
another "(2), 
and is "strictly empirical" (3). But how can pure Motion in which 
nothing moves, and which admits no points of reference really chhnge? 
Since it has been shown that a reply in terms of lines of 
advance, point- instants and nersepctives is inadequate, the only 
alternative is the doctrine of emergence. Now unless we are content 
to take refuge in sheer mystery, emergence depends on constellations 
and configurations of motion. 
"The emergence of a new quality from any level of existence 
means that at that level there comes into being a certain 
constellation or collocation of the motions belonging to 
that level and possessing the quality appropriate to it, 
and this collocation possesses a new quality distinctive 
of the higher complex." (4). 
Emergence thus presuppoees that pure Motion has already suffered 
the "empirical infection" necessary to process and becoming. Vie are 
forced to concludê that Alexander's doctrine of S -T or pure Motion as 
the stuff of things affords no intelligible basis for the admitted 
facts of change and becoming, and the plausibility of its being an 
intelligible notion is due to surrentitiously endowing it with proper- 
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(c) The Notion of S -T is Incompatible with the Nature of Categories 
Which are "Central" to the Entire System. 
The errors detected in the S -T doctrine cut at the root of 
the categorial theory. 
"Categories are for us expressions of the nature of 
S -T itself "(1). But it is also asserted that "The cate- 
gories are fundamental properties or determinations of 
S -T itself not taken as a whole, but in every portion of 
it. "(2). 
Here again we encounter the difficulty of the S -T doctrine in 
a new setting. How can the primordial S-T which is supra rela- 
tional and non categorialVlescend into the relational so that 
categories shall be the expression of its nature? Just as the 
togetherness and distinctness attributed to S -T is by means of 
perspectives which are not ultimate, so the relational struc- 
ture intrinsic to the categories is extraneous to S -T as such. 
Notwithstanding protests to the contrary (4), pure primordial 
S -T which allows no relational or categorial determination, appears 
to be as much of a philosophical strait jacket as the ancient 
Parmenidean One. As Mr. Hallett says 
"In attempting to escape from the limitations and particu- 
larities of empirical duration...we find ourselves con- 
demned to a 'dateless night "" (5). 
So also as the notion of pure S -T stuff could only march through 
a tacit substitution of L relational S -T of perspectives and quali- 
tied events, so the categories can function only by abandoning the 
(1) I. 191 
(2) I. 189 (Italics mine). 
(3) I. 337 
(4) I. 346-7 
(5) Aeternitas 31. 
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notion of their being stuff and making them essentially formal. 
We shall therefore render this contention more explicit by examin- 
ing Alexander's discussion of Universality, Substance and Relation. 
Universality 
Universality is generic identity or identity of kind, e.g. e 
dog is qua dog generically identical with another dog. 
"It is the existence or subsistence of a universal 
or concept which unites its particulars, which they imi- 
tate or in which they participate, or however else we 
may provisionally and traditionally describe the rela- 
tion between the universal and its particulars." (1) 
The essence of universality flows from the nature of S -T. Uni- 
versality- arises from 'uniformity' of S -T. (2). It is not due 
to mind, nor does it have its source in an eternal region of 
Forms. (3). Universality is the category in virtue of which 
there are universals. What then are universals? 
A Universal is a plan or nattern or 'habit'. Universals 
may exhibit degrees of complexity e.g. the constancy of form or 
pattern in :marble balls turned out from one machine is simpler 
than the pattern exhibited in the universal dog or ms.n; but whe- 
ther simple or complex, the essence of a universal is constancy of 
Plan or pattern amid particulars. 
What kind of being do universals possess? The answer sppears 
to be unequivocal. 
"There is no category of being other than that of 
determinate being or the existent." (4) 
(1) 1.208 
(2) 1.213;215 
(3) I. 217 
(4) I. 200 
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"Being is an occupation of a space -time (1) ", and 
"occupancy of a space -time is ipso -facto exclusion of 
other space -times. There are no beings (occupants of 
space- times) which are not existents." (2). 
Now es Mr. Murphy points out 
"We should have supposed that a plan or pattern is not at 
all the sort of thing that could occupy one snace -time in 
exclusion of other occupancy, for many particulars partake 
of the same universal. Yet, if universals are made out of 
space -time stuff, they are obviously as particular as their 
instances, and exist in the same exclusive sense. A uni- 
versal can no more be in two places at once than a particu- 
lar dog. And in that case it has lost all vestige of 
universality." (3) 
Of course Alexander cannot accept this result; and so notwith- 
standing the caveats about subsistence (4), we are now informed 
that the universal may be said to have that reality of existence 
which is called subsistence (5). A valiant but unsuccessful ef- 
fort is made to reconcile the two points of view in the following 
cassages- 
"The universal subsists in so far as its particulars 
exist and is spatio temporal though not particular. The 
universal is nowhere and nowhere in narticular but anywhere 
and anvwhen....It is not timeless or eternal as being out 
of time but as being free from limitation to a particular 
time." (6). 
Again, "(Universals) are never dead or petrified because in 
the end they are spa do temporal plans and instinct with 
time. And above all they are never bare potentialities, 
the creatures of abstract thinking, but possess such ac- 
tuality as they can possess, which is not particular actuality 
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In each of the ouota tion s the insistence. on the freedom 
from limitation to a particular time and particular existence 
essential to a universal is rendered nugatory by the assertion of 
its spatio temporal nature and determinate being, which is necessary 
to a stuff. The universal cannot be both form and stuff; if it is 
a spatio temporal existent it cannot also be a unifying principle 
for distinct existences. 
Universality "the category in virtue of which there are univer- 
sals whether empirical or a priori ones" (1) fares no better than its 
offspring. 
The feature of S -T which conditions universality is the constan- 
cy or uniformity of .S -T. 
"It is because S -T is uniform or constant in curvature 
and admits a plan that existents which are patches of space - 
time Possess universality." (2). 
"In a Space which is not uniform I do not see how there 
should be universals, for each plan would suffer distortion 
as it was transferred." (3) 
Alexander claims that there is no contradiction between the 
assertion that space is of constant curvature and Einstein's doctrine 
that space is warped wherever there is matter. 
":,hen I say that bodies do not change their configuration 
in S -T, I mean this only so far as S -T itself is concerned. 
On the relativity theory too, S -T in which there is no gravi- 
- ta.tional field is uniform. n body may on the view of the 
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Judgment as to whether this statement really reconciles 
the two views of S -T need not detain us. Its immediate interest 
is that it certainly a2pears to depend on the distinction between 
S -T and matter being sharply drawn. Now as Mr. Murphy points out 
"Surely (Alexander) is of all men the least entitled to 
distinguish between "S -T itself" and that which occupies it or 
which it relates. For the determinate being of particular 
things as particulars is constituted by the S -T which they 
are. Each event, :Ao far as it is different from any other 
is thereby a warp in S -T; the difference is not something 
extrinsic to S -T itself and to which it is indifferent; 
the difference is S -T, and so far as particular things 
exist at all S -T is not uniform." (1) 
We conclude therefore that the doctrine of a S -T stuff if 
consistently maintained would involve a nominalistic impasse; 
and that Alexander's category of universality is inconsistent 
with his doctrine of a pure S -T stuff. 
Substance 
The characteristic of S -T which underlies substance is the re- 
lation between the spatial and temporal elements in any space -time. 
Expressed in its simplest terms, a substance is a contour of space 
persisting through a duration. 
"When we come to the simplest substance of all, the life 
of which is movement in a straight line, what we have is the 
occupation of the most elementary contour in space viz. a 
point by an instant in time." (2) 
If as Mr. Murphy urges, for Alexander a point is not a piece 
of space, and an instant is not a duration, then it is obvious that 
the category; of substance as here defined is not applicable. But if 
the category is not applicable to point -instants, it has not been 
(1) Monist xxxvii 
(2) I.271 
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deduced from the intrinsic nature of S -T, for ex hypothesi Point - 
instants are the elements of S -T. 
There are indeed passages thich support the interpretation that 
points are extensionless and instants durationless. 
"Space and Time then are presented to us as infinite and 
continuous wholes of parts. I shall call these parts points and 
instants, availing myself of the conceptual description of them, 
and meaning by their connectedness or continuity at any rate 
that between any two points or instants another can be found. 
To me, subject to that may be said hereafter, this is a way 
of saying that the points and instants are not isolated. 
But if any reader jibs, let him substitute lengths and 
durations," (1) 
The following passage - in the demonstration of the interdependence 
of Space and Time - would seem to imply that instants are durationless. 
"If (Time) were nothing more than bare Time it would 
consist of perishing instants." (2) 
A corresponding conclusion might be drawn with regard to points from 
"Merely as points, as positions in space, they do not possess 
order, any more than instants merely as temporal possess 
position in time." (3) 
The sane conclusion follows from such passages as 
"Motion is not a. succession of point- instants but rather a 
point -instant is the limiting case of a motion. "(4). 
On the other hand, the discussion of perspectives with its 
emphasis on point -instants being real would preclude the notion of 
extensionless points and durationless instants. In this connection, 
however, we call attention to the conclusion of our discussion of per- 
spectives, which showed that 1.lexander never explains satisfactorily 
(1) I.43 -44 (Italics mine) 
(2) I.45 
(3) I.56. The remainder of the sentence seems to imply that 
points and instants thus conceived are merely fictions. 
(4) I.321 
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how perspectives and point- instants emerge prior to the level of 
qualified events. But even if we ignore these considerations, and 
ellow that points are spatial and instants durational, the deduction 
of substance from point- instants does not follow. The legitimacy 
of deducing substance from the intrinsic nature of S -T, depends on 
establishing the validity of the assertion 
"When we come to the simplest substance of all, the life of 
which is movement in a straight line, whet we have is the 
occupation of the most elementary contour in space viz. 
a point by an instant in time. "(1) 
my contention is that this contour of space is not realisable at the 
level of pure S -T., and that it depends on a conceptual view of points 
and instants which has been shown to make substance as defined inap- 
plicable. A definite contour of space is entirely extraneous to 
point instants as such. The correspondence between points and instants 
is not a one to one but a one -many correspondence. One instant may 
and does occupy several points, and one point may and does occur at 
more than one instant. In the pure continuum of S -T, points and 
instants flow, and definite contours are artibtrary cuts foreign to 
the nature of S -T as such. 
The deduction of substance from the intrinsic nature of S -T 
is thus fraught with insuperable difficulties. Unless instants are 
durational and points spatial,S -T cannot yield a definite contour in 
space \;hick the definition of substance requires. On the other hand, 
if instants are durational and points spatial they still fail to 
(1) I.271 
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disclose definite contours, for there is nothing in the nature 
of point -instants as such which make them cease to flow. 
We conclude then that the deduction of substance from the 
nature of S -T has failed. 
It would be tedious to pursue this investigation throughout 
the whole list of categories, and we may conveniently generalise 
our conclusions by examining the basic category of Relation itself. 
Relation 
Relation is a category, and arises from the continuity of S -T. 
"Relations are in no sense subjective or the work of the mind." 
( 
1 
Relations are spatio temporal and of the same stuff as their terms. 
"Not merely in bare Space or Time, but in the empirical relations 
that subsist between things with qualities, the relation is 
just as concrete and just as much a reality (being ultimately 
spatio- temporal) as the terms and belongs to the same tissue 
with them." (2) 
Three crucial points arise in Alexander's account of relations: - 
Are all relations reducible to spatio- temporal terms? Can such 
relations as maternity(3), truth- telling, and justice (4) be literally 
and strictly reduced to spatio temporal terms and retain their meaning? 
Since truth and justice are tertiary qualities and impossible apart from 
mind, their reduction to spatio temporal terms is possible only if 
mind and mental relations are spatio temporal. Decision as to the 
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depends therefore on the discussion of mental space -time and mind, 
which form the topic of the next chanter. It is desirable to add 
however that the issue involved is frauvht with far reaching impli- 
cations. If all relations including mental relations are strictly 
reducible to spatio temporal relations, then physics is the only 
science. Psychology, ethics and the social sciences are either moon- 
shine or reducible to physics. Alexander would not,I presume, admit 
this. Indeed he seems to grant the autonomy of the various sciences 
when he says 
"The higher quality emerges from the lower level of exis- 
tence and has its roots therein,but it emerges therefrom, and 
it does not belong to that lower level but constitutes its 
possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of 
behaviour. "(1) 
But this departs from the strict reduction of all relations to spatio 
temporal terms. His good, sense and emergence save him from doing 
violence to plain facts, but at the cost of consistency. 
If a relation is reduced to stuff can it relate? Are we not committed 
to the difficulty of the "Third Man ". Murphy insists that this 
crux meets Alexander in each of the categories. 
"If universality is substantialized you need a third thing 
to relate the resulting particularised universal to its in- 
stances; if structural continuity is identified with the di- 
versity of movements, it fails to connect them; if the rela- 
tion between point -instants is only another point -instant it 
fails to connect them. If the terms are to be identical 
in kind they must have something in common, but it certainly 
cannot be the S -T of either for they are diverse and exclude 
each other. Neither can it be a relation for that is a third 
space -time outside of them both." (2) 
(1) II.46 
(2) Murphy. Monist. xxxvii 
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(3) The motive in reducing relation to space -time stuff is to guarantee 
that relations shall be real and founded in the Real viz. S -T. 
But S -T as a stuff is supra relational. Hence the relational struc- 
ture on which the categories are based cannot be a real basis, it is 
a mere "fea.ture" (1) which does not condition Reality in its absolute- 
ness. 
Thus the conflict between the two meanings of S -T pervades the 
categorial theory. If S -T be a primordial stuff supra categorial 
and supra relational, it cannot be the basis of relation and cate- 
gories. If on the other hand S -T be relational and a sum of per- 
spectives, it is no longer a primordial stuff and complete in itself. 
It is no longer the basis of reality required by this system. 
(1) 1.337 
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CHAPTER VII 
MIND AND THE CATEGORIES 
Alexander's doctrine of categories may be summarily ex- 
pressed in two propositions: 
(1) Categories are expressions of the nature of S -T (1) ; 
(2) Categories are constitutive characters of all 
existents including mind.(2). 
The previous chapter was concerned with the first statement, 
and concluded that the deduction of the categories from S -T was 
unsuccessful. The present chapter will consider the second state- 
ment, and will argue that the categories defined as spatio- temporal 
cannot be constitutive characters of mind. 
We shall preface our discussion by some explanations of the 
terminology employed. 
"A mind is the substantial continuum of certain pro- 
cesses which have the conscious quality." (3) 
The relation of mind and its objects is one of "compresence." Com- 
presence is exnlained as follows: 
"Any experience whatever may be analysed into two distinct 
elements and their relation to one another. The two ele- 
ments which are the terms of the relation are, on the one 
hand the act of mind or the awareness, and on the other 
the object of which it is aware; the relation between them 
is that they are together or compresent in the world which 
is thus so far experienced" (4) 
(1) I. 191 
(2) I. 190 -193 
(3) II.81 
(4) Intro. 11. 
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Cognition is not a unique relation. It is simply an instance of 
compresence, where one of the partners has the empirical quality 
of consciousness. Again, compresence is not peculiar to the con- 
scious level. (1). On the contrary, 
"it is the simplest and most universal of all relations "(2). 
If one of the partners in the compresent relation be a mind, the 
act of mind "contemplates" its object, and "enjoys" itself. The 
act of mind qua experiencing is enjoyed; the object upon which the 
act is directed is experienced and contemplated. 
"I am accustomed to say that the mind enjoys itself and 
contemplates its objects. The act of mind is an enjoy- 
ment, the object is contemplated." (3). 
Alexander extends the customary connotation of enjoyment which 
restricts it to pleasureble experiencing. 
"It includes suffering or any state or process in so 
far as the mind lives through it." (4) 
Alexander will not allow that mind or its acts can be contemnlated.(5). 
The possibility of introspection might seem to falsify this statement, 
but that is because introspection is confused with extrospection. 
Introspection proper is the enjoyment of the acts of perceiving, 
remembering, thinking. etc. Bxtrospection is the contemplation of sen- 
se or images in perceiving, imagining and remembering. 
"But the landscape I imagine or Lorenzo's villa on the way down 
from Fiesole that I remember with the enchanting view of Florence 
from the loggia, are no more discovered to me by introspection 
than the rowan tree which I perceive in front of my window as I 
write. These objects are presented to me by imagination or 
(1) II.81;99;102 
(2) II.82; 99-100 
(3) 1.12 
(4) ibid 
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memory or perception, not by introspection, and are the 
objects not of introspection but of extrospection, if 
such a word may be used, all alike." (1) 
Enjoyment and contemplation are strictly correlative. 
"There are no two separate mental acts one of enjoyment 
and one of contemplation. The mind, in enjoying itself 
has before it and therefore contemplates, the object. 
Contemplation is e name for the same act as enjoyment only 
in reference to the object. The enjoyment is at once a 
state of being of the mind itself, and that to which the 
object is revealed, and so is an act of knowing. Recipro- 
cally, in knowing the object I know myself, not in the 
sense that I contemplate myself, for I do not do so, but 
in the sense that I live through this experience of 
myself." (2). 
With these preliminary explanations, we can now proceed 
to a critical examination of three points essential to Alexander's 
view of mind: 
(1) The theory of Emergence 
(2) The doctrine of mental space -time 
(3) The doctrine of intuition. 
1. The Theory of Emergence 
All existents are ultimately complexes of s-T; but corre- 
lative to spatio temporal configurations of a certain complexity, 
there 'emerge' qualities such as materiality, life, colour, con- 
sciousness. Such qualities are not - like the categories - per- 
vasive characters of all existents, but are li-Ated to levels pos- 
sessing the appropriate spa.tio- temporal configurations. 
"The emergence of a new quality from any level of exis -- 
tence means that at that level, there comes into being a certain 
constellation or collocation of the motions belonging to that 
level, and possessing the quality appropriate to it, and this 
collocation possesses a new quality distinctive of the 
higher complex." (3). 
(1) 1.18 
(2) I.xiv.Preface to New Impression. 
(3) I1.45 
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"An 'emergent' differs from a 'resultant'. A resultant is 
predictable on the basis of the nature of its components. An emergent 
on the other hand is unpredictable before the combination takes place, 
and is different from any of the qualities possessed by the separate 
elements that enter into the combination. 
"Thus certain physical and chemical processes of a certain 
complexity have the quality of life. The new quality life emerges 
with this constellation of such processes,and therefore life is 
at once a physico -chemical complex and is not merely physical 
and chemical, for these terms do not sufficiently characterize 
the new complex which in the course and order of time has been 
generated out of them The higher quality emerges from the 
lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it 
emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that lower level, 
but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its 
special laws of behaviour." (1) 
Thus for example "Mind is a new quality distinct from life, with its 
own peculiar methods of behaviour, for the reason already made 
clear, that the complex collocation which has mind, though 
itself vital, is determined by the order of its vital complexity, 
and is therefore not merely vital but also mental." (2) 
The relation between the various levels of existence should be 
noted. Emergent qualities presuppose the earlier, less complex, lower 
grades of existence. 
"Bach new type of existence when it emerges is expressible 
completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage, 
and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages." (3) 
Thus the qualitative level of mind presupposes and is expressible com- 
pletely in terms of living process; life presupposes and is expressible 
completely in terms of physico chemical process. It should be noted,how- 
ever, that only some vital processes give rise to mind, 
(1) 1I.46 
(2) II.45 -6 
(3) II.67 
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and only some physico chemical processes are vital. For example, 
in order that life may emerge, its ph;sico chemical processes must 
possess a certain kind of 'constellation' of physic() chemical pro- 
cesses which makes the structure to which they belong an organism. 
Furthermore, 
"The empirical qualities of the 'material' are carried un 
into the body of the higher level, but not into its new 
quality. Life is based on material existents which have 
colour or smell or weight. But life itself is not coloured 
The living thing has colour in respect of its body, 
but in respect of its distinctive life it has not. Mind 
has no secondary qualities, nor even has it life, but only 
es identical with a living thing has it life....Contrari- 
wise the categorial characters are carried up into the 
emergent existent. For everything is a complex of space - 
time and Possesses the fundamental properties of any 
space -time, which are the categories. Hence though life 
is not coloured it is extended and in time, and this we 
have seen to be true of mind as well." (1) 
It is not necessary for our purposes to challenge the doc- 
trine of emergence as such, but we are concerned to show that its 
acceptance is incompatible with the reduction of the 'higher' level 
emergents to spa.tio temporal terms. Alexander doubtless considers 
that the emergent theory affords very definite corroboration of his 
thesis that the categories are non mental. Since mind is e late 
emergent quality, the categories as pervasive characters of all 
levels of existence must precede the emergence of mind, and be en- 
tirely independent of mind. But the plausibility of this argument 
depends on showing that the categories are pervasive of all levels of 
existence; and our contention is that this pervasiveness of the 
categories is precluded by the acceptance of the doctrine of emergent 
(1) II.71 
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evolution. We shall argue that if emergence be taken seriously, 
the continuity of evolutionary development necessary for the per- 
vasiveness of the categories through all levels of existence is 
inconsistent with the like insistence on the radically new and ori- 
ginal character of the emergent qualities and with the autonomous 
nature asserted of the various levels. 
Let us confine ourselves to investigating the relation per- 
taining between an emergent and the level from which it emerges, 
The following passages are typical on this point 
"The higher quality emerges from the lower level of 
existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges there- 
from and it does not belong to that lower level, but 
constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with 
its special laws of behaviour." (1) 
"The quality and the constellation to which it belongs 
are at once new and expressible without residue in terms 
of the processes proper to the level from which they emerge." 
( 2 ) 
The underlined passages lose some of their blatantly verbal 
inconsistency when it is remembered that the basis of an emergent 
quality is a privileged constellation of its own level. For exam- 
ple a neural process which possesses the mental quality is privi- 
leged among neural processes. It differs in some respect from 
neural processes not possessing the mental character. 
"A neural process does not cease to be mental and remain 
in all respects the same neural process as before." (3) 
The assertions that the higher quality (e.g. mentality) emerges 
from a lower level of existence (neural process), and yet is some- 
thing new with its special laws of behaviour, is thus rendered much 
(1) II.46 (Italics mine) 
(2) II.45 (Italics mine) 
(3) II.8;46;62;69;74 
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more plausible. But do the passages really escape contradiction? 
Are not the neural processes underlying mentality admittedly of a 
specific kind having a privileged status? If so they are not 
accurately described in mere neural terminology. If a neural pro- 
cess with mental character is different radically from a neural 
process which is not mental, it cannot be merely neural. The fea- 
ture distinguishing neuro mental processes from merely neural pro- 
cesses is not yet known, but that is no justification for identi- 
fying them. If there be - as Alexander admits - a difference be- 
tween the neural process and the mental process, it is not permis- 
sable to say of a mental process that 
"The quality and the constellation to which it belongs 
are at once new and expressible without residue in terms 
proper to the level from which they emerge." (1) 
This inaccuracy ywells as we descend through the hierarchy of 
qualitative levels, until an initial lapse detected with difficulty 
becomes the palpable falsehood, that 
"Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible 
completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage 
and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages. "(2) 
Ergo Mind is expressible in spatio temporal terms. 
The fallacy disclosed is a species of the "nothing but" fallacy 
frequently appearing in genetic explanations. It argues that because 
C rose out of B and B out of A, therefore C is nothing but A. Applied 
to the present context the argument runs, because life arose out of 
physico- chemical processes which are spatio -temporal and mind arose 
from vital processes therefore mind is spatio temporal. 
(1) II.45 
(2) II.67 (Italics mine) 
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The reduction of mind to spatio - temporal terms and its 
consequent dependence on the categories as constituent factors, 
depends on a fallacy which fails to take the notion of genuinely 
new existents seriously. If the emergent qualities are genuinely 
new existents, they cannot be regarded as simply spatio temporal 
complexes in disguise. 
Furthermore, since on this view evolution is essentially 
"jumpy" there is no reason why an emergent should exhibit any con- 
tinuity with the lower levels of existence; and consequently, there 
is no reason why categories defined as spatio temporal should per- 
vade any level other than the physico chemical. 
Alexander's rejoinder would doubtless be to admit that the 
pervasiveness of the categories is not deducible by logical deduc- 
tion, but to remind us that it is not precluded by the absence of 
such demonstration. The facts of experience, he would contend, 
demonstrate the spatio temporal nature of mind, and that these facts 
are set forth in his doctrine of Mental Space -Time. 
. Mental Space -Time 
"If S and T are the stuff of things of which all things 
are made, it is necessary to show that mind is both spatial 
and temporal and that mental or 'enjoyed' space -time is 
part of the one Space -Time in which physical things also 
exist." (1) 
In this discussion mind is regarded as "the substantial 
continuum of certain processes which have the conscious quality."(2) 
The extension by analogy of mind to point- instants and lower levels 
of existence is considered irrelevant, since strictly speaking 
(1) Abstract p.9 
(2) II.81 
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"Mind exists only on its own level of existence." (1) 
We propose to confine our attention to the more difficult 
and crucial demonstration that mind is spatial. Notwithstanding 
Alexander's assurance that the temporal nature of mind is a 
"common place" and "would be admitted on all hands ", I would contend 
that the difficulties attending the demonstration of the spatial 
nature of mind also apply to the proof of its temporal nature. 
Since according to Alexander consciousness is the distinctive 
feature of mind (2), it must be shown that space is "carried up" 
into the emergent quality mind or consciousness; and consequently, 
that mental acts are spatial. Now mental acts cannot be contem- 
plated (3), they are enjoyed, hence the data relevant for demon- 
strating that mind or consciousness is spatial can only be disclosed 
in enjoyment. This condition of proof seems to be recognised in 
the following passages: 
"By mental Space, I mean, assuming it to exist, 
the space in which the mind experiences itself as living 
or which it enjoys." (4) 
"By mental space and time I do not mean the space and 
time which belong to our images or thoughts: these, accord- 
ing to our assumption, are nothing but physical space and 
time, as they are represented in images or thoughts. I 
mean the space and time in which the mind occurs." (5) 
;i) The Spatiality of Mind Shown in Enjoyment. 
The proof that mind or consciousness is spatial begins by an 
appeal to introspection. 
(1) II.41 
(2) This assertion may doubtless be challenged. That it is main- 
tained by Alexander seems assured from the definition of mind 
quoted above from I1.81 Cf.also the oft recurring expression 
"mind or consciousness" and the Index heading Mentality 
consciousness. 
(3) I.12; I1.156 
(4) 1.93 
(b) Abstract D.9 
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"My mind is for me, that is for itself, spread out or voluminous in its enjoyments. Within this vague extension or volume the separate and salient mental acts or processes stand out as having position and 'direction'. My mind is streaked with these more pungent processes,gs when a shoot of painful consciousness is felt or e sudden thought produces a new distribution in this extended mass. These streaks and shoots of consciousness have the vaguest position, but they have it, and such position and direction are most clearly marked in the higher acts of mind, imagina- tion or desire or thinking, and especially when there is a change in what we call the direction of our thinking. "(1). 
Anneal to this type of argument occurs but in two other passages in 
the two chapters on Mental Space and Time. And though this, in try 
opinion, is the only kind of proof relevant for Alexander, it is 
not pursued with any thoroughness or conclusiveness. As I shall 
endeavour to show later, it is subordinated entirely to another mode 
of proof which ennears to me to be a complete ignorati o elenchi. 
None of the three cassages, however, which anneal to intro- 
spection seem to establish. that consciousness is extended or volumi- 
nous, or spatial. No doubt the enjoyment of having stitches put in 
one's scalp is differently toned. from the enjoyment of a 'fuzzy' 
dull headache; but the spatial differences implied in the descriptive 
adjectives 'sharp' and 'dull' are extrinsic to the enjoyments and due 
to analogical transference. (2). The sharp piercing pain of the stitch- 
ing is e transfer by analogy to the enjoyment, of the contemplated 
spatial properties of the surgical instrument and the area of skin 
mutilated. The pain of the headache is described as dull because the 
underlying physiological processes are spread out over a wider contem- 
plated area of the head and do not allow of precise localisation. 
(1)I. 97 -8 
(2)Prof.Stout allows that the 'reasoning self' is locelised,but the 
localisation is dependent on referring it to a special Hart of the body (viz.the brain). He adds,however, "The so- called 'localisa - tion'of the self in the body, and distinctively in different parts of the body, is,strictly sneaking, not a localisation of the mind or its functions,but only of its experienced embodiment." Mind and Matter p.159 
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That our enjoyments are spatially described through analogical 
transference is also evident by considering such enjoyments as anger, 
disappointment, hope, anxiety in Which analogical transference of the 
spatial agencies concerned to the description of the enjoyments, is 
less prone to occur. In such instances the qualitative differences 
of the enjoyments in spatial terms is either meaningless or frankly 
analogical. A plausible illustration in support of Alexander's theory 
of mental space -time is the contrast of 'direction' of the vague 
premonitory shoots of consciousness which anticipates the winding up 
of nay watch at night and those connected with some other habit like 
turning off the electric light.(1). But the contrast of 'direction' 
indicated in the anticipatory consciousness of the two habits would 
seem to be dependent on imagery. The anticipation of each act is 
dependent on the (visual) image of finger commencing to turn the winding 
key or the pressing of the switch. The space factors involved belong 
to the objects of the mental act and are therefore contemplated not 
enjoyed. 
For the same reason $ challenge the passages from Tennyson, 
Keats and Wordsworth (2) as evidence of enjoyed space. The point of 
reference for comprehending "Somewhere, dead, far in the waste Soudan" 
is not, I would suggest, mental or enjoyed snace, but my body. 
I find two outstanding difficulties in Alexander's introspective 
type of proof for enjoyed space. 
In the first place, he fails to establish the fact of spatial 
enjoyment. In every illustration, the position and direction attri- 
(1) I. 212. The illustration is used by the author in another 
context; but is closely connected with the present tonic. 
(2) I. 98 -9 
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buted as intrinsic to the mental act, appears on analysis to be. the 
contemplated space of the sense, images etc. 
Secondly, the underlying principle of the whole discussion 
appears to be that the mind is as it enjoys, and hence, the enjoyment 
of space and time constitutes the mind spatio- temporal. This extra- 
ordinary assertion is not explicitly formulated, but there are many 
passages - in addition to the present topic - which presuppose it, 
eg 
"The mind enjoys itself as substance through intuition 
of an external substance." (1) 
"When the mind is aware of number, it also enjoys itself 
as number." (2). 
"The mind enjoys itself categorially in contemplating 
the corresponding categorial feature of the object which it 
contemplates." (3) 
/Tow this principle if consistently applied becomes a reductio ad 
adsurdum. If the mind is as it enjoys, then the mind is itself, 
sweet, blue, infinite, and illusory in its enjoyment of sweet, blue, 
infinity and illusion. 
"In becoming aware of external things as a totality of 
appearances, sensory, ideal, or of thought, and some real, 
some mere appearances, some illusory, we enjoy ourselves under 
the same denominations." (4) 
This principle becomes self contradictory in the case of illu- 
sion. If enjoying illusion constitutes our mind illusory, illusion 
would be impossible, for "illusory appearances have their source in 
the mind itself " (5). We conclude, therefore, that introspection 
fails to establish the spatial nature of mind or consciousness. 
(1) II.155 (Italics mine) 
(2) I.319. Cf. 1I.151. Where the assertion is softened to "our 




- 143 - 
(ii) Proof of the Spatial Nature of Mind From the Spatio -Temporal 
Properties of the Neural Processes. 
We shall now examine the proof of the spatial nature of mind 
from the spatio temporal properties of the neural processes. This 
argument appears to me to be inconclusive for two reasons. In the 
first place, the spatio temporal properties of the neural processes 
are physical and contemplated. They are therefore irrelevant as 
evidence for proving the existence of mental or psychological space 
and time, which is enjoyed. In the second place the implications 
of identifying neural and mental processes, on which the proof de- 
pends, commits us to epiphenomenalism and behaviourism which Alexander 
rejects. 
The irrelevancy of the proof of the spatial nature of mind 
from the nature of the neural processes is most evident from the 
di scussion on 'direction'. That consciousness exhibits di fferences 
of position and direction is a fundamental premise in proving the 
spatial and temporal nature of mind. The following passages eluci- 
date the meaning of di rection. 
"The direction of a mental process is that of its specific 
anatomical or physiological path. "(1) 
"Direction of the mental process means the actual movement 
within the neural space which is enjoyed in the identical 
mental space." (2). 
Now if by mental space is meant "the space in which the mind 
experiences itself as liviw or which it enjoys" how can the space and 
(1) I.110 
(2) II.128 
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direction of neural processes Which are never contemplated by their 
owner be relevant to the aiscussi on? (1) The neural processes are 
neither apprehended by themselves nor are they apprehended as con- 
stituent factors in the contemplation of objects. (2). As Alexander 
himself points out 
"It is a commonplace that in seeing a tree I know nothing 
of the occipital movement, and then I think of the occipital 
movement I am not seeing the tree." (3) 
It might however be contended that this interpretation is mis- 
tkken since it concentrates attention exclusively on the neural 
processes; and that a more accurate analysis would show the direction 
and position of the neural process to be a relational affair deter- 
mined by its compresence with the aoPropriate object. 
the form or pattern of the process is determined by 
its relation to its object." (4) 
Such would seem to be the presupposition of such statements as 
"In being conscious of its oven space and time, the mind is 
consciaas of the space and time of external things and vice 
versa. "(5) 
"Thus not only does mind enjoy its own space through intuition 
of its object's space, but the enjoyed and the contemplated 
spaces both belong to the same Space." (6) 
(1) Under certain conditions we may of course perceive other 
people's neural processes, or we may hear about them from 
observers. We can then contemplate our own neural processes 
by ideal construction. 3ut this circuitous procedure is 
not the type of apprehension considered by Alexander. 
(2) Even if the neural processes were contemplated, their space 
and time would be irrelevant for mental space -time, For 
"of course, if you will try to find a direction of rental 
process whic you can contemplate, you find none and the 
problem is queered from the outset." Preface xv. 
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A space which enjoys itself consciously or mentally 
as space (e.g. a neural tract LB) contemplates the space 
of the object (e.g. A line of colour ab), or rather has 
for its object an external, non -mental, contemplated 
space, contemplated that is in its form and position in 
total Space." (1) 
Now there are two objections to be urged against such 
statements. Firstly - It is not at all evident that contemplation 
by.a neural tract of the space of a line of colour justifies us in 
saying that the neural tract thereby enjoys itself spatially, or 
still less that it thereby enjoys its own space. The enjoyment in 
such an experience would be the enjoyment of contemplating the space 
of the line of colour. (2) Secondly, I would reiterate an argument 
used in criticising the introspective type of proof, and point out 
that in being conscious of the space of external things the body or 
skin is the subject's coordinate of reference not the neural processes 
engaged in the transaction. 
Let us now consider the second objection against Alexander's 
proof of the spatiality of mind from the spatio- temporal nature of 
the neural processes, viz. that it commits us to epiphenomenalism 
and behaviourism which are explicitly repudiated. 
(1) II.145 
(2) Cf. II.153. "In contemplating the action of the wind blowing 
down a chimney, we enjoy first the act of contemplating the 
blowing wind, and the standing chimney "(Italics mine). 
As this assertion is crucial to the criticism, it was grati- 
fying to find it supported by Mr. pallet in commenting on 
Alexander's use of enjoyment; "Thus the deliverance of imme- 
diate experience is that we enjoy the contemplation of the 
objects. It is only an outside observer (or the mind itself 
in thought 11.9) Who says that what we enjoy is the neural 
process." Aeternitas 261. Again "I understand Tx. Alexander 
to assert; when two things A and B are cognitively compresent 
one of them (say A) is of the order of complexity to which 
the quality of consciousness or mind belongs. A then has 
(or is) a neural system which is innervated in response to 
stimulus from B which is mediated by ordinary physical or organ- 
ic processes. This innervation is enjoyed by A. but not as a 
neural innervation; it is enjoyed as the contemplation of B 
ibid 262 (Italics Halle0S) 
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Holt's behaviouristic view of consciousness is rejected by 
Alexander, because it fails to account for self consciousness or 
self experience as exhibited in enjoyment. (1) 
Epiphenomenalism - 
"the theory thLt mind is but an inert accompaniment of 
neural process, a kind of aura which surrounds that process 
but plays no effective part of its own," (2) - 
is rejected because there is no evidence that a neural process pos- 
sessing the mental character would possess its specific neural charac- 
ter if it were not also mental. 
Now as I have already argued (3), to denominate a "mental 
neural" process which ex hypothesi possesses a unioue character in 
virtue of its being mental, merely neural, and a non -mental neural 
process which lacks that character in virtue of its being non -mental, 
also neural, is fallacious. If the neural process without conscious- 
ness be called neural, we are victims of a breach of the Method of 
Residues in calling the mental process also neural. The mental pro- 
cess exhibits peculiarities too strikingly different from other neural 
processes to be glibly identified in the class neural. If, however, 
this contention be not admitted, all neural processes must be con- 
ceived as fundamentally alike, and mentality or consciousness makes 
no difference. Consequently, 
(1) II.111 
(2) II.8 
(3) Supra p.137 
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"Consciousness would appear to be related to the 
mechanism of the body simply as a collateral product 
of its working, and to be as completely without the 
power of modifying that working as the steam whistle 
which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is 
without influence upon its machinery." (1) 
We must on this view eliminate from Alexander's doctrine the pur- 
posiveness and selectiveness attributed to mind, its unique role with 
respect to the tertiary quali ties (2), and the appeals to conscious- 
ness as unique "with its own peculiar methods of behaviour" by which 
Alexander refutes eninhenomenalism and behaviourism. 
A consistent theor;,. of mind must choose between these al- 
ternative views. Alexander however see -saws perplexingly from 
one to the other. The theory of the snatio temporal nature of 
mind with its proof from the spa do temporal nature of the neural 
processes, and the doctrine of the snatio temporal nature of the 
categories, require the epiphenomenalist view of mind. The selec- 
tiveness of mind, its autonomous nature, its role in illusion 
and the doctrine of tertiary qualities requires an idealistic 
view of mind. We conclude, therefore, that the attempt to prove 
the spa. ti o temporal nature of mind and its constitution by the 
categories is inconclusive both by the introspective line of ar- 
gument and also by the argument from the nature of the neural pro- 
cesses. 
(1) Huxley. Fortnightly Review. November 1874. 
(2) II. Ch.IX. 
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II. The Doctrine of Intuition. 
We pass to the consideration of intuition which we 
assigned as a third doctrine integral to Alexander's theory 
of the spatio temporal nature of the categories and mind. I 
shall endeavour to show that intuition can function only through 
the cooperation of categories, and that therefore the cate- 
gories cannot be characteristics of spatio temporal complexes 
revealed to intuition. 
Alexander maintains that the spatial and temporal char- 
acteristics of objects are not apprehended by the senses but 
by intuition. The sense organs acquaint us with the secondary 
qualities of matter; intuition reveals its spatio temporal pro- 
perties. Since, however, our experience of external things is 
'provoked' in us through sensation, we cannot intuite their 
spatio- temporal characteristics without sensing some of their 
secondary qualities. 
Thus 
%hen I see a blue patch I see its blue quality, 
but I have intuition of its extent. I do not see 
a blue which possesses an extent, but I intuite 
an extent of space which I see blue. I do not 
apprehend an extended colour but a coloured 
extent ". (1) 
Consequently, "Every sensory act contains in itself and conse- 





This statement must not be so interpreted as to give rise to phantom 
difficulties with respect to the coordination of the acts of intuiting 
and sensing. 
"There are not two acts of mind, but only one act of mind 
which in its sensory character apprehends the colour and 
in its intuitive character apprehends the place of it. We 
are conscious of a place coloured or of colour in a place." 
Nonetheless in evolutionary development Alexander would seem 
to maintain that intuition is temporally prior to other modes of 
apprehension. (2) 
"Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense 
alike are outgrowths from it, emn_ irica l determinations 
of it." (3) 
"Intuition pure and simple is more elementary than sensation. "(4) 
Conscious intuition, however, is inextricably dependent 
upon sensation. 
"('Intuition) is not to be had as consciousness in the absence 
of sensation (or else of course ideation)" (5). 
As a result of this cónnection with sensation intuition pro- 
cures consciousness at a price, for 
"whatever makes the sensory excitement in the brain indistinct 
affects the intuition of the sen sum." (6) 
As Murphy points out there appears to be a departure from this 
position in the treatment of illusion. Although illusion is relative 
to mind, there is no relativity so far as the appearances themselves 
are concerned (7). Illusion consists in misplacing appearances through 
(1) II.148 
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wrong reference. 
"So long as the object is contemplated in and for itself 
there is no question of illusion. When the mind goes on to 
refer these illusory objects, illusory in reference to the 
real thing, to the thing, then it is in a state of illusion, 
and we have an illusory appearance of the thing." (1) 
Mistakes arise then not in the appearance, but in 'squinting' at it, 
so that it appears to belong where it does not. (2) 
"What then, "asks Murphy, "becomes of the theory of intuition? 
On that view, the place of the object is given directly and 
is the one thing about which we are never mistaken as such. 
Now (in the treatment of illusion) it appears to be the only 
thing about which ti.e can be mistaken. There (in treating 
of intuition) the reference only deceived us in so far as the 
sensory content was deceptive, here the sensory content only 
deceives us so far as the reference is mistaken." (3) 
In passin, it may be noted that the doctrine of intuitional 
apprehension gives no support to the statements questioned in the 
preceding section on mental S -T such as "The mind enjoys its own 
space through intuition of its objects space." 
These assertions are supposed to be 
"a direct consequent of the continuity of S -T, in virtue of 
which any point- instant is connected sooner or later directly 
or indirectly eta th every other. " (4) 
This consideration is however irrelevant for the discussion 
of conscious enjoyment, for the enjoyment of continuity by point - 
instants is but a mythical analogy. So far as conscious apprehension 
is concerned the intuition of the neural tract is directed upon the 
spatio temporal properties of the object presented in sensation. 
"Though it possesses perfect 'knowledge' as spatio -temporal, of 
all parts of Space -Time, it is conscious only of the space and 
time of its object." 
(1) II.213 
(2) II.216 
(3) Monist vol. xxxvii 
(4) II.144 
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Consequently the enjoyment of this experience has nothing to 
do with the space -time of the conscious neural tract; it is the 
enjoyment of contemplating (intuitively) the spatio-temperal proper- 
ties of the object. 
In conformity with the view that the categories are fundamental 
characters of S -T, the doctrine of intuitional apprehension ipso 
facto applies to the categories. Since intuition is the peculiar 
mode of apprehension appropriate for awareness of S-T, and since 
the categories are essertially spatio temporal, it necessarily fol- 
lows that the categories are apprehended by intuition. (1) . If, 
however, the spatio -temporal nature of the categories be denied, 
the theory of the intuitional apprehension of the categories must 
also be denied; but we are not thereby committed to a complete re- 
jection of the doctrine of intuition. It can still be retained 
(with modificati ans) as the mode of apprehending space and time; 
and < s a theory of spatial and temporal apprehension it has much to 
recommend it. In the first place it affords valuable suggestions 
for dealing with the vexed problem of correlating the spaces of 
vision and touch. 
(1) 11.151. The necessity of forms of apprehension other than 
intuition would seem further evidence of the artificiality 
of analysis which reduces everything ultimately to STT. For 
if everything is strictly sneaking spatio temporal, and if 
intuition be the forte of apprehension appropriate to S -T, 
then no other kinds of apprehension should be necessary. 
But other forms of apprehension are necessary. Therefore 
there must be something in qualities etct. not reducible to 
spatio temporal properties which is therefore not revealed 
to intui ti on. 
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"If we suppose that our colours ere extended and our touches 
also, we are faced with the problem of correlating the spaces 
of vision and touch....Now if extent does not belong to colour 
as such, but colours are seen in their places within an extent, 
and the like is true of touch, it follows that when we appre- 
hend the same object by sight and touch we are apprehending the 
same extent, and in the one case seeing its colours and in the 
other feeling its pressures, and these objects though they do 
not ultimately occupy, microscopically, the same places, do 
all fall within the sane area or volume and microscopically 
coincide. There ere not two distinct spaces which have 
to be connected by custom, or otherwise, but one space which 
is the scene of different qualities." (1) 
Secondly, the theory is free from subjectivist implications. 
Spaces and times are objective and revealed to apprehension, not 
forms of apprehension which, es it were, enshroud appearances. It 
thus precludes any form of representationism. No intermediary sensuous 
or otherwise is introduced between the mind and reel space. (2). 
Nevertheless the theory of intuition requires an important 
modification. Analysis of our apprehension of the spatial and 
temporal properties of objects, discloses that intuition requires the 
cooperation of certain relational forms or categories. As Prof.Kemp 
Smith points out 
"Even intuitioL involves the apprehension of meanings, 
and as factors indispensable to the possibility of such meanings, 
categorial relations." (3) 
He argues that 
"there are at least two categories which are indispensable 
for any kind of intuition, whether of time or space - the cate- 
gories of totality (whole and part) and necessitation (deter - 
mining ground and conditioned consequent)" (4) 
(1) II.164-5 
(2) Cf.Kemp Smith.Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge 
p.114 
(3) op.cit. p.132 
(4) opicit. p.134-7 
(5) op.cit. p.138 
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His conclusion is that 
"the primary function of such categories as the above 
is not to clarify (Alexander's expression in II.147) our 
intuitions, but to make them possible....Categorial 
thinking is a condition of and is not derived from 
intuition." (1 ) 
For example, continuity, a fundamental of Space and Time, and 
presented - however crudely - in the experience of every finite 
space and time, (2), involves the transcending of the immediacy 
of intuition as such. According to Professor Kemp Smith the appre- 
hension of continuity involves the employment of the categories of 
whole and Part. 
"For only as we employ the concept of whole and part can 
we apprehend specific times and specific spaces as being 
continuous, i.e. as always being wholes, relatively to 
their constituent parts, and yet at the same time as always 
being themselves parts of a time and space which transcend 
them. If there be no anorehension of the relation of 
whole and Part, there can be no apprehension of con - 
tinui ty." 
The apprehension of continuity also involves the employment 
of the category of necessitation. 
"Any particular time or any particular space, however large 
or however small, is conditioned and made possible by the 
earlier time and by the wider space which leads into or con- 
tains it. That is to say, the kind of wholeness which is to 
be found in time and space is one that determines the ele- 
ments constituent of it. Though the category may therefore 
be said to express a feature quite fundamental to both time 
and space, and actually constituent of them, none the less 
this feature, in order to be intuited, must be apprehended, 
not merely in the particularity of some one actual instance, 
but again as a universal meaning in which the categorial 
relation is involved." (3) 
The term "concept" used by Processor Kemp Smith is liable to 
misunderstanding. He, himself, is careful to add "initially, the 
(1) op.cit. 138 
(2) op.cit. 134 
(3) op.cit. 137 
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presupposed categorial concepts must, indeed, be employed 
without explicit formulation, much in the manner in which 
a child employs the category of causality when it assumes 
that the fire which has burnt it once will, if approached 
too closely, burn it again." (1) 
In like manner, Professor Stout maintains that while we 
cannot attribute a full and articulate consciousness of categories 
to the undeveloped consciousness, nevertheless 
"they belong even to rudimentary perceptual consciousness 
as a condition of its further development." (2). 
It may be objected that such statements are vague, and 
are also guilty of the "psychologist's fallacy" by reading into 
rudimentary consciousness the products of deliberate reflective 
analysis. Professor Kemp Smith could, I think, rejoin that the 
objection is taken from the very standpoint it censures. In thus 
speaking of categories, the objector is himself thinking of their 
explicit formulation by reflective consciousness. Such formula- 
tions, however, are descriptions of the categories, indirectly obtained 
by the method of reflective analysis. The categories since they condi- 
tion consciousness can not themselves be directly apprehended. (3) 
Analysis discloses that dependence upon categorial functions is 
not confined to intuition. A like dependence is found to be necessary 
in all forms of meaningful apprehension. For example consider sensory 
apprehension_. i'To doubt there is an element in sensory apprehension 
which is immediate,irreducible and apprehended by direct acquaintance; 
but the apprehension of a sensum would never seem to be restricted 
solely to the awareness of these iamediate factors. 
(1) op.cit. 136 
(2) Stout, Manual of Psychology 4th ed. p.414 
(3) op.cit. 176. Commentary xliii -iv 
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"In sensing a red we apprehend an entity by direct acquain- 
tance. We stand over against it, and it reveals to us its 
actual nature. It cannot, of course, by itself, form a com- 
plete field of consciousness. Consciousness, if limited 
to it, would thereby be made to vanish." (1) 
Even a sense datum, in being attended to, is apprehended 
as being invested with some meaning which transcends its immediacy. 
"Try to take it at the level of apprehensio simplex, 
of immediate awareness without any admixture of judgment. 
Even so, there is a wide gulf which separates the sensory 
content as given, and that content as something of which 
one is aware and to which one attends. As given it is a 
bare that; when apprehended even most simply, it is a that 
which is apprehended as something. This °something ", 
which the immediate datum is apprehended as being, spreads 
beyond the datum. The awareness of meaning is the awareness 
of that spread." ("). 
To generalise, apprehension of the immediate is possible 
only by transcending the immediate, and the transcending of the 
immediate is an act of judgment involving categorial functions.(3) 
We conclude, therefore, that analysis of experience shows 
Alexander's view - that the categories are characteristics of spatio 
temporal configurations revealed to intuition, - to be untenable. 
This conclusion receives corroboration from the neurological 
evidence adduced by Alexander in support of his distinction between 
intuition and sensing. Passages have already been quoted (4) which 
show that although Alexander admits that in conscious intuitional 
apprehension, intuition and sensation are characters of one mental act, 
not two distinct mental acts, he also insists that in evolutionary 
development intuition is a distinct mode of apprehension temporally 
(1) op.cit. 156 
(2) Adams, G.P. Philosophical Rev. Vol. xxxvii.arch 1928 
(3) Cf. Commentary xlii 
(4) sutra n. 149 
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prior to sensing' and reason. Now from Alexander's epitomised 
version (1) of Dr. Head's neurological studies, I can find no sup- 
port for regarding intuition either as temporally prior to reason 
and sense or as capable of functioning by itself apart from these 
other modes of apprehension. On the contrary, the results of this 
neurological research favour the preceding logical analysis which 
argued that spatial and temporal apprehension is impossible apart 
from the categories. 
Intuition is not shown to be prior to sense, for we are told 
that 
"Pain, heat, and cold impulses cross in the spinal cord 
first, touch impulses later. Localisation and discrimina- 
tion remain at first grouped with touch impulses....Finally 
in the last of these researches, the result is arrived at 
roundly that the optic thalamus is the special seat of sen- 
sation so far as its mere quality is concerned, while the 
special function of the cortex is the apprehension, not of 
the quality of sensations but of their differences of in- 
tensity, the likeness and difference, the weight, size, 
shape of things, or in general the spatial aspects of 
sensation." (2). 
Now if spatial aoprehension be thus intimately connected 
with the cortex, so that below the cortical level it is but vague 
and merged with sensory process, how can it be maintained that sense 
is an. "outgrowth of intuition "? If we must speak of sense and intui- 
tion as separate and distinct processes, the evidence indicates that 
intuition is posterior to sensation, and is relatively late in ph;;lo- 
genetic development. This indeed is recognised by Alexander, but 
(1) II. 178-182 
(2) II. 179 
- 157 - 
without realising that it contradicts his assertion of the priority 
of intuition. 
"The question may still be asked how, if Space and Time 
are the simplest and most fundamental characters of the world, 
the apprehension of them should be entrusted to the latest 
and most highly developed part of the nervous system 
The answer is that spatial character, as I understand these 
inquiries does belong to sensory process below the cortical 
level, but it is vague and undifferentiated...:nd, secondly 
the vaguer, more extensive reactions are suitable to that 
stage of life, and the precise apprehension of Space and 
Time made possible by the cortex is appropriate to the 
higher type of mental life." (1) 
Without introducing the highly speculative question as to 
what subcortical consciousness involves, it is certainly signifi- 
cant that where cortical development has been attained, intuitional 
apprehension is assigned to the cortex. It indicates that intuition 
at this level of development no longer functions merely in conjunc- 
tion with sensory process, but requires the cooperation of mental 
functions which we call the categories. 
Perhaps it will be said this discussion about intuition does 
not affect Alexander's theory of categories at all. The most, it 
will be alleged, that the discussion shows is that for the categories 
to be revealed, modes of apprehension other than intuition are 
required. 
Alexander insists on calling the features revealed, categories; 
whereas his critic attributes the term to features implied in the mode 
of apprehension. Thus the argument is at cross nurnoses, since the 
term category is being used by the disputants in different senses. 
(1) II. 182 (Italics mine) 
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What is to decide which of the two connotations of the term category 
is more appropriate? 
In reply I would point out - 
Firstly, that the whole of this discussion on Alexander 
is designed to show that his use of the term category is inappro- 
priate; and I would especially refer to the demonstration of its 
resulting impasse in the case of Universality, Substance and Relation. 
Secondly, I beg to challenge the notion of contextual 
relationships from the cosmic point of view, which is a presupposi- 
tion of Alexander's non -mental theory of categories. 
"Finites below the level of mind and before the emer- 
gence of minds in the order of empirical history stand in 
categorial relations to one another though there is no 
mind to know them." (1) 
Take for example causality. 
"Causation is the continuous connection in sequence 
of two events within a substance." (2) 
Now cosmically, and apart from our mind, what will be termed a 
3substance' and what pair of the connecting continuous threads which 
hold between events shall be privileged as 'causal'? The shock of an 
event vibrates throughout the whole universe as the splash of a 
stone in a stagnant pond sends the ripples to its nethermost reaches. 
Why should one pair of these varied connections be regarded as 'closer' 
than the others? Shall we say that two events are in all circum- 
stances causally related if the event A immediately precedes B, and 
is a factor without which B would not occur? But why should the 
Universe allow A to be thus privileged, since it is but one such 
(1) II.157 
(2) II.153 
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event essential to B, and is itself dependent on many factors 
which are thus - as we say indirectly - also essential to B? some 
such definition of 'closer connection' is appropriate enough from 
the anthropomorphic point of view. Because of the limited range 
of our apprehension and the immediate necessities of survival, we 
are constrained to make a selection from the endless connecting 
cosmic threads; and those that subserve our interest and practical 
needs are termed 'close' 'causal', etc. In such wise I would explain 
the contextual relationships which categories as such imply; and 
apart from such a perspective or centre of reference, I can attach 
no meaning to categorial relations. As I shall try to show in the 
concluding section there is nothing subjective or arbitrary about 
this procedure. Our selections must bow to the necessity of stub- 
born reality, and are made from features in the world that owe 
nothing to our mind; but their meaning, importance and relational 
intimacy are dependent on mental functions or categories which 
enable us both to live and to "live well ". 
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C 014CLUS I OAT 
B1!SIC ISSUES OF THE CATEGORY PROBLEM 
Though disclaiming any attempt to formulate an articulate 
category theory, obligations to the authors discussed can be most 
appropriately acknowledged by showing that a study of their systems 
has at least resulted in .e grasp of the basic issues of the problem. 
I. Connotation of Category 
It is important to distinguish between an unrestricted use 
of the term category, denoting any concept or principle of organiza- 
tion, and the more precise meaning here adopted, which confines it 
to the fundamental forms involved in experience. Reserving the 
characteristics of a priority and the source of the categories for 
special discussion, the following observations may be pertinent for 
elucidating this restricted meaning of category. 
(a) Since the categories are presupposed in all experience they them- 
selves cannot be directly experienced. They must function in the 
early stages of mental development without being explicitly formu- 
lated. It is on this account I prefer to call the categories syn- 
thetic functions rather than 'pure concepts' or 'principles of or- 
ganization'. These expressions suggest deliberate and explicit 
formulation of concepts which are then applied to a sensuous manifold. 
The result is a series of embarrassing problems as to the a priori status 
of the categories, their objectivity and range of application. On the 
(b) 
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contrary, when the categories are recognised as indispensable 
conditions of any kind of cognitive apprehension, there is no need 
to postulate e. privilege(' cstegorial level of experience or to resort 
to artificial meanings of the a priori. 
Such a view is, doubtless, committed to the 'rationalist prejudice' 
that the categories are rooted in the 'rational nature of man'. It 
does rot, however, imply that the mind is a static, ready made, miracu- 
lous entity beyond the bounds of psychological analysis and genetic 
explanation. Though the categories are the sine auibus non of any 
exnerienc e, they are formal and problematical. They are canable of an 
indefinite range of application, as developing experience introduces 
new content and fresh interests. If we eschew an obsolete faculty 
psychology, which would delegate the categories to -an hyr_ostatised 
Reason, and recognise the organic connexion of the cognitive, conative 
and emotional aspects of the mind, we escape the 'rigidity' of both 
classical rationalism and empiricism. Hence mind and content are 
not crystallised entities standing frozen over against one another in 
unmediated opposition. Yet at the same time neither pole is completely 
characterless. The predispositions of mind no more preclude its 
growth and development and as little confine it within narrowly pres- 
cribed limits as congenital physiological structures do the body. 
Hence though the categories are the same for savage and civilised, 
child and adult, their sweep, their content and the resulting experience 
will be very different with the variation of interests, past experience 
and social milieu in each case. 
(e) 
(4) 
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If the categories are essential constituents of any experience, 
they cannot be restricted to veridical experience. They cannot 
therefore be regarded as criteria of truth. This follows not only 
from their ubiquity which implies their cooperation in all experience 
whether true or false, but also from their flexibility and the close 
knit connexion with interest already indicated. As Professor Kemp 
Smith, insisting on the 'problematic' character of categories, says 
"the mere employment of the category, by itself, decides nothing" (1). 
While the true is categorially determined, it would seem that the 
validity of specific categoriei determinations roust be tested by 
criteria other than themselves. Professor Lewis' sensational statement 
"It is the a priori element in knowledge which is thus 
pragmatic, not the empirical," (2) 
is not so outrageous as it might seem at first glance. It would seem 
then that such criteria as consistency, coherence or successful working 
must supervene upon the functions of the categories in order to 
determine whether an experience is true. (3) 
The categories, then, are fundamental analytical -synthetical 
functions which render possible meaningful apprehension. Being 
functions, which render consciousness possible, they cannot them- 
selves be directly apprehended. They are brought to explicit con- 
sciousness and given conceptual expression by reflective analysis 
on the conditions necessary for experience. 
(1) Smith, T ?.K. Prolegomena 150 
(2) Lewis, C.I. Mind and the World Order. p. 266 
(3) As to whether this involves subjectivism or not Cf.infrc IV. 
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H. The a priori Nature of the Categories 
The discussions of Chanters III and V and VI indicated the 
ambiguity of the term a priori. Three different meanings emerged 
(i) The a priori categories are the result of the mind's explicit 
reflection on the activities of the self. (Ward). 
(ii) The a priori categories are those pervasive features which 
characterise all existents. (Alexander). 
(iii) The a priori categories are the fundamental synthetic functions 
of the mind which are universal and necessary for the possibility 
of experience. (Kant) 
Kant and Alexander maintain that the a priori nature of 
the categories is guaranteed by their pervasiveness, universality. 
and necessity, and thereby establish one set of categories with com- 
plete sovereignty. This procedure has been challenged by Professor 
Loewenberg. He holds that primacy itself is a category. It has the 
three characteristics of Kant's use of the term category being formal, 
protean and democratic. 
"Present me with any content, and I can undertake to 
defend its hold on one of the protean aspects of 
primacy." (1) 
As a result of his analysis of the various types of priority, 
he demonstrates the presence of competitive principles of organisation 
each of which claims complete autonomy and inclusiveness. And just 
because these competitive principles of organization are simply schemati- 
zations of primacy, no one of them can establish a claim to priority 
over its rivals. 
(1) Univ. of Cal. Publ. in Phil. 13. n.42 
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It does not appear that this 'concentric predicament' prevails, 
if the categories are regarded not as abstract principles of organiza- 
tion but as the fundamental and indispensable modi operandi of mental 
activity. Could not these elementary functions legitimately claim 
sovereign priority in the sense that they are presuppositions of all 
experience and of subsequent conceptual schema ti zati on? 
The categories then are a priori as being presuppositions 
of all experience. 
III. Source of the Categories 
The critical study of Alexander's category theory disclosed 
three fundamental difficulties in the view that categories are 
intrinsic features of the cosmic stuff and in no sense dependent 
on mind. 
Firstly, the resulting theory of knowledge is confronted by 
a nominalistic impasse, since the categories lose all vestige of uni- 
versality and are as particular as the stuff in which they are 
merged. (1). 
Secondly, the spatio -temporal nature of the categories was 
shown to be at variance with the indisputably dynamic and selective 
functions of mind. (2) 
Thirdly, the criticism of Alexander's doctrine of Intuition 
shows that the apprehension of relational features is not a presenta- 
(1) Cf. supra p.129 
(2) Cf. supra pp.146 -7 
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tion to be taken in at a single gulp by some unique and privileged 
faculty. Apprehension of relational features implies the trans - 
cnnding of the immediate data by an act of judgment involving analyti- 
cal- synthetical functions. Because of their a priority, pervasive- 
ness and indispensability for mprehension these synthetic processes 
are here denominated categories. (1) 
We concluded,therefore, that the source of the categories 
cannot be in the "given" or in some cosmic stuff independent of mind. 
IV. The Categories are Mental but not Subjective. 
Conclusions resulting from a critical study of the present kind 
must depend on the validity of the analysis which has eliminated 
alternatives. Consequently, a positive and constructive argument to 
show that the source of categories is mind falls outside the scope 
of this work. Nevertheless, since this view has been criticised 
on the ground of inherent subjectivism, it seems advisable to outline - 
in a very general way - some considerations by which a systematic 
formulation would seek to dispose of the charge of subjectivism. 
It must be reiterated that the view here adopted contends that 
the function of the categories is to render possible the annrehension 
of reality. It in no way countenances the notion that mind creates 
reality, or that reality in being known becomes transformed into a 
representational substitute. 
(1) Cf. supra pp.152 ff. 
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The discussion may be divided into two parts:. 
(a) The Nature of Sense Data 
(b) The Function of Categories 
(a) The Nature of Sense Data 
Sense data are the starting point for any theory of knowledge. 
They result from events in c ompre sence with an organism. (1) . They are 
not created by the organism nor subjective modifications of a Reality 
in se. There appears to be no evidence for Reality simpliciter. It 
discloses itself as a transaction of events; and sense data are simply 
the resultant of a complex transaction of events, one member of which 
is an organism. (2). Sense data are reality specifically conditioned. 
For example, 'red' is one set of events attuned to a periodicity or 
tempo appropriate to a transaction with another complex of events - 
the sensory organsi In general, sense are simply a set of characters 
belonging to a complex of events in relation to a human body. 
It does not seem necessary to suppose that the esse of sense 
data depends on'nercipi. For example, the detection of one species of 
error reveals the presence of sensa hitherto unnoticed, which it would 
(1) I cannot here discuss the difficult problem of universalia 
in rebus - the status of 'essences' and 'eternal objects'. 
The results of our critical analysis et least commits us to 
maintaining that the apprehension of such would be only pos- 
sible through the categories. 
(2) The basis of the GesetzmtIssigkeit which characterises events 
is a metaphysical problem which is irrelevant to the present 
discussion, since I grant that it cannot be due to individual 
minds. 
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be fantastic to maintain had not existed previously. (1). Whether 
consciousness be an indispensable for the existence of sense data 
or not, physics, astronomy and biology show that consciousness - 
as a function of animal organisms - depends on a set of conditions 
which is relatively unique in the planetary system, and afford conclusiv 
evidence against its indispensability for all forms of actuality and 
existence. Whatever explanation be offered of its 'emergence', 
consciousness justifies itself not through any essential conditioning 
of reality, but by its indispensability to the survival of animal 
organisms. 
(b) The Function of the Categories. 
The eminently practical role of consciousness is of the 
utmost significance in elucidating its nature and functions. 
The ultimate fact from which analysis of consciousness 
must start is that of an organism reacting to sense. (2). The initial 
reactions are instinctive and disclose modes of behaviour readapted 
to specific kinds of sense'. Now, whether consciousness be considered 
as an integral factor in instinct, or as arising' owing to tension and 
blockage in a chain reflex, it immediately discloses a selective and 
normative attitude with respect to sense. It contemplates sense with 
an ulterior motive - for what they imply rather than for what they 
(1) Nevertheless as Dr. Broad remarks "Since we cannot get a 
brain end nervous system like ours working properly without 
a kind like ours, it is obviously impossible to be sure that 
the latter is irrelevant for the present purnose and that the 
former is sufficient by itself." The Mind and Its Place in 
Nature. p.177 
(2) I do not say a 'presentational continuum', because as I have 
argued, its apprehension involves the categories. Again 
however, I must plead to be excused a lengthy discussion 
with reference to the spatial and temporal characters of 
sense. 
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merely are. This transcendence of the merely immediate is - as I 
have repeatedly argued - only possible by means of analytical-synthe- 
tical sweeps of thought proceeding on:.what we descriptively term the 
concepts or categories of whole and part,necessitation, etc. Again 
this procedure - it has been insisted - is essentially problematical, 
and though the categories are a priori. the validity of their applica- 
tion to specific situations can only be determined by empirical con- 
siderations. 
Without entering into further detail, this brief discussion 
discloses two reasons for repudiating the charge of subjeltivism 
against the view of the categories here adopted. 
(1) Since the categories are necessary to consciousness and appre- 
hension which are indispensable to survival, they cannot conceivably 
be supposed to fulfil their function by capriciousness or an inherent 
distortion of the real. 
(2) Though the categories transcend the immediacy of specific sense 
data or fields of sense data, they can never lose their footing in 
sense data. Their validity can only be established by an appeal to 
sense data. 
